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This thesis contains three empirical papers on labor unions and corporate cash holdings, 
payout policy. Previous literature about firms' financial choices, such as corporate cash 
holdings, dividend payouts, and share repurchases, has focused on the effects of firm-level 
financial characteristics. This thesis investigates whether labor unions affect these financial 
policies in the international settings.  
The second chapter examines the relation between the presence of labor unions and 
corporate cash holdings in the international setting. Firms in countries with higher union 
membership have less corporate cash holdings. This negative relation is stronger for firms in 
countries with weak employment protection legislation, firms in countries with a high degree 
of labor bargaining centralization, and financially constrained firms. Moreover, the market 
value of corporate cash holdings is lower for firms in countries with high union membership. 
The number of strikes and lockouts is higher in countries with more corporate cash holdings. It 
suggests that firms strategically choose corporate cash holdings to gain a bargaining position 
with labor in an international setting.  
The third chapter examines the relation between the presence of labor unions and firms' 
dividend payouts. Firms in countries with higher union membership have more dividend 
payouts. This positive relation is stronger for firms in countries with weaker employment 
protection legislation, firms in countries with a higher degree of labor bargaining centralization. 
Moreover, this chapter conducts a smaller sample analysis and find that the announcement 
return and operating performance around the date of dividend increases (decreases) are 
positively (negatively) related to the union membership. In addition, the number of strikes & 
lockouts is higher in countries with less corporate payout. It suggests that firms strategically 
payout dividend to gain the bargaining position with labor in the international setting.  
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Chapter 4 examines the relation between the presence of labor unions and firms' share 
repurchases. Firms in countries with higher union membership have more share repurchases. 
This positive relation is stronger for firms in countries with weaker employment protection 
legislation, firms in countries with a higher degree of labor bargaining centralization. Similar 
with Chapter 2, this chapter finds that the announcement return and operating performance 
around the date of share repurchase are positively related to the union membership in small 
sample analysis. In addition, the number of strikes & lockouts is higher in countries with less 
share repurchases. It suggests that firms strategically increase share repurchases to gain the 
bargaining position with labor in the international setting.  
Overall, these results are consistent with the bargaining hypotheses and suggest that firms 
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1.1 Background and Motivation 
Labor unions are a form of social organizations that represent and protect the legitimate 
rights and interests of workers. They are formed by workers because labor unions have more 
collective strength comparing with individuals. Workers exert collective pressure to force 
employers to improve their benefits including wage demands, improvements of working 
conditions and other benefits. 
Labor unions play an important role in collective bargaining with employers. First, labor 
represent workers in collective bargaining with employers. In negotiations, they can help 
workers get more specific improvements in compensation, working conditions and other 
benefits through a variety of means; such as the threat of a strike with all their member workers. 
Second, labor unions combine their individual voices to be heard to affect firms’ activities.  For 
example, they can use their collective power to convince employers to make significant changes 
and improve their working benefits set by labor markets. Third, labor unions affect the legal 
and political environment through negotiations and several other measures. For instance, they 
encourage workers to vote, provide campaign support for local politicians to affect the legal 
and political environment (Gould, 2004). 
Labor unions exert their effects on employers by shaping processes and mechanisms that 
their collective power influences firms’ decisions making, including certification election, 
contract negotiations and grievance procedures. For example, if employers reject claims from 
labor unions organized by workers themselves, employees can request a certification election 
to get recognition of these unions. The election is held through secret ballot voting, labor unions 
will be attained legal recognition if they get a majority of the votes. After certification election, 
employers are obliged to negotiate with labor unions for their requests. Then, union 




cannot arrive an agreement in this bargaining process, unions may organize a strike and 
employers may announce a lockout. However, strike and lockout are usually used as the last 
resort to solve the conflicts between labor unions and employers. Instead, they use grievance 
procedures to solve these problems. Grievance procedures is a quasi-judicial process that 
unions representatives and employers solve their conflicts through in a number of meetings 
with more expertise and increasing authority (Clark and Sadler, 2010). Through these processes, 
labor unions give opportunities to employees to make their voice be heard and influence firm’s 
activities. 
The collective power of labor unions affects a firm's financial policies. For example, 
Leontief (1946) state that the wage was set by labor unions before the level of employment is 
set by firms. Moreover, McLaughlin and Fraser (1984) emphasize that labor unions represent 
employees' benefits and play an important role in collective bargaining. As a result, firms take 
several measures when there are strong labor unions, such as leverage (Bronars and Deere, 
1991; Perotti and Spier, 1993; Matsa, 2010; Myers and Saretto, 2015), earnings management 
(DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 1991), cash holdings (Klasa, Maxwell and Ortiz-Molina, 2009; 
Tong and Huang, 2018) and so on.  
However, most papers about the relation between labor unions and corporate finance use 
US data. Labor unions are a prevalent phenomenon around the world. For example, Visser 
(2006) shows that the union density ranges from 8.1% to 78.0% in 24 countries in 2001. 
 Besides, the function of labor unions varies across countries under different labor 
policies. First, in most countries, employees have the right to choose a particular union to 
represent them. Different labor unions represent different proportions of employees in a 
bargaining unit. This proportional representation results in multiple unions representation in 
these countries (e.g. Western Europe, Australia, Israel, etc.). In a bargaining unit, employees 




involved in this unit. This multi representation situation does not apply in employees in United 
States, instead, the union representation is exclusive that there is only one union representation 
to employees in a certain bargaining unit.1 In return, this exclusive union is responsible to 
represent all employees in it. Second, the differential of the role of labor unions across countries 
refers to the different union centralization. Among Nordic countries (e.g. Sweden, Norway, and 
Finland), labor unions are centralized in both industry level and country level. Employees are 
represented by a labor union in each industry and they share a national union confederation in 
a country. These unions have strong bargaining power and cover the majority of employees in 
these countries. However, there are few chances of industry-level collective bargaining in the 
United States. Most bargaining activities occur in firm-level, which means that they rarely 
affect the whole industry or the country. Third, employees have the right to vote for union 
representatives in corporate boards among a majority of OECD countries and European Union 
members.2 For example, in Finland, a company with more than 150 employees is required to 
have one fifth of board members if there is no representation agreement with employees.3 For 
another example, in Germany, representation proportion in supervisory board is one third in 
companies with more than 500 workers. If a company employs more than 2000 workers, the 
representation proportion in board must be no less than 50%. But in most industries, the chair 
of the board is shareholder representative and has the casting vote (McGaughey, 2016).4 
Moreover, in some countries (e.g. Czech Republic, Greece, Ireland, etc.), this law-guaranteed 
board representation is only valid in state owned companies. Labor unions in these 35 countries 
                              
1 See National Labor Relations Act. 
2 There are 20 countries that have some form of corporate law protecting the voting right of workers in board level, 
especially in state-owned companies, they are: Austria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Spain, and Sweden. In addition, there are 7 countries with certain regulations related to the right of 
workers to have their voices heard in board level. These countries include Belgium, Bulgaria, Malta, Romania, 
Switzerland, United Kingdom and United States. 
3 See the 1990 Act on Personnel Representation in the Administration of Undertakings. 




have strong power to affect firms’ activities from corporate boards. Overall, labor unions have 
some country-specific differential in the function of representing employees and protecting 
employees’ benefits across countries.   
The variation of the function of labor unions across countries is affected by different labor 
policies in countries under different legal systems. In Europe, for example, the different 
regulatory traditions among countries influence the labor policies and shape the content of 
industry relations in these countries (Hall, 1994). Moreover, in European Community, there are 
different legal traditions and have developed three main legal systems among states members.5 
The first legal system is the Romano-Germanic system6   which covers most countries in 
European Community. There is intensive legal protection of employees and industry relations. 
For example, in Germany, the participation degree of employees to the corporate board is high 
due to the statutory support. In addition, employees have full voting rights in the union elections. 
The second one is the Anglo-Irish system which is developed from the Anglo-Saxon law and 
covering the United Kingdom and Ireland. The statutory regulations for employees are less 
intensive compared with it in Roman-Germanic system. For example, the employee 
codetermination in corporate board are not compulsory except in universities in United Kingdom.7 
The third legal system is the Nordic system that covers five Nordic countries, namely Denmark, 
Finland, Iceland, Norway. In this legal system, the derogation of labor legislation is allowed by 
national federations and this situation is normal. Instead, the basis of labor regulations is the 
collective agreements. Labor unions play a very important role in these countries because they 
have strong bargaining power in agreements negotiations.  
Therefore, combined with union density in Visser (2006), the country-level union density 
may be affected by the legal system. The more intensive legal system is associated with lower 
                              
5 See European Confederation of Executives and Managerial Staff (CEC) 1989: 8-12. 
6 The Roman-Germanic law sometimes refers to as the continental law. 




country-level union density. For example, the three countries with highest union density, 
namely Finland, Norway and Denmark, are in the Nordic system where the labor statutory are 
based on the collective agreements. However, the union density in Roman-Germanic countries 
(e.g. France, Germany) with intensive statutory regulations is quite low. Given various legal 
systems around the world, it is meaningful to conduct further analysis on how labor unions 
affect corporate financial policies in international settings.   
In this thesis, I examine how the presence of labor unions affects financial policies in the 
international setting, including the corporate cash holdings, dividends and share repurchases. 
This thesis is motived from the following three perspectives: First, corporate cash holdings, 
dividends and share repurchases are three essential financial policies for a firm around the 
world. For example, Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson (2013) find that in 2010 the mean of the 
ratio of cash to assets is 13.49% for firms in Compustat across 45 countries. Given such a large 
magnitude of corporate cash holdings, firms may take some strategies such as dividend 
payments and share repurchase to reduce the available financial resources to gain bargaining 
positions with labor unions around the world.  
Second, most previous papers use US data to investigate how labor unions impact firms' 
financial policies. However, to our knowledge, no previous paper studies the relation between 
labor unions and these three financial policies with international data. Labor unions are a 
prevalent international phenomenon. According to Visser (2006), union density of United 
States ranks 22nd among the 24 countries. If we think of the distribution of union density 
around the world as a spectrum, the United States is at the lower end. It is meaningful to study 
how labor unions affect corporate cash holdings, dividends and share repurchases in the middle 
part and higher end of the spectrum. Besides, the function of labor unions varies across 
countries under different labor policies. This variation of the function of labor unions across 




Given various legal systems around the world, it is meaningful to conduct further analysis on 
how labor unions affect corporate financial policies in international settings.   
Third, the findings in the existing literature using US data and international data find 
different patterns in the impact of labor unions on corporate financial policy. For example, 
Matsa (2010) uses the US data and finds that there is a positive relation between the strength 
of labor unions and leverage with the presence of external financial constraints, and he 
interprets the results as the supporting evidence for the bargaining hypothesis. However, 
Simintzi, Vig and Volpin (2015) find the opposite results with the international data. They find 
that there is a negative relation between union density and leverage, and argue that this is not 
consistent with the theory of debt as a bargaining tool. Instead, they argue that the employment 
protection increases operating leverage and crowds out financial leverage. Therefore, it is 
possible that the impacts of labor unions on corporate financial policies are different between 
the US data and the international data. This motivates us to examine the relation between labor 
unions and the three financial policies in the international setting.  
1.2 Contribution and Empirical Results 
This thesis makes several contributions by studying how labor unions affect corporate 
financial policies including corporate cash holdings, dividends and share repurchases in 
international settings. 
First, existed papers show that there are mixed results of the study about the relation 
between labor unions and corporate financial policies. For example, Matsa (2010) and Simintzi, 
Vig and Volpin (2015) find opposite results of the relation between labor unions and leverage 
by using US data and international data separately. For another example, Chen, Chen, and 
Wang (2015) and He, Tian and Yang (2016) find negative relation between labor unions and 
share repurchases, while Chino (2016) argue that the effects of labor unions on payout police 




reveals a negative relation between labor unions and corporate cash holdings, as well as a 
positive relation between labor unions and payout policy with international data.  
Second, this thesis contributes to the literature about corporate cash holdings, dividends 
and share repurchases in international setting. There are extensive literatures studying these 
three financial policies with US data, European data and international data. For example, Opler, 
Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (1999) use US data and propose the trade-off theory, the 
financing hierarchy theory and the agency theory of corporate cash holdings. Moreover, Eije 
and Megginson (2008) show that although fewer firms pay dividends, the amount of dividends 
payout increases in recent years by using the European data. With the international data, 
Manconi, Peyer and Vermaelen (2014) find that the short-term announcement return of share 
repurchases is smaller in non-US firms while the long-term abnormal return is larger in 32 
countries. To our knowledge, no previous paper has examined the relation between labor unions 
and these three financial policies in the international setting. This thesis extends the literature 
about the impact of labor unions on corporate finance in the international setting.  
Third, this thesis extends the literature about the effects of labor unions in the area of 
corporate finance in the international setting. Since most papers focus on the US data, the union 
membership in US is at the lower end of the spectrum of union membership. In this case, using 
international data provides an extension to the impacts of labor unions on corporate cash 
holdings, dividends and share repurchases in the middle part and higher end of the spectrum. It 
provides more comprehensive evidence based on a more complete distribution of union density 
around the world.8 
This thesis finds the following empirical results by using a sample of 355715 firm-year 
observations from 66 countries from 1992 to 2013. 
                              




Chapter 2, “Labor Unions and Corporate Cash Holdings: Evidence from International 
data”, is a joint work by Dr. Zhenxu Tong. He proposes the original research topic and 
contributes to the development of hypotheses and research design. I conduct the empirical 
analysis, draw the interpretation of the empirical results and link them with the rationale of the 
hypotheses. We find that a one standard deviation increase in the country-level union 
membership leads to a 0.317 decrease in corporate cash holdings, corresponding to a decrease 
in corporate cash holdings with a dollar value of 55.40 million dollars. Moreover, we find that 
this negative relation between country-level union membership and corporate cash holdings is 
stronger for firms in countries with weaker employment protection legislation, for firms in 
countries with a higher degree of labor bargaining centralization, and for financially 
constrained firms. In addition, we find that the market value of corporate cash holdings is lower 
for firms in countries with higher union membership. Then, we examine how labor unions 
affect the relation between corporate cash holdings and profitability as well as labor costs. We 
find that the positive relation between corporate cash holdings and operating profitability is 
stronger for firms in countries with lower union membership and that the positive relation 
between corporate cash holdings and labor costs is weaker for firms in countries with lower 
union membership.  
Chapter 3, "Labor Unions and Dividend Payouts: Evidence from International Data", is 
a joint work by Dr. Zhenxu Tong. He proposes the original research topic and contributes to 
the development of hypotheses and research design. I participate in the further development of 
the research topic. I also propose some additional hypothesis and some additional research 
design. I conduct the empirical analysis and interpret the results with respect to the rationale of 
the hypotheses. We examine how the presence of labor unions affects firms' dividend payout. 
When there is higher union membership in a country, firms tend to pay more dividends. A one 




the level of dividend payout, corresponding with an increase in dividends payout with a dollar 
value of 3.033 million dollars. In addition, we find that the positive relation between country-
level union membership and dividend payout is stronger for firms in countries with weaker 
employment protection legislation and firms in countries with a higher degree of labor 
bargaining centralization. We conduct event study about how the country-level union 
membership affects the around the date of dividend change. We find that the announcement 
return is higher (lower) for firms in a country with higher (lower) union membership around 
the announcement date of dividend increase (decrease). Moreover, we examine how labor 
unions affect the operating performance around the event of dividend changes. We find that the 
net ROA change is positively (negatively) correlated with the union membership around the 
event date of dividend increase (decrease).  
Chapter 4, "Labor Unions and Share Repurchases: Evidence from International Data", is 
a single-authored paper. I examine how the presence of labor unions affects firms' share 
repurchases. When there is higher union membership in a country, firms tend to repurchase 
more shares. A one standard deviation increase in the country-level union membership leads to 
a 0.010 increase in the level of share repurchases, corresponding with an increase in share 
repurchases with a dollar value of 1.600 million dollars. In addition, I find that the positive 
relation between country-level union membership and share repurchases is stronger for firms 
in countries with weaker employment protection legislation and firms in countries with a higher 
degree of labor bargaining centralization. Moreover, in the event study, I find that the 
announcement return is higher for firms in a country with higher union membership around the 
announcement date of share repurchases, while the net ROA change is positively correlated 




1.3 Organization of This Thesis 
This thesis is organized as follows, Chapter 2, Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 present the 





Chapter 2 Labor Unions and Corporate Cash 
Holdings: Evidence from International data 
2.1 Introduction 
Corporate cash holdings occupy an important role in the collective bargaining with labor 
unions around the world. For example, in the United States in 2006, the workers in General 
Motors observed that the firm had a cash balance of $20 billion and claimed that “they hope 
the threat of a strike will prompt GM’s management to dip into its cash reserves to compensate 
them for accepting lower pay and benefits”9. As another example, in South Africa in 2016, the 
labor unions in wage negotiations with South African Airlines (SAA) said that they “had 
revised upwards their wage demands from single digits to 11%‚ after the airline's board chair 
Dudu Myeni said on Friday SAA was financially sound and ‘had money’”. After that, SAA 
“moved to distance itself from perceptions it had sufficient cash to meet high wage demands”.10 
Combined with the example in South Africa Airlines, it is meaningful to do research on this 
international phenomenon.  
In this chapter, we examine how the presence of labor unions affects corporate cash 
holdings in an international setting. Our motivation is based on the following three perspectives. 
First, corporate cash holdings have an important role in a firm’s balance sheet around the world. 
For example, Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson (2013) find that in 2010 the mean of the ratio 
of cash to assets is 13.49% for the firms in Compustat in 45 countries, and that the 
                              
9  “Last Tango in Detroit? General Motors, Delphi and the Unions,” The Economist (April 2006), p. 70. The 
article is available at the following website when we write the first draft of this article: 
https://www.economist.com/business/2006/04/06/last-tango-in-detroit. A PDF copy of the article is available 
from the authors upon request. 
10 Karl Gernetzky, “SAA denies wage deadlock during negotiations”, Times LIVE, (May 12, 2016). The article 
is available at the following website when we write the first draft of this article: 
http://www.timeslive.co.za/local/2016/05/12/SAA-denies-wage-deadlock-during-negotiations. A PDF copy of 




corresponding mean is 21.48% for US firms. Given such a large magnitude of corporate cash 
holdings, we believe that it is a promising area to examine the impact of labor unions on 
corporate financial policy in the international setting.  
Second, while labor union is a prevalent phenomenon around the world, there is 
substantial difference between US and other countries in the world. For example, Visser (2006) 
examines the data of labor unions in the international setting. He finds that in 2001 the union 
density ranges from 8.1% to 78.0% in 24 countries. Among them, the union density in the US 
is 12.8%, ranking at the 22nd place. It implies that there is a significant difference between the 
US data and the international data in terms of unionization rates. This motivates us to conduct 
the research in the international setting.  
Third, the findings in the existing literature reveal that sometimes there is a different 
pattern in the impact of labor unions on corporate financial policy between US data and 
international data. For example, Matsa (2010) finds that a firm with the external finance 
constraints has an incentive to use the cash flow demands of debt service to improve its 
bargaining position with workers. However, Simintzi, Vig and Volpin (2015) find that there is 
a negative relation between union density and leverage, and argue that this is not consistent 
with the theory of debt as a bargaining tool. Instead, they argue that the employment protection 
increases operating leverage, crowding out financial leverage. Nevertheless, the situation may 
be different in the setting of corporate cash holdings. For instance, the two examples we 
mentioned in the beginning of the paper imply that corporate cash holdings affect the collective 
bargaining both in the US and in South Africa. Therefore, we conjecture that corporate cash 
holdings may have a bargaining role both in the US and in other countries in the world. This 





 We develop two hypotheses. First, the bargaining hypothesis argues that with the 
presence of stronger labor unions, a firm will strategically hold lower level of corporate cash 
holdings to increase a firm’s bargaining position with labor unions, because this can make a 
more credible case that the risk of liquidity shortages would be exacerbated by granting 
additional concessions to the labor unions. Second, the operating leverage hypothesis argues 
that since stronger labor unions increase the rigidity of labor costs, the trade-off theory predicts 
that a firm will hold a higher level of corporate cash holdings with the presence of a higher 
level of fixed costs. 
We use a sample of 355715 firm-year observations from 66 countries in our empirical 
analysis. We use the country-level union membership, defined as total number of trade union 
members to the total number of paid employees in a country, as our primary measure of the 
bargaining power of labor unions across countries. Since endogeneity problem can be a 
potential concern in studying the relation between union membership and corporate cash 
holdings, we use the instrumental variables approach accompanied with the tests on the validity 
of the instruments and the specification.   
We find that firms in countries with higher union membership have less corporate cash 
holdings. The data shows that a one standard deviation increase in the country-level union 
membership leads to a 0.317 decrease in corporate cash holdings which are defined as the ratio 
of cash and marketable securities to non-cash assets. This corresponds to a decrease in corporate 
cash holdings with a dollar value of 55.40 million dollars. We divide the firms into sub-groups 
based on the characteristics that can affect the bargaining power of labor unions. We find that 
this negative relation between country-level union membership and corporate cash holdings is 
stronger for firms in countries with weaker employment protection legislation, for firms in 





To better understand the negative relation between country-level union membership and 
corporate cash holdings, we proceed to examine how labor unions affect the market value of 
corporate cash holdings. We find that the market value of corporate cash holdings is lower for 
firms in countries with higher union membership. Moreover, we examine how labor unions 
affect the relation between corporate cash holdings and profitability as well as labor costs. We 
find that the positive relation between corporate cash holdings and operating profitability is 
stronger for firms in countries with lower union membership, and that the positive relation 
between corporate cash holdings and labor costs is weaker for firms in countries with lower 
union membership. 
Our findings are consistent with the bargaining hypothesis, and we conclude that firms 
strategically choose corporate cash holdings to gain the bargaining position with labor in the 
international setting. 
Our paper makes several contributions. First, we contribute to the literature by finding 
out the difference in the role of bargaining between cash and leverage in terms of the 
comparison between US and international data. Both cash (e.g.  Klasa, Maxwell and Ortiz-
Molina, 2009) and leverage (Matsa, 2010) have been found as an effective bargaining tool in 
the studies that use US data. However, Simintzi, Vig and Volpin (2015) argue that leverage is 
not regarded as a bargaining tool in the international data. Nevertheless, the situation is different 
in the setting of corporate cash holdings because we find that corporate cash holdings have an 
important role for bargaining in the international data. Therefore, if we take our paper and Klasa, 
Maxwell and Ortiz-Molina (2009) as a pair, and take Simintzi, Vig and Volpin (2015) and 
Matsa (2010) as another pair, the comparison between the two pairs reveal that cash and 
leverage play different roles in the collective bargaining between US data and international data. 




Broadly speaking, our findings are also consistent with the argument proposed by Opler, 
Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (1999) that cash is not negative debt. Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, 
and Williamson (1999) argue that cash is not negative debt from the perspective of trade-off 
theory.11 However, our paper reveals a new channel, namely collective bargaining, through 
which cash is not simply regarded as negative debt based on the study of international data. 
Therefore, our paper extends Opler et al. (1999) by pointing out a new difference between cash 
and leverage from the bargaining perspective. 
Second, our research extends the literature on corporate cash holdings in the international 
setting. There is a large literature on corporate cash holdings using both US data 12  and 
international data. Among the previous papers that use international data, Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith 
and Servaes (2003) find that the level of corporate cash holdings is determined by the degree 
of shareholder protection from laws in different countries, and argue that firms with low 
shareholder protection cannot make managers to disgorge cash. Kalcheva and Lins (2007) find 
that when external country-level shareholder protection is weak, firm values are lower when 
controlling managers hold more cash. Lins, Servaes and Tufano (2010) conduct an international 
survey and find that lines of credit are strongly related to a firm’s need for external financing 
to fund future investment opportunities, and that cash is primarily held as a general buffer 
against future cash flow shortfalls. To our knowledge, no previous paper has examined the 
relation between labor unions and corporate cash holdings in the international setting.  
                              
11 Opler et al. (1999, p. 8) state that “for a given amount of net debt, there is an optimal amount of cash, and cash 
is not simply negative debt”. 
12 Among the previous papers that use the US data, for example, Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson (1999) 
argue that corporate cash holdings can be explained by the tradeoff theory, the financing hierarchy theory and the 
agency theory. Harford (1999) finds that cash-rich firms are more likely to make value-decreasing acquisitions. 
Mikkelson and Partch (2003) find that firms with persistent high cash holdings do not have lower operating 
performances, and argue that the findings do not support the free cash flow hypothesis. Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith 





Third, we add to the literature on the impact of labor unions on corporate finance in the 
international setting. There is growing literature that examines the impact of labor unions on 
corporate finance. Many papers in this literature use the US data. For example, previous papers 
have focuses on the impact of labor unions on leverage (e.g., Bronars and Deere, 1991; Hanka, 
1998; Matsa, 2010), earnings management (e.g., DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 1991; D’Souza, 
Jacob, and Ramesh, 2001), and the cost of equity (e.g., Chen, Kacperczyk, and Ortiz-Molina, 
2011). Moreover, Agrawal (2012) finds that labor union pension funds have preferences that 
partly reflect union worker interests rather than equity value maximization alone. Lee and Mas 
(2012) find a negative impact of union elections on firm performance. Among the papers that 
use international data, Atanassov and Kim (2009) documents the importance of interaction 
among management, labor, and investors in shaping corporate governance. They find that 
strong union laws protect not only workers but also underperforming managers. Therefore, our 
research extends the literature by studying the impact of labor unions on corporate cash 
holdings in the international setting.  
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 review the literature. Section 2.3 
develops the hypotheses. Section 2.4 describes the data and the variables. Section 2.5 discusses 
the methodology. Section 2.6 presents the results. Section 2.7 shows the robustness checks. 
Section 2.8 concludes this chapter. 
2.2 Literature Review 
This section reviews the literature about labor unions and corporate financial policies and 
the literature about the corporate cash holdings. 
2.2.1 The literature about labor unions and corporate financial policies 
There are various literature studying the relation between labor unions and corporate 




2.2.1.1 Labor unions and corporate productivity 
Early literature suggests that the presence of labor unions increase firms’ productivity in 
labor economics.  
For example, Clark (1980) finds that unionization increases the productivity of workers 
in a firm in his case study of the US cement industry. He explains that this higher productivity 
comes from the efforts of labor unions who improve the management procedures and labor 
quality in that firm. Allen (1984) finds evidence supporting the positive impacts of labor unions 
on firms' productivity in the US office and school contractors. They argue that labor unions 
offer more training and hiring opportunities to employees whose majority are short-term 
workers and conclude that labor unions increase firms' productivity.  
Despite the positive relation between labor unions and firms' productivity, Allen (1988) 
extends his research by studying the productivity change. He finds that labor unions have no 
impact on the productivity growth in manufacture industry while having negative impacts on 
productivity growth in the construction industry. Furthermore, Abowd (1989) shows that higher 
productivity from labor unions cannot affect firms' market value. He argues that the positive 
effects of firms' productivity from labor unions are offset by the negative effects of higher wage 
demands in collective bargaining. 
2.2.1.2 Labor unions and bargaining 
Previous literature study the labor unions from bargaining perspective in two lines. The 
first line is based on the union monopoly model which is proposed by Leontief (1946), the wage 
was set by labor unions before the level of employment is set by firms. Subsequently, 
McDonald and Solow (1981) describe labor unions as the monopoly seller of labor resources 
selecting the best wage point on firms’ employment demand curve. Although various labor 




This model is inefficient because it is not Pareto efficient13. The second line is McLaughlin and 
Fraser (1984) theoretically discuss the role that labor unions played in collective bargaining 
and argue that the labor unions represent employees' benefits and strengthen their' bargaining 
power to both employers and shareholders. Moreover, Lewis (1986) presents empirical 
research to examine the difference of wage of unionized and non-unionized workers in the US 
between 1967 and 1979. He finds empirical evidence that labor unions increase the salaries of 
workers because labor unions increase workers' bargaining power leading to higher wages and 
more capital costs in collective bargaining. Freeman (1986) shows that management will take 
measures to prevent the organizing of labor unions. The higher differential in employees' wages 
in unionized firms and nonunionized firms, the more opposition from firms' management, these 
effects are even stronger than the workers' desire for unionization. 
Besides, financial economists find more evidence that this stronger bargaining power 
from labor unions has effects on firms’ various financial policies. 
2.2.1.3 Labor unions affect corporate financial policies 
Labor unions affect firms’ leverage. Bronars and Deere (1991) argue that by issuing debt, 
firms credibly reduce the funds that are available to a potential union when bankruptcy is costly. 
They show that there is a cooperative Nash solution where the union will moderate its demand 
in the face of outstanding debt and that there is a negative relation between the union wage and 
debt. Dasgupta and Sengupta (1993) investigate in firms in the electric utility industry in the 
US between 1972 and 1983 and examine the probability of debt financing for a firm before 
collective bargaining with labor unions. They predict that unionized firms in this industry are 
more likely to choose a higher level of debt to gain bargaining power in the negotiations with 
labor unions. A contemporaneous paper on firms' leverage is Perotti and Spier (1993), they 
                              




theoretically analyze the strategical use of capital structure in dynamic conflicts between 
shareholders and other stakeholders, such as creditors, employees and so on. They find that the 
firms exchange junior debt for equity when there is insufficient profit to pay the wages of 
employees and when there are new NPV projects. They argue that the firms use temporarily 
high leverage as a bargaining tool with labor unions in negotiations because firms threat unions 
that they cannot finance new profitable projects unless labor unions compromise wage 
concessions. Recently, Matsa (2010) examines the relation of debt financing and labor unions 
in both firm-level and state-level data in the US. He finds that firms with external finance 
constraints use the cash flow demands of debt service to reduce the internal liquidity available 
for wage demands from labor unions. He emphasizes that these firms choose debt financing as 
a strategy to increase their bargaining position in collective bargaining with labor unions. 
Moreover, Myers and Saretto (2015) examine the relation between labor unions and corporate 
leverage in contract negotiations in the US. They find that the likelihood of strikes organized 
by labor unions before contract negotiations are lower in firms who have a higher level of 
corporate leverage, because that the higher leverage is associated with stronger bargaining 
power in negotiations with labor unions. 
Labor unions also have influences on firms’ cost of capital. On one hand, labor unions 
increase firms’ cost of equity, for example, Chen, Kacperczyk and Ortiz-Molina (2011) 
examine the effects of labor unions on firms' cost of equity with American data. They show a 
positive relation between the cost of equity and the industry level of unionization, because the 
labor unions decrease firms' operating flexibility. On the other hand, labor unions increase 
firms' cost of debt, for example, Qiu and Shen (2017) examine how labor unions affect the cost 
of bank loan and find a causal relation by using the election data in the US from 1988 to 2009. 
They find that the bank loan spread increases when labor unions win elections in a firm, because 




Kacperczyk and Oritz-Molina (2011, b) examine the relation between labor unions and firms' 
bond yields in the US and find that the higher level of unionization in an industry leads to lower 
corporate bond yields. They argue that labor unions reduce firms' risky investments and the 
likelihood of acquisition to decrease the bond risks. 
There is some literature about labor unions and earnings management. Reynolds (1978) 
state that a firm's union leader will increase wage demands when firms report good financial 
conditions and will accept current wage when firms in poor business situations. Liberty and 
Zimmerman (1986) use a small sample with 105 unionized firms to test the negative effects of 
labor unions on firms' reported earnings around labor negotiations. However, they find modest 
evidence that firms have less incentive to reduce earnings for labor negotiations. Moreover, 
DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1991) investigate in firms in steel production industry in the US and 
find that firms take various measures to manage their earnings, such as lower income reporting, 
dividend reductions and so on during negotiations with labor unions. As a result, firms increase 
their bargaining power and gain more concessions in collective bargaining with labor unions. 
Some literature suggests that labor unions affect corporate investments. Hirsch and Link 
(1987) study the relation between labor unions and firms' innovation in 315 manufacturing 
firms located in central New York State. They find labor unions have negative impacts on firms 
R&D expenditure and reduce future performance. Moreover, Fallick and Hassett (1991) exploit 
the level of corporate investment in the year following the election of union certification. They 
find the win in union certification election reduces corporate investment, but they provide no 
explanation about these results. Recently, Bradley, Kim and Tian (2016) examine the relation 
between unionization and firms' innovation with a regression discontinuity design. Firms 
reduce the R&D expenditures when they experience a passing in union election. This reduction 




The presence of labor unions decreases firms’ performance. Earlier research suggests 
positive effects of labor unions on firms' profitability and argues that the effects come from the 
higher productivity in unionized firms (e.g., Clark, 1980 and Allen, 1984). More research 
proves that the positive effects are offset by the higher wage demands collective bargaining 
between firms and labor unions (e.g., Abowd, 1989). Ruback and Zimmerman (1984) compare 
the abnormal monthly return for the month of union elections and for the month of results 
outcome which published by the National Labor Relation Board. They find significant negative 
impacts from labor unions on firms' equity value in 253 the US-listed firms. In addition, 
Connolly, Hirsh and Hirschey (1986) argue that more unionized firms have a lower return on 
R & D investments. They conclude that labor unions reduce firms' profitability and market 
value by reducing the intangible capital investment. Hirsh (1991) develops a union rent-seeking 
model and find labor unions are negatively associated with firms' profitability and market value. 
He shows that extensively unionized firms turn to invest in intangible capital rather than long-
lived capital across industries in the US. Bronars and Deere (1993) find the manufacturing firms 
grow less when union elections win. However, they argue that the negative effects of labor 
unions on firms’ market value are not related to the growth changes and the effects cannot 
explain the equity losses from unionization perspective. Lee and Mas (2012) examine the long-
run impacts of union elections on equity value by using event study in the US-listed firms. They 
find that union election win decreases the market value in the following 15 to 18 months. More 
recently, Marciukaityte(2018) finds that stock performance of unionized firms in states without 
right-to-work laws is poor, due to the higher labor costs. There are also some literature studies 
the effects of labor unions on corporate cash holdings, dividend payouts and share repurchase, 
but the predictions are conflict or weak. 
Early literature finds little support for the line that labor unions affect firms’ mergers and 




concessions after acquisitions in 258 takeovers and compares the union wealth change with real 
wage growth. He finds modest evidence that acquiring firms gain shareholder wealth from 
union wealth concessions of target firms and it is more severe in hostile takeovers. For another 
example, Garvey and Gaston (1997) examine the effects of firms’ financial and employment 
contracts on hostile takeovers in 369 the US firms in 1984 and find modest evidence that labor 
unions lower the cost barriers to hostile takeovers. Because the presence of labor unions 
increases the bargaining power of employees so that firms reduce their investments to 
precaution the wage demands and employment growth and become more vulnerable in a hostile 
takeover. Recently, more empirical research reveals that the presence of labor unions increases 
employees’ bargaining power and affect firms’ mergers and acquisition activities. For example, 
John, Knyazeva and Knyazeva (2015) find that the negative effects of labor rights on the 
announcement return of acquiring firms are larger in an industry with higher unionization rate. 
Because firms need to negotiate with labor unions about labor force restructuring, wage and 
other contract conditions.  For another example, Tian and Wang (2016) show target firms are 
less likely to receive takeover bids when they pass the union elections than firms who fail in 
the union elections. These firms also experience longer bid durations and receive lower bid 
premiums when they become targets. Moreover, Chen, Chen and Chen (2018) study the 
payment method in the US domestic acquisition between 1990 and 2012. They find acquiring 
firms prefer to cash payment when there are labor unions. They argue that cash payments 
reduce firms’ liquidity so that firms gain a better bargaining position with labor unions.   
Financial economists apply to labor unions in their study of corporate payout policies. In 
terms of corporate dividend payments, for example, Ramirez (2004) studies how labor unions 
affect the signaling effects of corporate dividend payments. Since firms pay out dividends to 
signal future profits to investors, this signal also inspires labor unions to increase wage demands. 




firms and that leads to different markets responses. For another example, Addessia and Busatob 
(2009) examine the effects of labor unions’ preference between wage and employment 
demands on firms’ asset returns. They find that when labor unions claim the fair wage based 
on the firms’ dividend policies, the volatility of corporate asset returns increases. Chino (2016) 
finds that firms with higher profitability has a higher payout with the presence of strong labor 
unions and argues that this is consistent with the rent extraction hypothesis that firms use payout 
policies to reduce the rent extracted by potential collective bargaining of labor unions. In terms 
of share repurchases, Chen, Chen and Wang (2015) examine the relation between the firms’ 
share repurchases and unionization in the US and find a negative relation. They argue that firms 
are less likely to repurchase shares with the presence of stronger labor unions because labor 
unions will get tougher after firms repurchase shares, which weakens firms’ bargaining 
positions. 
Labor unions decrease corporate cash holdings. Klasa, Maxwell and Ortiz-Molina (2009) 
apply the bargaining effects of labor unions to their studies about corporate cash holdings by 
using the US data. They argue that firms hold fewer cash holdings to improve their bargaining 
positions against labor unions, because firms can claim liquidity shortages and gain more 
concessions to the labor unions in collective bargaining. As a result, a firm will strategically 
hold less cash to increase its bargaining position with labor unions. 
Labor unions impact firms’ bankruptcy procedures. For example, Dawson (2015) study 
the role of labor unions played in corporate bankruptcy in the US. He finds that labor unions 
decrease the recovery rate of creditors and help firms' management to prevent asset sales in 
bankruptcy, because labor unions also afraid of bankruptcy costs.  Furthermore, Campello, Gao, 
Qiu and Zhang (2017) investigate the effects of labor unions on corporate bankruptcy 




the difficulty, the costs and the period of bankruptcy procedures, and decrease bondholders' 
recovery value. 
However, labor economists find evidence that the RTW laws lower the demands of union 
representation. For example, Ellwood and Fine (1987) state that RTW laws impact the 
organizing of labor unions and decrease the attraction because RTW laws provide economic 
benefits similar to labor unions. They demonstrate 5%-10% decrease of union membership 
across states in the US due to the passage of RTW laws. Recent research about the bargaining 
effects of labor unions on corporate financial policies finds that the positive effects are weaker 
when they include the right-to-work (RTW) laws in their study. For example, Matsa (2010) 
suggests that corporate leverage in unionized industries are lower after the passage of RTW 
laws in the 1950s and 1960s. More recently, Marcjukaityte (2015) compare the positive effects 
of labor unions on firms’ leverage in states with right-to-work (RTW) laws and states without 
RTW laws in the US. He shows that the positive effects are stronger in firms that located in 
states without RTW laws than firms that located in states with RTW laws, because labor unions 
in states without RTW laws are more powerful, corresponding with higher bargaining power 
of labor unions.  
Labor unions exist all around the world. Most papers have focuses on the impact of labor 
unions on firms’ financial policies in the US. However, Visser (2006)shows that the union 
density in 2001 ranges from 8.1% to 78.0% in 24 countries. This data in the US is only 12.8%, 
ranking 22nd in his sample. The difference of unionization across countries motives financial 
economists to study the relation between labor unions and financial policies in the international 
settings. Among the papers that use international data, Atanassov and Kim (2009) documents 
the importance of interaction among management, labor, and investors in shaping corporate 
governance. They find that the strong union laws protect not only workers but also 




More recently, a growing number of literature study the role of corporate cash holdings 
in more diverse areas such as productive market competition, culture, non-financial 
stakeholders and so on. 
Recently, financial economists connect labor unions to more objectives in the literature 
of corporate finance. For example, Agrawal (2012) focuses on proxy votes in union pension 
funds. He exploits the change of union pension funds and finds union pension funds pursue 
employees' interest rather than shareholder wealth. Moreover, Huang, Jiang, Lie and Que (2017) 
examine the effects of labor unions on CEO compensation in the US with a sample period of 
1993-2011. They find that firms decrease the chief executive officers’ compensation when 
there are strong labor unions who threaten managers with possible strikes. In addition, Chun 
and Shin (2018) link labor unions to corporate social responsibility in Korea. They find labor 
unions force firms decrease the expenditure in corporate social responsibility activates to 
compensate employees’ benefits.   
2.2.1.4 Labor unions and agency problems 
Labor unions try to raise their wages and other benefits through collective bargaining. 
However, investors want to maximize firms’ profits and avoid these costs. This conflict always 
exists in a firm. As a result, both shareholders and labor unions try to influence managers’ 
decision-making process. When investors have a greater influence, managers will give priority 
to capital value gain. When labor unions have a greater influence, managers have to increase 
employee’s welfare before value enhancement (Tirole, 2001). Both the relations between 
investors and managers, as well as the relation between labor unions and managers are 
documented in previous literature. In terms of the relation between investors, previous literature 
finds that there are agency problems between shareholders and managers which lead to 
overinvestment problems. For example, Jensen (1986) develops the free cash flow hypothesis 




becomes free cash flow. These free cash flows can be used to satisfy managers’ own benefits 
and lead to overinvestment problems (e.g. Harford, 1999; Bates, 2005) Harford, Mansi and 
Maxwell (2007) find firms with higher shareholder rights decrease the capital expenditures and 
acquisitions, thus reduce agency costs. In terms of the relation between labor unions and 
managers, labor unions affect firms’ activities through bargaining which is discussed in Section 
2.2.1.2.  
In terms of the relation between labor unions and investors, previous literature discusses 
about the relation from two opposite sides. Quite a lot literature emphasizes the negative effect 
of labor unions on firms’ operations and shareholder value (e.g. Hirsch, 1991; Baldwin,1983; 
Chen, Kacperczyk and Ortiz-Molina, 2011).  
However, some literature supports the positive effect of labor unions on operations of 
companies, because labor unions reduces the agency costs. On one hand, labor unions play a 
monitoring role to protect their long-term benefits and job security. For example, Leung at al. 
(2010) state that firms with labor unions increases the accounting conservatism because labor 
unions demand the accounting conservatism to protect themselves from managerial 
misbehavior. The accounting conservatism is associated with a higher level of verification 
before firms report profits, that is used to monitor managers behaviors (Watts, 2003). For 
another example, Gomez and Tzioumis (2006) find that labor unions decrease the CEO 
compensations which is one of sources of the agency costs. In addition, Faleye, Mehrotra and 
Morck (2009) find that labor unions monitor firms’ cash flows to make sure that firms have 
enough money to pay their wages. They also point out that labor unions have a corporate 
governance voice that they prevent managers from investing in risky projects. On the other 
hand, firms decrease their liquidity and increase leverage to against the bargaining power of 




2015). From this aspect, the presence of labor unions reduces the free cash flow, that lower the 
agency costs.  
2.2.2 The literature about corporate cash holdings 
The literature about corporate cash holdings starts from Keynes (1936). He documents 
that holding cash can reduce firms’ transaction costs when making payments, and it is a buffer 
to future uncertainty. Recent literature shows that firms hold a large amount of corporate cash 
holdings. For example, Bates, Kahle and Stulz (2009) find that the ratio of cash to assets in the 
US industrial firms increases from 10.5% in 1980 to 23.2% in 2006. In worldwide, Kalcheva 
and Lins (2007) state that the average proportion of cash or cash equivalents in total assets is 
16% among 5000 firms from 31 countries.  
Several papers develop several reasons why firms hold so much cash. Opler, Pinkowitz, 
Stulz, and Williamson (1999) propose three theories about corporate cash holdings. First, the 
tradeoff theory predicts that there is an optimal level of cash, and that firms trade off both the 
benefits and the costs of holding cash by choosing the level of cash where the marginal benefits 
equal to the marginal costs. Second, the financing hierarchy theory predicts that there is not an 
optimal level of cash, and that firms choose the financing method based on the pecking order 
among cash, debt and equity. Third, the agency theory predicts that with the presence of agency 
problem between managers and shareholders, managers will use cash in a discretionary way to 
realize their self-interests. Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (1999) find evidence 
supporting the tradeoff theory of corporate cash holdings by using data listed the US firms 
between 1971 and 1994. For example, they find firms hold a higher level of cash to total non-
cash assets when they have strong growth opportunities and riskier cash flows. Moreover, they 
find some evidence that supports the financing hierarchy theory. For example, they find that 
firms keep a certain level of cash so that they can still finance projects when the firms are in 




they do not find evidence to support the agency theory by using one-year data about agency 
costs in 1994.  
2.2.2.1 Tradeoff theory 
Some literature supports the tradeoff theory.  
Early papers try to find an optimal level of cash in a firm in two main lines. The first line 
is proposed by Baumol (1952). He argues that the optimal level of cash demand in a firm is 
determined by the lowest total costs of opportunity and transaction costs, based on the 
assumption which cash income is stable. Miller and Orr (1966) extend Baumol’s model and 
develop the second line with inventory model. He argues that cash flow is random, and that 
firms hold cash for transaction costs and precautionary motives.  
Recent literature finds empirical evidence supporting the tradeoff theory. For example, 
Kim, Mauer and Sherman (1998) develop a model by using industrial firms in the US and 
predict that there is an optimal level of corporate cash holdings. They find that this optimal 
level is determined by the tradeoff between the lower return of liquid assets and the benefits 
when a firm needs financing, but external financing is costly. Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith and 
Servaes (2003) examine the how shareholder protection affects corporate cash holdings and 
find firms tend to hold more cash when they have higher level of R&D expenditure and higher 
market-to-book ratio in international data. They argue that both market-to-book ratio and 
investments can be used as proxies for transaction costs and precautionary motives. They 
explain that the market-to-book ratio captures the growth opportunities, which is important in 
transaction motives and reflects the asymmetric information problems.  
Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) study the relation between managerial ownership and corporate 
cash holdings in UK firms. They suggest that firms hold more cash when there are better growth 
opportunities due to the external financing costs and bankruptcy costs. In addition, Ferreira and 




find a positive relation between corporate cash holdings and investment opportunities and argue 
these results are consistent with the tradeoff theory. 
2.2.2.2 Financing hierarchy theory 
There is some literature show evidence in financing hierarchy theory.  
Different from the tradeoff theory, Myers and Majluf (1984) propose that firms give first 
preference to internal funds to finance their projects, then external financing. 
Several later papers find evidence that there is no optimal level of cash in a firm. For 
example, Kalcheva and Lins (2003) examine the benefits and costs of cash reserves in firms by 
using country-level shareholder protection data from 31 countries. They argue that cash is 
positively related to the growth opportunities, but it is not related to firm value only when 
country-level shareholder protection is strong. Deloof (2001) also finds evidence in Belgian 
listed firms when he studies the determinants of liquidity reserves. He finds a negative relation 
between corporate cash reserves and firms’ cash flow and argues that corporate cash reserves 
play an important role in financing profitable projects according to the pecking order theory. 
Moreover, Ferreira and Vilela (2004) observe higher cash holdings in firms with lower leverage 
and argue this is consistent with pecking order theory.  Furthermore, D’Mello, Krishnaswai and 
Larkin (2008) examine the excess cash ratio around the spin-off with similar control variables 
suggested by tradeoff theory. They find a positive relation between excess cash ratio and firms' 
cash flow for the sample period from 1985 to 2000. The average corporate cash holdings are 
lower than that predicted in tradeoff theory. This positive relation and lower level of corporate 
cash holdings are consistent with financing hierarchy theory. More recently, Lambrecht and 
Myers (2017) assume that managers are risk averse and study the interaction among firms’ debt, 
investment and payout policy. They argue that under their risk aversion assumption, debts are 




leverage and reserves more cash as predict by the pecking-order theory because more debts are 
associated with more risks, while only firms with low profitability prefer debt financing. 
2.2.2.3 Agency theory 
There is also some literature supports the agency theory.  
Jensen and Meckling (1976) have pointed out that there is an agency problem between 
firms' shareholders and managers. Jensen (1986) argues that the presence of agency problem 
leads to extra agency costs of free cash flows. Since the free cash flows are essential sources of 
corporate cash holdings, the agency problem is more severe in firms with more corporate cash 
holdings. For example, Harford (1999) studies the acquisition activities in firms with a large 
amount of corporate cash holdings and find that managers tend to maintain more cash than the 
current amount for investment requirements. However, he argues that the decreases in stock 
return of acquiring firms predict that the higher level of cash reserves will lead to shareholder 
wealth loss due to the presence of agency costs. 
Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith and Servaes (2003) find evidence to support the agency theory by 
using international data. They examine firms in 45 countries and find that cash holdings of 
firms in a country with poor shareholder protection are up to twice of the cash holdings of firms 
in a country with good shareholder protection. They argue that the findings support the 
interpretation that managers cannot be forced by shareholders to pay out cash in a country with 
poor shareholder protection, and that they tend to hold excessive corporate cash holdings. In 
addition, Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) compare the value of cash holdings in poorly-
governed firms and well-governed firms to test how corporate governance affects firms' value. 
They find evidence to support agency theory that the value of one dollar of cash in poorly-
governed firms is from $0.42 to $0.88, which is lower than the value of cash in well-governed 
firms. Moreover, Harford, Mansi and Maxwell (2008) study the corporate governance in 




managers tend to hold more cash, and the excess cash increases capital expenditure and 
acquisition due to the presence of agency problems. 
More recently, Drobetz, Gruninger and Hirschvogl (2010) use the dispersion of analysts' 
prediction of earnings per share as a proxy of information asymmetry problem to test the effects 
the financing hierarchy theory and agency theory. They find that the higher level of information 
asymmetry related to the lower value of corporate cash holdings. Nikolov and Whited (2011) 
estimate the effects of agency problems on shareholder value with a dynamic model of finance 
and investment. They show that the typical agency problems lead to 22% increases in corporate 
cash holdings corresponding with 6% decrease in shareholder value in the US firms. Tong 
(2011) shows that the firm diversification reduces the value of cash when the level of corporate 
governance is low by using the methodology of Faulkender and Wang (2006). He argues that 
this negative impact is caused by agency costs in firms with poor corporate governance. Gao, 
Harford and Li (2013) compare the cash policies in public and private firms in the US over the 
period 1995 to 2011. They find the average cash holdings in public firms is about double of 
that in private firms because the agency problems are severe in public firms. Dudley and Zhang 
(2016) demonstrate a positive relation between corporate cash holdings and the level of social 
trust in a country. Due to the agency problems, shareholders tend to push managers to disgorge 
cash in countries with lower level of social trust.  
2.2.2.4 Other literature in more diverse areas 
Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (1999) identify several factors that impact 
corporate cash holdings, such as size, leverage, capital expenditure and so on. More recently, a 
growing number of literature study the role of corporate cash holdings in more diverse areas 
such as productive market competition, culture, non-financial stakeholders and so on. 
Fresard (2010) examine the corporate cash holding in the setting of product market 




market. Moreover, he finds that firms with more corporate cash holdings will gain higher future 
market shares compared with their rivals with less corporate cash holdings. 
Chen, Dou, Rhee, Truong and Veeraraghavan (2015) link national culture and corporate 
cash holdings by studying how the culture dimensions affect the variation of corporate cash 
holdings across countries and within the United States. They find that corporate cash holdings 
are negatively related to individualism and positively related to uncertainty-avoidance, and that 
the precautionary motive for holding cash is affected by both individualism and uncertainty 
avoidance. They argue that the cultural difference can explain the variation of corporate cash 
holdings after controlling for the various other factors such as corporate governance and so on.  
Gu (2017) find that the multinational firms hold 5.31% more cash than domestic firms in 
the US with a dynamic model. However, they cannot provide proper interpretation about this 
difference because of the lack of valid instruments and accurate proxies for some important 
variables.  
In terms of the firms’ non-financial stakeholders and corporate cash holdings, Cornell 
and Shapiro (1987) propose the stakeholder theory and suggest firms’ financial policies are 
affected by the relationship with non-financial stakeholders. Matsa (2010) shows that firms 
strategically lower the corporate cash holdings to gain bargaining positions with labor unions. 
Itzkowitz (2013) finds that firms with important relation with their customers hold more cash 
for precaution motives. He argues that adverse cash flow risks of losing an important customer 
make firms hold more cash to precaution the additional risks. Ghaly, Dang and Stathopoulos 
(2015) find that there is a positive relation between firms’ commitment to workers’ well-being 
activities and corporate cash holdings by using the employee welfare index. They interpret that 
firms who take these employee-friendly activities hold more cash to send signals which they 
have abilities to maintain and improve the employee welfare provisions. As a result, firms gain 




Stathopoulos (2017) state a positive relation between corporate cash holdings and the 
percentage of skilled workers in a firm due to the precaution motive. They argue that firms with 
more skilled workers are more difficult to adjust their labor benefits and have more cash flow 
risks from labor adjustments. To mitigate the potential adverse cash flow shocks from skilled 
labor adjustments, firms tend to hold more cash. 
2.3 Hypothesis 
We develop the hypotheses in this section. 
2.3.1 Bargaining hypothesis 
There is an extensive literature on the impact of debt on the bargaining between the firm 
and the labor. For example, (e.g., Baldwin, 1983; Bronars and Deere, 1991; Dasgupta and 
Sengupta, 1993; Perotti and Spier, 1993; Hanka, 1998; Matsa, 2010). Dasgupta and Sengupta 
(1993) find unionized firms have more debt to gain bargaining power with labor unions. This 
literature is built upon the essential rationale that employees will accept a lower level of wage 
with the presence of a substantial amount of debt, provided that the bankruptcy will be costly 
for employees. Consequently, a firm can gain the bargaining position with labor by taking on 
more debts.14 
Klasa, Maxwell and Ortiz-Molina (2009) apply this reasoning to the area of corporate 
cash holdings. They argue that firms hold fewer cash holdings to improve their bargaining 
positions against labor unions because firms can make it a more credible case that the risk of 
liquidity shortages would even be exacerbated by granting additional concessions to the labor 
unions. As a result, a firm will strategically hold a lower level of corporate cash holdings to 
increase its bargaining position with labor. We expect that this mechanism is more likely to 
                              
14 For example, Bronars and Deere (1991) develop a model in which firms use debt to protect the wealth of 
shareholders from the threat of unionization. By issuing debt, firms can credibly reduce the funds that are available 
to a potential union when bankruptcy is costly. Bronars and Deere show that there is a cooperative Nash solution 
where the union will moderate its demand in the face of outstanding debt, and that there is a negative relation 




occur with the presence of stronger labor unions because it will be more beneficial for a firm 
to engage in this kind of strategic choice of corporate cash holdings. Therefore, we have the 
following hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 1: The bargaining hypothesis predicts that there is a negative relation 
between the strength of labor unions and the level of corporate cash holdings. 
2.3.2 Operating leverage 
Labor unions make wages more sticky and layoffs more costly. This increases the fixed 
labor costs, which results in an increase in a firm’s operating leverage. For example, Chen, 
Kacperczyk, and Ortiz-Molina (2011) find that unionization is positively related to various 
measures of operating leverage. Danthine and Donaldson (2002) argue that fixed labor costs 
are an important source of operating leverage.  
Operating leverage can affect a firm's corporate cash holdings because according to the 
tradeoff theory of corporate cash holdings, firms hold more cash when there are more 
expenditures due to the transaction motive. Maure and Traintis (1994) note that the more rigid 
labor costs and higher operating leverage lead to higher demands of financial flexibility. More 
recently, Kahl, Lunn and Nilsson (2014) find that firms with higher fixed costs hold more 
corporate cash holdings. 
Linking the two streams of literature together, it implies that there is a positive relation 
between labor unions and corporate cash holdings through the impact of operating leverage. 
Similarly, this mechanism is more likely to occur with the presence of stronger labor unions, 
because the increase in operating leverage will be higher with the presence of stronger labor 
unions. Therefore, we have the following hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 2: The operating leverage hypothesis predicts that there is a positive relation 




2.4 Data and Variables 
In this section, we describe the data and variables.  
2.4.1 Data 
This chapter uses the international data obtained from the following sources. We get the 
financial data of U.S. firms and Canadian firms from Compustat North America database. We 
get the financial data of firms in other countries from Compustat Global database. We convert 
the data in foreign currencies to the corresponding data in U.S. dollars by using the monthly 
exchange rates from Compustat Global database. We get the country-level data of union 
membership from ILOStat database maintained by International Labor Organization. The 
sample period is from 1992 to 2013. The data starts from 1992 because we need to use the data 
in the prior five years to calculate the industry cash flow volatility, while the data in Compustat 
Global database starts from 1987. We follow the literature (e.g., Pinkowitz, Stulz and 
Williamson, 2013) and exclude firms with less than 5 million U.S. dollars in total assets or 
market capitalization. We also follow the literature and exclude financial firms (SIC codes 
between 6000 and 6999). We exclude the observations with incomplete data. Our final sample 
consists of 42777 firms with 355715 firm-year observations from 66 countries. 
2.4.2 Variables 
2.4.2.1 Union Membership 
We use the variable Union Membership as a measure of the country-level bargaining 
power of labor unions. Union Membership is defined as the ratio of the total number of trade 
union members to the total number of paid employees in a country. A higher level of Union 




2.4.2.2 Corporate Cash Holding 
We follow the literature (e.g., Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson, 1999) and define 
the variable Corporate Cash Holdings as the ratio of cash and marketable securities to non-cash 
assets, where non-cash assets is calculated as total assets minus cash and marketable securities. 
2.4.2.3 Control variables 
We include the following control variables. We define the variable Size as natural 
logarithm of non-cash assets. We define the variable Tobin’s Q as market value of equity plus 
non-cash assets minus book value of equity, divided by total assets.15 Tobin’s Q is included to 
control financial constraints and growth opportunity. We define the variable Leverage as the 
ratio of long-term debts to non-cash assets. Leverage is included to control capital structure and 
financial constraints. We define the variable Capital Expenditures as the ratio of capital 
expenditures to non-cash assets. Capital Expenditures is included to control the investment 
opportunity. We define the variable Dividends as the ratio of dividends to non-cash assets. 
Dividends is included to distinguish the effects of firm’s dividend payments. We define the 
variable Cash Flow as income after interest, and taxes, but before depreciation and provisions 
for common and/or preferred dividends, divided by non-cash assets. Cash Flow is included to 
control a firm’s profitability. We define the variable R&D as the ratio of research and 
development expenses to non-cash assets. R&D is included to control the potential for financial 
distress costs. We define the Net Working Capital as the ratio of working capital minus cash 
and marketable securities to non-cash assets. Net Working Capital is included to control 
company’s ability to pay current liabilities with current assets associated with bankruptcy 
probability. We calculate the Industry Cash Flow Volatility as the standard deviation of the 
                              
15 Since the replacement value of assets is difficult to estimate, we often use book value of assets as a proxy of the 




median of Cash Flow in an industry classified by two-digit SIC codes in the prior five years. 
Industry cash-flow volatility is included to control the cash flow uncertainty. 
We also include year dummy variables, industry dummy variables and country dummy 
variables in our regressions. Among these dummy variables, we use country dummy variables 
to control the time-invariant characteristics in different countries. For example, Dittmar et al. 
(2003) include the variables such as shareholder rights as developed by La Porta et al. (1997), 
a dummy variable indicating whether the country has the tradition of common law or civil law, 
the level of external capital as documented in La Porta et al. (1997), and the level of private 
credit as documented in Levine, Loayza, and Beck (2000). However, these variables are all 
time-invariant in different countries.16 It means that we do not need to include these four 
variables as additional control variables in the regression because they have already been 
controlled by the country dummy variables. 
2.5 Methodology 
In this section, we discuss the methodologies to handle the potential endogeneity problem. 
2.5.1 The potential endogeneity problem 
One may propose an argument that the potential endogeneity problem exists due to the 
reverse causality exists. For example, suppose firms in a country generally hold a lower level 
of cash. The workers in the country may be concerned that generally the firms in the country 
are not in a financially stable situation, and that these firms may have a shortage of corporate 
liquidity in the future and will fire workers to reduce expenditures. Consequently, more workers 
will join the labor unions to protect themselves, resulting in a higher country-level union 
membership. In this argument, the causality is the other way around.  
                              
16 For example, the data of shareholder rights in La Porta et al. (1997) for each country in his sample period has 
unique value. It means that this variable will be the same for each year in our sample period for a country. Since 
this is a time-invariant variable, our country dummy variables can control for the impact related with shareholder 




2.5.2 Instrumental variables 
We use the instrumental variables approach (e.g., Greene, 1997) with two-stage least 
squares estimation (2SLS) to address the potential endogeneity problem. 17 In our research 
setting, instrumental variables are those variables that directly affect the country-level union 
membership but do not directly affect a firm’s choice of corporate cash holdings.  
The labor economics literature has shown that both the gender (e.g., Hirsch, 1980; Hirsch, 
1982) and age (e.g., Hirsch 1980; Scoville, 1971) of workers affect the demand for union 
services. Both gender and age are related to workers’ benefits that can be obtained from labor 
unions, so the propensity of joining labor unions is different among workers according to their 
gender and age. Female workers are more likely to join labor unions because they benefit more 
from the collective bargaining organized by labor unions and the protection of job conditions 
supported by labor unions. Thus, we expect proportion of female workers are positively related 
to union membership. Similarly, older workers are less likely to join labor unions because they 
will receive a shorter time period of non-pension benefits than younger workers. Thus, we 
expect a negative relation between the average age of workers and union membership. 
Therefore, we follow the literature (e.g., Chen, Kacperczyk and Ortiz-Molina, 2011) and use 
the country-level data of these two variables as instrumental variables.  
2.5.2.1 The gender of the workers 
It is a country-level variable. The workers’ gender variable is called Fraction of Female 
Workers and is defined as the fraction of female workers in the country a firm belongs to. 
2.5.2.2 The age of the workers 
It is also a country-level variable. The workers’ age variable is called Average Age of the 
Workers and is defined as the average age of the workers in the country a firm belongs to. 
                              
17 The instrumental variables approach can also address the potential endogeneity problem stemming from the 




We collect the data on gender and age from the ILOStat database maintained by 
International Labor Organization. To our knowledge, no theory has been proposed in the 
literature to directly link the gender or age of workers to a firm’s choice of corporate cash 
holdings.   
2.5.3 The validity of the instruments and the specification 
We use a series of tests to examine the validity of our instrumental variables and the 
specification. First, we conduct a first-stage F-test to examine the relevance of the instruments 
to determine whether they are weak (Stock, Wright and Yogo 2002). Then, we examine the 
first-stage partial R2, which measures the strength of the instrumental variables (e.g., Shea, 
1997). Moreover, we conduct the over-identifying restrictions test to examine the exogeneity 
of the instruments. Finally, we conduct the Hausman (1978) test to examine the difference in 
the estimates between the OLS estimation and the 2SLS estimation. 
2.6 Results 
In this section, we describe our empirical results. We start with univariate statistics, and 
then we report OLS regressions on the determinants of corporate cash holdings. Next, we report 
the results by using two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimation. Furthermore, we report the 
results of sub-samples separated by Employment Protection Legislation, labor bargaining 
centralization, and financial constraints. Finally, we report the results on how the union 
membership affects the market value of corporate cash holdings, and the relation between 
corporate cash holdings and operating profitability as well as labor costs. 
2.6.1 Univariate statistics 
Table 2-1 shows the univariate statistics. Panel A reports the univariate statistics of the 
variables. The mean of the variable Corporate Cash Holdings is 0.3418, and the median is 
0.1232.  The mean of the variable Union Membership is 0.2548, and the median is 0.1860. 




corporate cash holdings, the mean of union membership, number of firm-year observations, 
number of firms in a country are reported in the panel. The mean of the variable Union 
Membership for the U.S. is 0.1289, which is significantly lower than the mean of the variable 
Union Membership in the whole sample as reported in the Panel A.  
Figure 2-1 illustrates the mean of Union Membership from 1992 to 2013 across 66 
countries. The deeper the colour in a country in the world map indicates that the mean of Union 
Membership is higher in that country. Figure 2-2 illustrates the mean of Corporate Cash 
Holdings in our sample period across 66 countries. The deeper the colour in a country in the 
world map indicates that the mean of Corporate Cash Holdings is higher in that country. In 
United States, the color in Figure 2-1 is deep while the color in Figure 2-2 is light, implying 
that the low Union Membership in United States is associated with high Corporate Cash 
Holdings. 
Given such large difference in the magnitude of Union Membership between the U.S. 
data and international data, United States is at the lower end of the spectrum of labor unions 
around the world. It is meaningful to examine the impact of union membership on corporate 
cash holdings in the international setting. 
2.6.2 OLS regression 
We first use an OLS regression to examine the relation between country-level union 
membership and corporate cash holdings. We follow the literature (Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, 
and Williamson, 1999) and include various control variables. We also add year dummy 
variables, industry dummy variables and country dummy variables in the regression. We follow 
the literature (e.g., Fernandes and Gonenc, 2016) and cluster the standard errors at the firm 
level. We report the p–value in the parentheses in the tables. 
Table 2-2 reports the results. We find that the coefficient of Union Membership is -0.187 




is -0.185 (p-value = 0.01) in Non-US firms in Column 2. Our results are consistent with 
Hypothesis 1 that there is a negative relation between the strength of labor unions and the level 
of corporate cash holdings because a firm strategically choose corporate cash holdings to gain 
bargaining position with the labor.  
In terms of the economic magnitude, Table 2-1 reports that the standard deviation of 
Union Membership is 0.2503. It implies that a one standard deviation increase in Union 
Membership leads to a 0.047 (= (–0.187) * 0.2503) decrease in the level of Corporate Cash 
Holdings. Since the median of non-cash assets is 159.65 million dollars in our sample, this 
corresponds to a decrease in corporate cash holdings with a dollar value of 7.50 million dollars 
(= 0.047 * 159.65). The economic magnitude based on the OLS regression is relatively modest.  
2.6.3 Country-level regression 
Since we use country-level data of Union Membership, a country that has more firms 
takes more weight in the firm-level regression in Table 2-2. We therefore conduct a country-
level analysis by giving each country an equal weight. We convert all firm-level variables into 
country-level variables each year by taking the average of the variables across the countries. 
This sample includes 974 country-year observations.  
Table 2-3 reports the results. The coefficient of Union Membership is -0.125 (p-value = 
0.01) across 66 countries in Column 1, while the coefficient of Union Membership for Non-US 
firms is -0.128 (p-value = 0.01). It implies that the country-level corporate cash holdings are 
lower with the presence of a higher country-level Union Membership. The results are consistent 
with the firm-level results in Table 2-2, and support the Hypothesis 1.  
2.6.4 First-stage regression 
Table 2-4 shows the first-stage regression of the 2SLS estimation. The dependent variable 
is Union Membership. The independent variables are two instrumental variables and other 




country dummy variables in the regression. We find that the coefficient of the instrumental 
variable Fraction of Female Workers is 2.151 (p-value = 0.01) and the coefficient of Average 
Age of the Workers is -0.017 (p-value = 0.01).18 The partial F-statistic is 3795.91 (p-value = 
0.01), indicating that the instruments are not weak. The partial R-square is 0.32, indicating that 
the instruments have a reasonable strength. 
2.6.5 Union membership and the corporate cash holdings 
Table 2-5 shows the second stage of 2SLS estimation. 19  The dependent variable is 
Corporate Cash Holdings, while the independent variable is the predicted union membership 
and the same control variables in the first stage of 2SLS. In Column 1, the coefficient of Union 
Membership is –1.265 (p-value = 0.01) with the data of full sample. In Column 2, the 
coefficient of Union Membership is -1.744 (p-value = 0.01) with the data of non-US firms. We 
conduct the over-identifying restrictions test and find that the F-statistic is 1.55 (p-value = 0.21). 
This insignificant F-statistic indicates that these instrumental variables are exogenous and valid. 
We also conduct the Hausman test and find that the F-statistic is 114.47 (p-value = 0.01). This 
significant F-statistic implies that the 2SLS estimate reported in this table and the OLS estimate 
reported in Table 2-2 are significantly different. Therefore, it is more proper to draw 
implications based on the 2SLS estimates due to the existence of the endogeneity problem. 
In terms of the economic magnitude, the 2SLS estimate is more economically significant 
than the OLS estimate. Using the 2SLS estimate reported in Table 2-5 and the standard 
deviation of Union Membership reported in Table 2-1, we find that the a one standard deviation 
increase in Union Membership leads to a 0.317 decrease (= (–1.265) * 0.2503) in the level of 
                              
18 The positive coefficient of Fraction of Female Workers is consistent with the findings in Blanchflower (2006), 
who finds that male workers are less likely to join labor unions in public firms in a sample from 34 countries.  The 
negative coefficient of Average Age of the Workers is consistent with the argument in Hirsch (1980) that older 
workers are less likely to join labor unions because they will receive a shorter time period of non-pension benefits 
than younger workers. 
19  We obtain the predicted union membership from the first stage regression of 2SLS estimations with two 




corporate cash holding. Since the median of non-cash assets is 159.65 million dollars in our 
sample, this corresponds to a decrease in corporate cash holdings with a dollar value of 55.40 
million dollars (= 0.317 * 159.65) 
Therefore, the results in Table 2-5 are consistent with the interpretation that firms hold 
less cash to gain bargaining position to the labor, and support the Hypothesis 1. 
2.6.6 Employment protection legislation 
Several recent papers on labor and finance have developed their research setting based 
on Employment Protection Legislation. For example, Simintzi, Vig and Volpin (2015) examine 
inter-temporal variation in employment protection legislation across 21 countries. They find 
that labor-friendly reforms are associated with a reduction in firm leverage. Bornhall, Daunfeldt 
and Rudholm (2015) examine the employment protection legislation in Sweden and find that 
employment protection legislation seems to act as a growth barrier for small firms. Borisov, 
Gupta and Subramanian (2013) exploit within-country variation provided by changes in 
employment protection laws in OECD countries to examine the effect of stronger dismissal 
laws on M&A activity by U.S. firms in these countries. 
We get the data of Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) indicator from OECD. It 
measures the procedures and relevant costs of hiring and dismissing employees, as well as 
working contracts. The indicators have been constructed by OECD based on statutory laws, 
collective bargaining agreements and case law as well as contributions from officials from 
OECD member countries and advice from country experts.20 A higher level of EPL indicates 
better employment protection. 
A higher level of employment protection implies that it is more difficult to fire workers. 
Consequently, it increases the operating leverage. Therefore, we expect that the impact from 
                              





the perspective of operating leverage as discussed in Hypothesis 2 will be stronger for firms in 
countries with a higher level of employment protection. This can, at least, offset a certain degree 
of the impact from the bargaining perspective. Serfling (2016) find that higher firing costs lead 
to higher financing distress costs, which crowding out financial leverage. Therefore, we expect 
that the negative relation between corporate cash holding and union membership is stronger 
(weaker) when a firm is in a country with a lower (higher) level of employment protection.  
 We divide the sample into two sub-groups. A firm is in a country with higher (lower) 
level of employment protection if the EPL indicator of that country is above (below) the median. 
Table 2-6 reports the OLS regressions and the second stage of 2SLS estimations for these two 
sub-groups. 
Table 2-6 shows the results. In Panel A, we report the OLS regressions in Column 1 and 
2. The coefficient of Union Membership in Column 1 is –0.312 (p-value = 0.01) for the sub-
group of firms in a country with lower level of employment protection. The coefficient of Union 
Membership in Column 2 is –0.083 (p-value = 0.01) for the sub-group of firms in a country 
with higher employment protection. We conduct a t-test of the difference in the coefficients of 
Union Membership between the two sub-groups separated by the EPL indicator, and report the 
results in Panel B. We find that the difference is –0.229 (p-value = 0.01).  
Panel A also shows the second stage of 2SLS estimations in Column 3 and 4. The 
coefficient of Union Membership in Column 3 is –1.001 (p-value = 0.01) for the sub-group of 
firms in a country with lower level of employment protection. The coefficient of Union 
Membership in Column 4 is –0.082 (p-value = 0.16) for the sub-group of firms in a country 
with higher employment protection. The over-identifying restrictions test and the Hausman test 
show that it is more proper to draw implications based on the 2SLS estimates. The results in 
Column 4 support the interpretation that the operating leverage effect is stronger in the sub-




insignificant coefficient of Union Membership in this column. We also conduct a t-test of the 
difference in the coefficients of Union Membership between the two sub-groups separated by 
the EPL indicator, and report the results in Panel B. We find that the difference is –0.920 (p-
value = 0.01).  
Therefore, the results in Table 2-6 imply that the negative relation between corporate cash 
holding and union membership is stronger (weaker) when a firm is in a country with a lower 
(higher) level of employment protection. This is consistent with both Hypothesis 1 and 
Hypothesis 2. 
2.6.7 Labor bargaining centralization 
The degree of labor bargaining centralization has also been used as a measure of the 
power of collective bargaining in the literature (Simintzi, Vig and Volpin, 2015). We get the 
data of labor bargaining centralization from the Institutional Characteristics of Trade Unions, 
Wage Setting, State Intervention and Social Pacts (ICTWSS) database.21 In that database, the 
variable Centralization is an indicator of the degree of labor bargaining centralization in a 
country, which is a continuous variable ranging from 0 to 1.  
A higher level of Centralization indicates higher power of collective bargaining in a 
country, because a collective bargaining will have a broader impact and will be more centrally 
coordinated in a country. Therefore, we expect that the negative relation between corporate 
cash holding and union membership is stronger (weaker) when a firm is in a country with a 
higher (lower) level of Centralization.  
We divide the sample into two sub-groups. A firm is in a country with higher (lower) 
level of Centralization if the Centralization indicator of that country is above (below) the 
                              
21 The ICTWSS database is maintained by Professor Jelle Visser, and it is publicly available at the following 
website when we wrote the first draft of the paper. The database covers 51 countries with nearly 200 variables and 




median. Table 2-7 reports the OLS regressions and the second stage of 2SLS estimations for 
these two sub-groups. 
Table 2-7 shows the results. In Panel A, we report the OLS regressions in Column 1 and 
2. The coefficient of Union Membership in Column 1 is significantly more negative for the 
sub-group of firms in a country with lower level of Centralization than the coefficient for the 
sub-group of firms in a country with higher centralization.  
Panel A also shows the second stage of 2SLS estimations in Column 3 and 4. The 
coefficient of Union Membership in Column 3 is –0.741 (p-value = 0.01) for the sub-group of 
firms in a country with lower level of Centralization. The coefficient of Union Membership in 
Column 4 is –9.934 (p-value = 0.01) for the sub-group of firms in a country with higher 
Centralization. The over-identifying restrictions test and the Hausman test show that it is more 
proper to draw implications based on the 2SLS estimates. We also conduct a t-test of the 
difference in the coefficients of Union Membership between the two sub-groups separated by 
the Centralization indicator, and report the results in Panel B. We find that the difference is 
9.193 (p-value = 0.01).  
Therefore, the results in Table 2-7 imply that the negative relation between corporate cash 
holding and union membership is stronger (weaker) when a firm is in a country with a higher 
(lower) level of Centralization. This is consistent with Hypothesis 1. 
2.6.8 Financial constraints 
If a firm is financially constrained, the risk of liquidity shortage stemming from a lower 
cash balance is more credible (Klasa, Maxwell and Ortiz-Molina, 2009). We expect that the 
negative relation between corporate cash holding and union membership is stronger (weaker) 
when a firm is financially constrained (unconstrained). We follow the literature and use two 




The variable Payout is defined as the ratio of dividends plus shares repurchases to assets. 
We divide the sample into two sub-groups separated by payout. A firm is financially 
constrained (unconstrained) if it does not have any payout (if it has payout).  
The variable KZ index is calculated with the formula proposed by the Kaplan and 
Zingales (1997). A firm is financially constrained if its KZ index if above the 70th percentiles 
while a firm is financially unconstrained if its KZ index is below the 30th percentile. This 
formula is widely used to measure the financial constraints in previous literature (e.g., Baker, 
Stein, and Wurgler, 2003; Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach, 2004) 
𝐾𝑍 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 = −1.002 × 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤 + 0.283 × 𝑄 + 3.139 × 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 − 39.368 ×
𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠 − 1.315 × 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠                         (1) 
In Equation (1), Cash Flow is calculated as income after interest, and taxes, but before 
depreciation and provisions for common and/or preferred dividends in year t minus 
depreciation in year t, divided by plant, property and equipment in year t−1. Q is defined as 
market capitalization in year t plus total shareholder’s equity in year t minus book value of 
common equity in year t minus deferred tax assets in year t, divided by total shareholder’s 
equity in year t. Leverage is defined as the ratio of total long-term debts to assets in year t. 
Dividends is defined as dividends in year t to long plant, property and equipment in year t−1. 
Cash Holdings is defined as cash and marketable securities in year t to long plant, property and 
equipment in year t−1 
Table 2-8 shows the results. In Panel A, financial constrains are measured as total payout. 
We report the OLS regressions in Column 1 and 2. The coefficient of Union Membership in 
Column 1 is significantly more negative for the sub-group of financially unconstrained firms 
than the coefficient for the sub-group of financially constrained firms. Panel A also shows the 
second stage of 2SLS estimations in Column 3 and 4. The coefficient of Union Membership in 
Column 3 is –1.474 (p-value = 0.01) for the sub-group of financially constrained firms. The 




financially unconstrained firms. The over-identifying restrictions test and the Hausman test 
show that it is more proper to draw implications based on the 2SLS estimates. We also conduct 
a t-test of the difference in the coefficients of Union Membership between the two sub-groups 
separated by payout, and report the results in Panel C. We find that the difference is –0.874 (p-
value = 0.01). 
In Panel B, financial constrains are measured as KZ index. In OLS regressions, the 
coefficient of Union Membership in Column 1 is –0.140 (p-value = 0.01) for the sub-group of 
financially unconstrained firms, while the coefficient is -0.215 (p-value = 0.01) in Column 2 
for the sub-group of financially constrained firms. The coefficient of Union Membership in 
Column 3 is –1.070 (p-value = 0.01) for the sub-group of financially unconstrained firms. The 
coefficient of Union Membership in Column 4 is –1.880 (p-value = 0.01) for the sub-group of 
financially constrained firms. We report the difference is 0.810 (p-value = 0.01) in the 
coefficients of Union Membership between two sub-groups separated by KZ index in Panel C. 
Therefore, the results in Table 2-8 imply that the negative relation between corporate cash 
holding and union membership is stronger (weaker) when a firm is financially constrained 
(unconstrained). This is consistent with Hypothesis 1. 
2.6.9 The market value of corporate cash holdings 
To better understand the negative relation between country-level union membership and 
corporate cash holdings, we examine how labor unions affect the market value of cash. We use 
the model of Fama and French (1998) to examine the market value of cash. This model has 
been widely used in the literature about corporate cash holdings (e.g. Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith, 
2007; Bates, Kahle, and Stulz, 2009; Pinkowitz and Williamson, 2007). 
We divide the sample into two sub-groups separated by union membership. A firm in a 
country with higher (lower) union membership if its country-level union membership is above 




and Mahrt-Smith, 2007). When firms hold more cash, there are more internal resources 
available for collective bargaining and firms lose bargaining positions with labor unions. It 
decreases the market value of cash to shareholders. If a firm in a country with higher union 
membership, they lose more bargaining power in that there are stronger labor unions. This 
situation further lowers the market value of cash. Therefore, we expect the market value of 
corporate cash holdings is lower (higher) for firms in countries with higher (lower) union 
membership. We examine the difference in the market value of cash between the two sub-
groups. 
We use the following equation based on Fama and French (1998). 
𝑉𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑑𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑑𝐸𝑖,𝑡+2 + 𝛽5𝑅&𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑑𝑅&𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑑𝑅&𝐷𝑖,𝑡+2 
+𝛽8𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑑𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽10𝑑𝐷𝑖,𝑡+2 + 𝛽11𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽12𝑑𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽13𝑑𝐼𝑖,𝑡+2 + 𝛽14𝑑𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡 
              +𝛽15𝑑𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡+2 + 𝛽16𝑑𝑉𝑖,𝑡+2 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 
     +𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 + 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                          (2) 
The coefficient β1 in the Equation (2) is the measure of the market value of an additional 
dollar. For each independent variable Xt is the level of the variable X in year t, divided by total 
assets in year t. dXt is the change in the level of the variable X from year t-2 to year t, divided 
by total assets in year t (dXt = (Xt − Xt−2)/At). dXt+2 is the change in the level of the variable 
X from year t + 2 to year t, divided by total assets in year t (dXt+2 = (Xt+2 − Xt)/At). Market 
Value of Firm is the market value of firm, which is defined as the sum of the market value of 
equity, the book value of short-term debt, and the book value of long-term debt. 
Table 2-9 shows the results. In Panel A, we report the OLS regressions in Column 1 and 
2. The coefficient of Cash in Column 1 is 1.454 (p-value = 0.01) for the sub-group of firms 
with lower country-level union membership. The coefficient of Cash in Column 2 is 1.006 (p-
value = 0.01) for the sub-group of firms with higher country-level union membership. We 




separated by union membership, and report the results in Panel B. We find that the difference 
is 0.445 (p-value = 0.01).    
When firms hold more cash, there are more internal resources available for collective 
bargaining. Workers in a country with higher union membership may be able to get a larger 
part out of these cash holdings through collective bargaining because of higher bargaining 
power. This higher labor costs increase the operating costs that have negative effects on the 
market value of cash for shareholders. Therefore, the results in Panel A of Table 2-9 imply that 
the market value of corporate cash holdings is lower (higher) for firms in countries with higher 
(lower) union membership. It is consistent with the bargaining hypothesis. 
2.6.10 Corporate cash holdings and profitability 
In this section, we investigate how labor unions affect the relation between corporate cash 
holdings and operating profitability. If firms hold a certain amount of cash holdings, workers 
in a country with stronger labor unions may be able to get a larger part out of these cash holdings 
through collective bargaining because of higher bargaining power. Consequently, firms’ 
operating profitability will be lower. Conversely, firms may retain these cash holdings if 
workers are in countries with weaker labor unions because of lower bargaining power. 
Consequently, firms’ operating profitability will be higher. Therefore, we expect that the 
contribution of corporate cash holdings to operating profitability is higher (lower) when the 
country-level union membership is lower (higher).22 
We use ROA as the measure of a firm’s operating profitability. ROA is defined as the 
ratio of earnings before interests and taxes (EBIT) to total assets. We divide the sample into 
                              
22 There is still a debate in the literature regarding the relation between corporate cash holdings and operating 
profitability. Although some papers find a positive relation between cash and operating profitability (e.g., 
Mikkelson and Partch 2003; Fresard 2010), other papers find a negative relation between them (e.g., Harford 1999; 
Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith 2007). However, our results do not depend on a generally positive or negative relation 
between cash and operating profitability. Instead, our results depend on the difference in the coefficients of 




two sub-groups separated by country-level union membership. A firm is in a country with 
higher (lower) union membership if its country-level union membership is above (below) the 
median.  
Table 2-10 shows the results. In Panel A, we report the OLS regressions in Column 1 and 
2. The coefficient of Corporate Cash Holdings in Column 1 is 0.031 (p-value = 0.01) for the 
sub-group of firms with lower country-level union membership. The coefficient of Union 
Membership in Column 2 is 0.003 (p-value = 0.01) for the sub-group of firms with higher 
country-level union membership. The positive coefficients of corporate cash holdings imply 
that more corporate cash holdings is associated higher operating profitability. We conduct a t-
test of the difference in the coefficients of Corporate Cash Holdings between the two sub-
groups separated by union membership, and report the results in Panel B. We find that the 
difference is 0.028 (p-value = 0.01). The significant difference implies that the positive relation 
between corporate cash holdings and operating profitability is stronger for firms in countries 
with lower union membership.  
Suppose firms have more cash holdings and have more operating profitability in a country 
with labor unions. Labor unions observe the situation that firms have a large amount of cash 
holdings. They tend to organize collective bargaining to increase their wages and other benefits, 
this increasing operating costs from labor costs lower firms’ operating profitability. The higher 
country-level corporate cash holdings, the stronger negative effects on firms’ operating 
profitability. Therefore, the results in Table 2-10 imply that the positive relation between 
corporate cash holdings and operating profitability is stronger for firms in countries with lower 
union membership. This is consistent with the interpretation that the contribution of corporate 
cash holdings to operating profitability is higher (lower) when the country-level union 




2.6.11 Corporate cash holdings and labor costs 
In this section, we investigate how labor unions affect the relation between corporate cash 
holdings and labor costs. Given a certain amount of corporate cash holdings, workers in 
countries with stronger labor unions may be able to get a larger part out of these cash holdings 
through collective bargaining to increase their wages and gain more benefits because of higher 
bargaining power. Consequently, firms’ labor costs will be higher. Therefore, we expect that 
the contribution of corporate cash holdings to labor costs is higher (lower) when the country-
level union membership is higher (lower). 
We obtain a sub-sample of the firms whose data of labor costs are available in Compustat. 
This sub-sample includes 77380 firm-year observations. We follow Chemmanur, Cheng and 
Zhang (2013) and define the labor costs as the average employee pay. In the regressions, the 
dependent variable is the logarithm of Average Labor Costs. We follow Chemmanur, Cheng 
and Zhang (2013) and include size, leverage, average sales per employee, market to book ratio 
and tangibility as control variables. We divide the sample into two sub-groups separated by 
country-level union membership. A firm is in a country with higher (lower) union membership 
if its country-level union membership is above (below) the median.  
Table 2-11 shows the results. In Panel A, we report the OLS regressions in Column 1 and 
2. The coefficient of Corporate Cash Holdings in Column 1 is 0.334 (p-value = 0.01) for the 
sub-group of firms with lower country-level union membership. The coefficient of Corporate 
Cash Holdings in Column 2 is 0.504 (p-value = 0.01) for the sub-group of firms with higher 
country-level union membership. The positive coefficients imply that there is a positive relation 
between corporate cash holdings and labor costs. We conduct a t-test of the difference in the 
coefficients of Corporate Cash Holdings between the two sub-groups separated by union 
membership, and report the results in Panel B. We find that the difference is –0.170 (p-value = 




sub-group of firms with lower country-level union membership is significantly lower than the 
coefficient of Corporate cash holdings for the sub-group of firms with higher country-level 
union membership. 
Therefore, the results in Table 2-11 imply that the positive relation between corporate 
cash holdings and labor costs is weaker for firms in countries with lower union membership. 
When firms hold more cash, they lose bargaining positions to labor unions because labor unions 
tend to claim more wages and other benefits in that firms have sufficient cash reserves. When 
there is higher country-level union membership, labor unions have more bargaining power in 
this country. It strengthens labor unions’ bargaining positions and further raise the wage 
demands in collective bargaining when workers find firms have more cash holdings. As a result, 
a firm in this country have to pay more labor costs compared with a firm in a country with 
lower union membership. The higher the union membership in a country, the stronger positive 
effects of corporate cash holdings on a firm’s labor costs. This is consistent with the 
interpretation that there will be more (fewer) positive effects of corporate cash holdings on 
labor costs when the country-level union membership is higher (lower). The results are 
consistent with the Hypothesis 1. 
2.6.12 Corporate cash holdings and strikes & lockouts 
To further investigate how corporate cash holdings affect firms’ bargaining power in a 
country, we examine the relation between corporate cash holdings and the country-level strikes 
& lockouts. Myers and Saretto (2015) show a negative relation between the level of corporate 
leverage and the likelihood of strikes organized by labor unions before contract negotiations. 
They argue that the higher level of corporate leverage strengthens firms’ bargaining power in 
wage negotiations with labor unions. In this thesis, previous results support the bargaining 
hypothesis that firms lower their corporate cash holdings to gain bargaining position with labor 




get less benefits through these activities. If firms hold more cash, workers tend to increase their 
wage demands and organize strikes to threat firms satisfy their demands. Then, we expect that 
there should be a positive relation between corporate cash holdings and the intensity of strikes 
& lockouts. 
We collect the data of strikes & lockouts from the International Labor Organization. The 
data of strikes & lockouts start from 2000 and are available for 52 countries in our sample. We 
construct a variable called Log (Country-level Strikes & Lockouts + 1), where the Country-
level Strikes & Lockouts are defined as the total number of strikes and lockouts in a country. 
We also collect the data of labor force from International Labor Organization as an additional 
control variable. Labor Force is defined as the sum of all persons of working age who are 
employed and those who are unemployed. Since the data of strikes & lockouts are at the country 
level, we conduct the country-level analysis in a similar way as Table 2-3. We convert all firm-
level variables into country-level variables by taking the average of the variables across the 
countries. 
We report the results in Table 2-12. The coefficient of the Country-level Corporate Cash 
Holdings is 0.616 (p-value = 0.08). The positive coefficient indicates that there is a positive 
relation between strikes & lockouts and corporate cash holdings in a country. When firms hold 
more cash, labor unions have more incentive to increase their wage demands They tend to 
organize a strike to strengthen their bargaining power in negotiations with firms. As a result, 
there will be more strikes & lockouts in a country when corporate cash holdings are higher in 
that country. Therefore, the results in Table 2-12 support the bargaining hypothesis in that labor 
unions organize more strikes to gain bargaining power when firms hold more cash. 
2.7 Robustness Checks 




2.7.1 The validity of instrumental variables 
Since we use country-level instrumental variables in our paper, they may be correlated 
with other country-level characteristics, which can lower the validity of the instrumental 
variables. For example, it has found that female workers earn less compared with male workers. 
On one hand, if there are more female workers in a country, the average salary in that country 
will be lower. Consequently, firms in that country will have more cash reserves. On the other 
hand, the coefficient of Fraction of Female Workers in Table 2-4 is positive, which means more 
female workers are associated with higher union membership. This leads to a negative 
relationship between corporate cash holding and union membership. However, it is driven by 
the gender pay gap rather than the bargaining power. 
Therefore, we collect the data of global gender gap from the World Economic Forum. 
The global gender gap index measures the gender equality in different countries. The index is 
constructed based on the equality between women and men across four key areas: health, 
education, economy and politics. The data are available from 2006. For the sample period 
before 2006, we use the data of 2006 as a proxy of the index for each year. We use the data of 
2006 as a proxy because there is limited variation of this index over time.   The index ranges 
from 0 to 1. The higher index means that female and male are more equal in a country. We 
divide our sample into two sub-groups based on the median. A firm is in a country with lower 
(higher) gender gap if the index is above (below) the median. 
Table 2-13 shows the results. We show the second stage of two 2SLS estimation for 
brevity. Column 1 shows that the coefficient of Union Membership is -1.263 (p-value = 0.01), 
and Column 2 shows that such coefficient is -1.264 (p-value = 0.01). We conduct t-test and 
find that the difference is 0.001 (p-value = 0.94). The results imply that after we control for the 
gender gap, we still find that firms in countries with higher union membership have less 




that the results are not entirely driven by the gender pay gap and that they are consistent with 
our bargaining hypothesis. 
2.7.2 Alternative measurements of bargaining power  
In previous analysis, we use union membership as the measurement of labor unions’ 
bargaining power, however, there are also alternative data related to bargaining power of labor 
unions including union law index and collective bargaining coverage rate. 
Botero et al. (2004) construct the union law index by using the data of employment laws, 
collective relations, social security laws and other labor protection items across 85 countries in 
1997. The higher the index, the more extensive legal protection of employees. They argue that 
this index captures regulations of labor markets from different aspects across countries. It may 
be alternative measure of bargaining power because it reflects the strength of labor unions 
across countries. However, the main data source of the index is the sample established by 
Djankov et al. (2002) with data only available in 1997. We don’t include this index in our 
empirical analysis because the index is time invariant. Besides, the index is outdated because 
several aspects of this index have been already covered in supplemental analyses with more 
recent data. 
Another possible measure of labor unions’ bargaining power is the collective bargaining 
coverage rate. The consequence of collective bargaining may apply to the workers who do not 
belong to labor unions. For example, the union membership in France is 7.92%, which is much 
lower than the average union membership in our sample. However, the collective bargaining 
coverage rate in France is 95.8% 23 , implying that most French workers are covered by 
collective bargaining.  In this case, there is a limitation to use union membership as the measure 
of bargaining power, given such a high collective bargaining coverage rate in France.  
                              




Therefore, we use collective bargaining coverage rate as an alternative measure of the 
bargaining power of labor unions. We collect the data of Collective Bargaining Coverage Rate 
from the Institutional Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage Setting, State Intervention and 
Social Pacts (ICTWSS) database. The database reports the collective bargaining coverage rate 
in intervals. If the data is not available in a year, we use the data available in the most closest 
precedent year as a proxy for the Collective Bargaining Coverage Rate in that year.24 The 
variable Collective Bargaining Coverage Rate is defined as the percentage of workers who are 
covered by the collective bargaining agreements, including both unionized workers and 
ununionized workers.  
We show the results about Collective Bargaining Coverage Rate in Table 2-14. We use 
the similar specifications as in previous tables. Column 1 of Panel A shows the results of OLS 
regression. The coefficient of Collective Bargaining Coverage Rate is -0.234 (p-value = 0.01). 
Column 2 shows the second stage of 2SLS estimation. The coefficient of Collective Bargaining 
Coverage Rate is -1.063 (p-value = 0.01). The results are similar with the previous tables that 
there is a negative relation between Collective Bargaining Coverage Rate and corporate cash 
holdings. We conduct the test on the market value of cash in countries whose Collective 
Bargaining Coverage Rate are above or below the median. Column 1 of Panel B shows that the 
coefficient of Cash is 1.485 (p-value = 0.01) in countries with lower collective bargaining 
coverage rate. Column 2 of Panel B shows the coefficient of Cash is 1.054 (p-value = 0.01) in 
countries with higher collective bargaining coverage rate. We conduct a t-test of the difference 
in the coefficients of Cash between the two sub-groups separated by the Collective Bargaining 
Coverage Rate, and report the results in Panel C. We find that the difference is 0.431 (p-value 
= 0.01). Our results are consistent with the previous tables in that the value of cash is lower in 
                              
24 For example, the data of Collective Bargaining Coverage Rate is available for France in 1990, 1997, 2004, 2008, 
2009 and 2012. We use the data of 1990 as a proxy for the Collective Bargaining Coverage Rate in France between 




countries with higher collective bargaining coverage rate. Therefore, we find similar results 
when we use collective bargaining coverage rate as alternative proxy for bargaining power of 
labor unions. 
2.7.3 Fixed effects model and mixed effects model 
To test the independencies of observations within an industry and within a country, we 
apply fixed effects approach and random effects approach to each chapter. In fixed effects 
model, we control the fixed effects of country and industry and class our observations by 
country and industry. In mixed effects model, the country effects are random. Our results of 
both fixed effects model and mixed effects model are consistent with our original results from 
OLS estimations and support the bargaining hypothesis.25 
2.7.4 CPI deflation 
We use CPI deflated data and conduct the robustness checks. 26 We get the Consumer 
Price Index data across countries from World Bank.  The variables are deflated to their 
corresponding level in 2010 using the CPI. We find consistent results with the CPI deflation. 
2.8 Conclusion 
We examine how the presence of labor unions affects corporate cash holdings in the 
international setting. We use country-level union membership as the measure of the bargaining 
power of labor unions across countries. We use two-stage least square estimation accompanied 
with the econometrics tests for the validity of the instruments and the specification.  
We find that firms in countries with higher union membership have less corporate cash 
holdings. We divide the firms into sub-groups and find that this negative relationship is stronger 
for firms in countries with weaker employment protection legislation, for firms in countries 
                              
25 The independent variable are cash, dividends, repurchase, and total payout in corresponding chapters. In the 
mixed effects model, we test the industry fixed effects and the country random effects with above independent 
variables in each chapter. The coefficients of union membership are similar with the coefficients of OLS 
regressions in table 2 in each chapter. The results are available from the authors upon request. 




with a higher degree of labor bargaining centralization, and for financially constrained firms. 
Moreover, we find that the market value of corporate cash holdings is lower for firms in 
countries with higher union membership. We also find that the positive relation between 
corporate cash holdings and operating profitability is stronger for firms in countries with lower 
union membership, and that the positive relation between corporate cash holdings and labor 
costs is weaker for firms in countries with lower union membership. Furthermore, we find that 
the number of strikes & lockouts is higher in countries with more corporate cash holdings. In 
addition, we conduct robustness checks by using gender gap and collective bargaining coverage 
rate, and find consistent results. 
Our findings are consistent with the bargaining hypothesis, and we conclude that firms 






Table 2-1 Univariate Statistics 
This table shows univariate statistics. We use a sample of 355715 firm-year observations from 66 countries 
between 1992 and 2013. Panel A reports univariate statistics. Corporate Cash Holdings is defined as the ratio of 
cash and marketable securities to non-cash assets, where non-cash assets is calculated as total assets minus cash 
and marketable securities. Union Membership is defined as the ratio of the total number of trade union members 
to the total number of paid employees in a country. Size is defined as natural logarithm of non-cash assets. Tobin’s 
Q is defined as market value of equity plus non-cash assets minus book value of equity, divided by non-cash assets. 
Leverage is defined as the ratio of long-term debts to non-cash assets. Capital Expenditures is defined as the ratio 
of capital expenditures to non-cash assets. Dividends is defined as the ratio of dividends to non-cash assets. Cash 
Flow is defined as income after interest, and taxes, but before depreciation and provisions for common and/or 
preferred dividends, divided by non-cash assets. R&D is defined as the ratio of research and development expenses 
to non-cash assets. Net Working Capital is defined as the ratio of working capital minus cash and marketable 
securities to non-cash assets. Industry Cash Flow Volatility is defined as the standard deviation of the median of 
Cash Flow in an industry classified by two-digit SIC codes in the prior 5 years. Fraction of Female Workers is 
defined as the fraction of female workers in the country a firm belongs to. Average Age of the Workers is the 
average age of the workers in the country a firm belongs to. Employment Protection Legislation is the OECD 
indicators of employment protection legislation that measure the procedures and costs involved in dismissing 
individuals or groups of workers and the procedures involved in hiring workers on fixed-term or temporary work 
agency contracts in a country. Centralization is an indicator of the degree of labor bargaining centralization in a 
country from the Institutional Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage Setting, State Intervention and Social Pacts 
(ICTWSS) database. Panel B reports the mean of corporate cash holdings, the mean of union membership, number 
of firm-year observations, number of firms by countries. 
 









Corporate Cash Holdings 0.342 0.123 0.043 0.306 1.128 
Union Membership 0.255 0.186 0.129 0.279 0.250 
Size 18.995 18.888 17.624 20.265 2.005 
Tobin’s Q 1.713 1.244 0.958 1.849 1.456 
Leverage 0.146 0.083 0.001 0.227 0.179 
Capital Expenditures 0.073 0.046 0.022 0.086 0.090 
Dividends 0.014 0.000 0.000 0.013 0.037 
Cash Flow -0.007 0.031 -0.016 0.077 0.832 
R&D 0.044 0.000 0.000 0.014 0.431 
Net Working Capital 0.023 0.023 -0.088 0.167 0.243 
Industry Cash Flow Volatility 0.126 0.088 0.054 0.163 0.096 
Fraction of Female Workers 0.439 0.454 0.419 0.464 0.038 
Average Age of the Workers 39.718 39.557 38.335 40.962 2.133 
Employment Protection Legislation 1.362 1.369 0.257 2.194 0.970 

























Argentina 0.092 0.382 171 60 Malaysia 0.199 0.103 11010 1022 
Australia 0.420 0.214 13690 2000 Malta 0.100 0.546 57 7 
Austria 0.204 0.341 1287 126 Mauritius 0.046 0.257 89 20 
Belgium 0.233 0.543 1669 157 Mexico 0.106 0.159 1803 124 
Brazil 0.187 0.253 3018 363 Namibia 0.176 0.304 1 1 
Bulgaria 0.152 0.166 137 30 Netherlands 0.189 0.217 3117 263 
Canada 0.357 0.288 18839 2822 New Zealand 0.146 0.217 1309 157 
Chile 0.095 0.144 1962 165 Norway 0.323 0.544 2654 342 
China 0.360 0.457 44077 5807 Peru 0.127 0.042 538 80 
Colombia 0.083 0.165 60 36 Philippines 0.196 0.145 1674 179 
Croatia 0.106 0.328 288 60 Poland 0.162 0.152 2731 422 
Cyprus 0.160 0.530 390 54 Portugal 0.067 0.215 778 75 
Czech 0.098 0.241 210 33 Russia 0.144 0.317 1181 238 
Denmark 0.286 0.710 1968 185 Serbia 0.120 0.279 4 4 
Egypt 0.203 0.275 59 59 Singapore 0.316 0.183 7009 758 
Estonia 0.165 0.092 162 17 Slovakia 0.072 0.256 81 12 
Finland 0.214 0.726 1987 157 Slovenia 0.089 0.319 273 28 
France 0.255 0.079 10171 1017 South Africa 0.208 0.338 2648 340 
Germany 0.281 0.225 10171 992 South Korea 0.212 0.104 8706 1497 
Greece 0.131 0.243 2633 269 Spain 0.113 0.167 2101 183 
Hungary 0.139 0.193 307 32 Sri Lanka 0.125 0.142 659 146 
Iceland 0.207 0.832 94 15 Sweden 0.291 0.741 4360 516 
India 0.136 0.175 4764 1693 Switzerland 0.277 0.193 3628 276 
Indonesia 0.163 0.152 1009 257 Tanzania 0.097 0.202 3 3 
Ireland 0.342 0.369 1450 126 Thailand 0.166 0.029 1097 406 
Israel 0.614 0.373 1132 389 Trinidad and Tobago 0.211 0.210 11 11 
Italy 0.166 0.350 3533 346 Turkey 0.155 0.072 2425 273 
Japan 0.252 0.201 52109 3866 Ukraine 0.043 0.647 11 8 
Kazakhstan 0.176 0.423 30 12 United Kingdom 0.302 0.294 23899 2783 
Kuwait 0.163 0.023 10 10 United States 0.454 0.129 93389 11132 
Latvia 0.092 0.164 140 17 Vietnam 0.209 0.146 189 189 
Lithuania 0.059 0.108 299 37 Zambia 0.054 0.057 7 7 



















Table 2-2 Union Membership and Corporate Cash Holdings 
This table shows an OLS regression about union membership and corporate cash holdings. We use a sample of 
355715 firm-year observations from 66 countries between 1992 and 2013. Corporate Cash Holdings is defined as 
the ratio of cash and marketable securities to non-cash assets, where non-cash assets is calculated as total assets 
minus cash and marketable securities. Union Membership is defined as the ratio of the total number of trade union 
members to the total number of paid employees in a country. Size is defined as natural logarithm of non-cash 
assets. Tobin’s Q is defined as market value of equity plus non-cash assets minus book value of equity, divided 
by non-cash assets. Leverage is defined as the ratio of long-term debts to non-cash assets. Capital Expenditures is 
defined as the ratio of capital expenditures to non-cash assets. Dividends is defined as the ratio of dividends to 
non-cash assets. Cash Flow is defined as income after interest, and taxes, but before depreciation and provisions 
for common and/or preferred dividends, divided by non-cash assets.  R&D is defined as the ratio of research and 
development expenses to non-cash assets. Net Working Capital is defined as the ratio of working capital minus 
cash and marketable securities to non-cash assets. Industry Cash Flow Volatility is defined as the standard 
deviation of the median of Cash Flow in an industry classified by two-digit SIC codes in the prior 5 years. Year 
Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the years in the sample and not reported in the table. Industry 
Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the industries defined by two-digit SIC codes and not reported in 
the table. Country Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the countries in the sample and not reported in 
the table. The standard errors are clustered at the firm level. The p–value is noted in the parentheses. 
 
 Corporate Cash Holdings 
 Full sample Non-US firms 
Intercept 2.545 2.158 
  (0.01) (0.01) 
Union Membership -0.187 -0.185 
  (0.01) (0.01) 
Size -0.106 -0.094 
  (0.01) (0.01) 
Tobin’s Q 0.021 0.029 
  (0.01) (0.01) 
Leverage -0.247 -0.187 
  (0.01) (0.01) 
Capital Expenditure 0.858 0.682 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Dividends 2.266 3.230 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Cash Flow -0.326 -0.480 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
R&D 0.969 0.963 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Net Working Capital -0.420 -0.262 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Industry Cash Flow Volatility 0.276 0.271 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Year Dummy Variables YES YES 
Industry Dummy Variables YES YES 
Country Dummy Variables YES YES 
Number of Observations 355715 262326 






Table 2-3 Union Membership and Corporate Cash Holdings: Country-level Analysis 
This table shows an OLS regression on the country-level analysis about union membership and corporate cash 
holdings. We convert all firm-level variables into country-level variables by taking the average of the variables 
across the countries. The full sample includes 974 country-year observations between 1992 and 2013. Corporate 
Cash Holdings is defined as the ratio of cash and marketable securities to non-cash assets, where non-cash assets 
is calculated as total assets minus cash and marketable securities. Union Membership is defined as the ratio of the 
total number of trade union members to the total number of paid employees in a country. Size is defined as natural 
logarithm of non-cash assets. Tobin’s Q is defined as market value of equity plus non-cash assets minus book 
value of equity, divided by non-cash assets. Leverage is defined as the ratio of long-term debts to non-cash assets. 
Capital Expenditures is defined as the ratio of capital expenditures to non-cash assets. Dividends is defined as the 
ratio of dividends to non-cash assets. Cash Flow is defined as income after interest, and taxes, but before 
depreciation and provisions for common and/or preferred dividends, divided by non-cash assets. R&D is defined 
as the ratio of research and development expenses to non-cash assets. Net Working Capital is defined as the ratio 
of working capital minus cash and marketable securities to non-cash assets. Cash flow Volatility is defined as the 
standard deviation of the median of Cash Flow in an industry classified by two-digit SIC codes in the prior 5 years. 
Year Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the years in the sample and not reported in the table. Industry 
Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the industries defined by two-digit SIC codes and not reported in 
the table. Country Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the countries in the sample and not reported in 
the table. The p-value is noted in the parentheses. 
 
 Country-level Corporate Cash Holdings 
 Full sample Non-US firms 
Intercept 1.281 1.361  
(0.01) (0.01) 
Union Membership -0.125 -0.128  
(0.01) (0.01) 
Country-level Size -0.045 -0.051  
(0.01) (0.01) 
Country-level Tobin’s Q 0.016 0.014  
(0.03) (0.05) 
Country-level Leverage -0.314 -0.322  
(0.01) (0.01) 
Country-level Capital Expenditure 0.687 0.683  
(0.01) (0.01) 
Country-level Dividends 0.718 0.784  
(0.01) (0.07) 
Country-level Cash Flow -0.189 -0.182  
(0.01) (0.01) 
Country-level R&D 1.824 1.778  
(0.01) (0.01) 
Country-level Net Working Capital -0.024 0.000  
(0.76) (1.00) 
Country-level Cash Flow Volatility 0.970 1.070  
(0.01) (0.01) 
Year Dummy Variables YES YES 
Industry Dummy Variables YES YES 
Country Dummy Variables YES YES 
Number of Observations 974 952 






Table 2-4 Two-stage Least Square Estimation: First Stage 
This table shows the first stage of two-stage least square estimation. We use a sample of 355715 firm-year 
observations from 66 countries between 1992 and 2013. Union Membership is defined as the ratio of the total 
number of trade union members to the total number of paid employees in a country. Fraction of Female Workers 
is defined as the fraction of female workers in the country a firm belongs to. Average Age of the Workers is the 
average age of the workers in the country a firm belongs to. Size is defined as natural logarithm of non-cash assets. 
Tobin’s Q is defined as market value of equity plus non-cash assets minus book value of equity, divided by non-
cash assets. Leverage is defined as the ratio of long-term debts to non-cash assets. Capital Expenditures is defined 
as the ratio of capital expenditures to non-cash assets. Dividends is defined as the ratio of dividends to non-cash 
assets. Cash Flow is defined as income after interest, and taxes, but before depreciation and provisions for common 
and/or preferred dividends, divided by non-cash assets R&D is defined as the ratio of research and development 
expenses to non-cash assets. Net Working Capital is defined as the ratio of working capital minus cash and 
marketable securities to non-cash assets. Industry Cash Flow Volatility is defined as the standard deviation of the 
median of Cash Flow in an industry classified by two-digit SIC codes in the prior 5 years. Year Dummy Variables 
are the dummy variables for the years in the sample and not reported in the table. Industry Dummy Variables are 
the dummy variables for the industries defined by two-digit SIC codes and not reported in the table. Country 
Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the countries in the sample and not reported in the table. The p–
value is noted in the parentheses. 
 
 Union Membership 
Intercept -0.053  
(0.02) 
Fraction of Female Workers 2.151  
(0.01) 
Average Age of the Workers -0.017  
(0.01) 
Size -0.001  
(0.01) 
Tobin’s Q -0.002  
(0.01) 
Leverage -0.005  
(0.01) 
Capital Expenditure -0.036  
(0.01) 
Dividends 0.085  
(0.01) 
Cash Flow -0.001  
(0.17) 
R&D -0.003  
(0.01) 
Net Working Capital -0.026  
(0.01) 
Industry Cash Flow Volatility -0.019 
 (0.01) 
Year Dummy Variables YES 
Industry Dummy Variables YES 
Country Dummy Variables YES 
Number of Observations 355715 
Adjusted R-square 0.73 
Partial F-statistic (p-value) 0.01 






Table 2-5 Two-stage Least Square Estimation: Second Stage 
This table shows the second stage of two-stage least square estimation. We use a sample of 355715 firm-year 
observations from 66 countries between 1992 and 2013. Corporate Cash Holdings is defined as the ratio of cash 
and marketable securities to non-cash assets, where non-cash assets is calculated as total assets minus cash and 
marketable securities. Union Membership is defined as the ratio of the total number of trade union members to the 
total number of paid employees in a country. Size is defined as natural logarithm of non-cash assets. Tobin’s Q is 
defined as market value of equity plus non-cash assets minus book value of equity, divided by non-cash assets. 
Leverage is defined as the ratio of long-term debts to non-cash assets. Capital Expenditures is defined as the ratio 
of capital expenditures to non-cash assets. Dividends is defined as the ratio of dividends to non-cash assets. Cash 
Flow is defined as income after interest, and taxes, but before depreciation and provisions for common and/or 
preferred dividends, divided by non-cash assets R&D is defined as the ratio of research and development expenses 
to non-cash assets. Net Working Capital is defined as the ratio of working capital minus cash and marketable 
securities to non-cash assets. Industry Cash flow Volatility is defined as the standard deviation of the median of 
Cash Flow in an industry classified by two-digit SIC codes in the prior 5 years. Year Dummy Variables are the 
dummy variables for the years in the sample and not reported in the table. Industry Dummy Variables are the 
dummy variables for the industries defined by two-digit SIC codes and not reported in the table. Country Dummy 
Variables are the dummy variables for the countries in the sample and not reported in the table. The standard 
errors are clustered at the firm level. The p–value is noted in the parentheses.  
 
 Corporate Cash Holdings 
 Full sample Non-US firms 
Intercept 3.436 3.802 
  (0.01) (0.01) 
Union Membership -1.265 -1.744 
  (0.01) (0.01) 
Size -0.142 -0.159 
  (0.01) (0.01) 
Tobin’s Q 0.019 0.035 
  (0.01) (0.01) 
Leverage -0.112 -0.076 
  (0.01) (0.01) 
Capital Expenditure 1.037 1.099 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Dividends 2.631 4.149 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Cash Flow -0.278 -0.435 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
R&D 4.077 4.389 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Net Working Capital -0.889 -0.751 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Industry Cash Flow Volatility 0.332 0.313 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Year Dummy Variables YES YES 
Industry Dummy Variables YES YES 
Country Dummy Variables YES YES 
Number of Observations 355715 262326 
Adjusted R-square 0.39 0.36 
Over-identifying Restrictions Test (p-value) 0.21 0.44 







Table 2-6 Employment Protection Legislation 
This table shows OLS regressions and the second-stage regressions of the 2SLS estimation for the sub-groups separated by the 
employment protection legislation. We use a sample of 289889 firm-year observations from 41 countries between 1992 and 2013. 
Panel A shows the regressions. Corporate Cash Holdings is defined as the ratio of cash and marketable securities to non-cash assets, 
where non-cash assets is calculated as total assets minus cash and marketable securities. Employment Protection Legislation is the 
OECD indicators of employment protection legislation that measure the procedures and costs involved in dismissing individuals or 
groups of workers and the procedures involved in hiring workers on fixed-term or temporary work agency contracts in a country. 
Union Membership is defined as the ratio of the total number of trade union members to the total number of paid employees in a 
country. Size is defined as natural logarithm of non-cash assets. Tobin’s Q is defined as market value of equity plus non-cash assets 
minus book value of equity, divided by non-cash assets. Leverage is defined as the ratio of long-term debts to non-cash assets. Capital 
Expenditures is defined as the ratio of capital expenditures to non-cash assets. Dividends is defined as the ratio of dividends to non-
cash assets. Cash Flow is defined as income after interest, and taxes, but before depreciation and provisions for common and/or 
preferred dividends, divided by non-cash assets R&D is defined as the ratio of research and development expenses to non-cash assets. 
Net Working Capital is defined as the ratio of working capital minus cash and marketable securities to non-cash assets. Industry Cash 
flow Volatility is defined as the standard deviation of the median of Cash Flow in an industry classified by two-digit SIC codes in the 
prior 5 years. Year Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the years in the sample and not reported in the table. Industry 
Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the industries defined by two-digit SIC codes and not reported in the table. Country 
Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the countries in the sample and not reported in the table. The standard errors are 
clustered at the firm level. The p–value is noted in the parentheses. Panel B shows the difference in the coefficients of Union 
Membership between the two sub-groups.  
Panel A. Regressions 
 Corporate Cash Holdings 
 OLS The Second Stage of 2SLS 
 EPL < Median EPL ≥ Median EPL < Median EPL ≥ Median 
Intercept 3.301 1.813 4.669 1.925 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Union Membership -0.312 -0.083 -1.001 -0.082 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.16) 
Size -0.119 -0.080 -0.189 -0.080 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Tobin’s Q 0.011 0.035 0.016 0.036 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Leverage -0.321 -0.171 -0.188 -0.164 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Capital Expenditure 1.019 0.667 1.374 0.673 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Dividends 1.497 3.017 3.502 3.072 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Cash Flow -0.309 -0.459 -0.490 -0.463 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
R&D 0.916 0.978 4.237 0.974 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Net Working Capital -0.604 -0.239 -1.146 -0.239 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Industry Cash Flow Volatility 0.039 0.234 0.032 0.071 
  (0.52) (0.03) (0.69) (0.46) 
Year Dummy Variables YES YES YES YES 
Industry Dummy Variables YES YES YES YES 
Country Dummy Variables YES YES YES YES 
Number of Observations 160992 128897 160992 128897 
Adjusted R-square 0.59 0.40 0.41 0.40 
Over-identifying Restrictions Test (p-value)   0.46 0.38 
Hausman Test (p-value)   0.01 0.04 
Panel B. Difference in the Coefficients of Union Membership 
The following table shows the difference in the coefficients of Corporate Cash Holdings between the two sub-groups 
separated by EPL and reports the p-value of the t-test in the parentheses. 
     Union Membership 
 OLS Second Stage of 2SLS Estimation 
Difference -0.229 -0.920 





Table 2-7 Labor Bargaining Centralization 
 
This table shows OLS regressions and the second-stage regressions of the 2SLS estimation for the sub-groups separated by the labor 
bargaining centralization. We use a sample of 259655 firm-year observations from 32 countries between 1992 and 2013. Panel A shows 
the regressions. Corporate Cash Holdings is defined as the ratio of cash and marketable securities to non-cash assets, where non-cash 
assets is calculated as total assets minus cash and marketable securities. Centralization is an indicator of the degree of labor bargaining 
centralization in a country from the Institutional Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage Setting, State Intervention and Social Pacts 
(ICTWSS) database. Union Membership is defined as the ratio of the total number of trade union members to the total number of paid 
employees in a country. Size is defined as natural logarithm of non-cash assets. Tobin’s Q is defined as market value of equity plus non-
cash assets minus book value of equity, divided by non-cash assets. Leverage is defined as the ratio of long-term debts to non-cash 
assets. Capital Expenditures is defined as the ratio of capital expenditures to non-cash assets. Dividends is defined as the ratio of 
dividends to non-cash assets. Cash Flow is defined as income after interest, and taxes, but before depreciation and provisions for 
common and/or preferred dividends, divided by non-cash assets R&D is defined as the ratio of research and development expenses to 
non-cash assets. Net Working Capital is defined as the ratio of working capital minus cash and marketable securities to non-cash assets. 
Industry Cash flow Volatility is defined as the standard deviation of the median of Cash Flow in an industry classified by two-digit SIC 
codes in the prior 5 years. Year Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the years in the sample and not reported in the table. 
Industry Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the industries defined by two-digit SIC codes and not reported in the table. 
Country Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the countries in the sample and not reported in the table. The standard errors 
are clustered at the firm level. The p–value is noted in the parentheses. Panel B shows the difference in the coefficients of Union 
Membership between the two sub-groups. 
Panel A. Regressions 
 Corporate Cash Holdings 










Intercept 1.150 2.237 3.044 2.952 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Union Membership -0.240 -0.319 -0.741 -9.934 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Size -0.044 -0.088 -0.118 -0.050 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Tobin’s Q 0.022 0.036 0.003 0.035 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.10) (0.01) 
Leverage -0.139 -0.294 -0.394 -0.134 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Capital Expenditure 0.502 0.485 1.576 0.307 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Dividends 0.715 2.881 1.790 1.590 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Cash Flow -0.027 -0.553 -0.245 -0.084 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
R&D 1.903 0.787 0.995 1.487 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Net Working Capital -0.174 -0.318 -0.669 -0.087 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Industry Cash Flow Volatility 0.144 0.299 -0.197 0.087 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Year Dummy Variables YES YES YES YES 
Industry Dummy Variables YES YES YES YES 
Country Dummy Variables YES YES YES YES 
Number of Observations 129913 129742 129913 129742 
Adjusted R-square 0.56 0.48 0.60 0.33 
Over-identifying Restrictions Test (p-value)   0.22 0.82 
Hausman Test (p-value)   0.01 0.01  
 
Panel B. Difference in the Coefficients of Union Membership 
The following table shows the difference in the coefficients of Union Membership between the two sub-groups separated by 
Centralization and reports the p-value of the t-test in the parentheses. 
     Union Membership 
 OLS Second Stage of 2SLS Estimation 
Difference 0.078 9.193 




Table 2-8 Financial Constraints 
This table shows OLS regressions and the second-stage regressions of the 2SLS estimation for the sub-groups separated by the 
financial constraints. We use a sample of 355715 firm-year observations from 66 countries between 1992 and 2013. Panel A shows 
the regressions with the measure of financial constraints is Total Payout. Panel B shows the regressions with the measure of financial 
constraints is KZ index. Corporate Cash Holdings is defined as the ratio of cash and marketable securities to non-cash assets, where 
non-cash assets is calculated as total assets minus cash and marketable securities. Payout is defined as the ratio of dividends plus 
shares repurchases to assets. KZ index is calculated with the formula discussed in 2.6.8. Union Membership is defined as the ratio of 
the total number of trade union members to the total number of paid employees in a country. Size is defined as natural logarithm of 
non-cash assets. Tobin’s Q is defined as market value of equity plus non-cash assets minus book value of equity, divided by non-cash 
assets. Leverage is defined as the ratio of long-term debts to non-cash assets. Capital Expenditures is defined as the ratio of capital 
expenditures to non-cash assets. Dividends is defined as the ratio of dividends to non-cash assets. Cash Flow is defined as income 
after interest, and taxes, but before depreciation and provisions for common and/or preferred dividends, divided by non-cash assets 
R&D is defined as the ratio of research and development expenses to non-cash assets. Net Working Capital is defined as the ratio of 
working capital minus cash and marketable securities to non-cash assets. Industry Cash flow Volatility is defined as the standard 
deviation of the median of Cash Flow in an industry classified by two-digit SIC codes in the prior 5 years. Year Dummy Variables are 
the dummy variables for the years in the sample and not reported in the table. Industry Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for 
the industries defined by two-digit SIC codes and not reported in the table. Country Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for 
the countries in the sample and not reported in the table. The standard errors are clustered at the firm level. The p–value is noted in 
the parentheses. Panel C shows the difference in the coefficients of Union Membership between the two sub-groups. 
 
Panel A. Regressions with the measure of financial constraints is Total Payout. 
 
 Corporate Cash Holdings 
 OLS The Second Stage of 2SLS 
 Payout = 0 Payout > 0 Payout = 0 Payout > 0 
Intercept 2.912 2.340 4.563 3.207 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Union Membership -0.219 -0.072 -1.474 -0.600 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Size -0.120 -0.089 -0.200 -0.133 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Tobin’s Q 0.028 0.026 0.037 0.028 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Leverage -0.260 -0.246 -0.033 -0.046 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Capital Expenditure 0.951 0.432 1.559 0.574 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Cash Flow -0.341 -0.179 -0.038 -0.047 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
R&D 0.946 1.224 4.924 4.159 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Net Working Capital -0.360 -0.680 -0.798 -0.857 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Industry Cash Flow Volatility 0.246 0.286 0.376 0.521 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Year Dummy Variables YES YES YES YES 
Industry Dummy Variables YES YES YES YES 
Country Dummy Variables YES YES YES YES 
Number of Observations 262237 93478 262237 93478 
Adjusted R-square 0.54 0.48 0.35 0.33 
Over-identifying Restrictions Test (p-value)   0.36 0.31 






Panel B. Regressions with the measure of financial constraints is KZ index. 
 
 Corporate Cash Holdings 
 OLS The Second Stage of 2SLS 
 
KZ index <  
30th Percentile 
KZ index ≥  
70th Percentile 
KZ index <  
30th Percentile 
KZ index ≥  
70th Percentile 
Intercept 2.419 3.500 5.002 4.116 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Union Membership -0.140 -0.215 -1.070 -1.880 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Size -0.111 -0.159 -0.207 -0.166 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Tobin’s Q 0.050 -0.001 0.032 0.004 
 (0.01) （0.65） (0.01) （0.01） 
Leverage -0.335 -0.383 -0.588 -0.340 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Capital Expenditure 0.786 0.846 2.213 0.862 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Cash Flow -0.009 -0.570 -0.395 -0.370 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
R&D 0.362 1.582 1.019 0.769 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Net Working Capital -0.340 -0.183 -0.843 -0.170 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Industry Cash Flow Volatility 0.721 -0.244 0.931 -0.110 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) （0.11） 
Year Dummy Variables YES YES YES YES 
Industry Dummy Variables YES YES YES YES 
Country Dummy Variables YES YES YES YES 
Number of Observations 262237 93478 262237 93478 
Adjusted R-square 0.54 0.48 0.35 0.33 
Over-identifying Restrictions Test (p-value)   0.36 0.31 
Hausman Test (p-value)   0.01 0.01  
 
 
Panel C. Difference in the Coefficients of Union Membership 
 
The following table shows the difference in the coefficients of Union Membership between the two sub-groups separated 
by payout and reports the p-value of the t-test in the parentheses. 
 
 Union Membership 
 Financial constraints is measured by Total Payout Financial constraints is measured by KZ index 
 OLS Second Stage of 2SLS Estimation OLS Second Stage of 2SLS Estimation 
Difference -0.147 -0.874 0.075 0.810 






Table 2-9 The Market Value of Corporate Cash Holdings 
This table shows the regressions of the market value of corporate cash holdings for the sub-groups separated by 
union membership. We use a sample of 251947 firm-year observations from 66 countries between 1992 and 2013. 
Panel A shows the regressions. For each independent variable Xt is the level of the variable X in year t, divided by 
total assets in year t. dXt is the change in the level of the variable X from year t - 2 to year t, divided by total assets 
in year t (dXt = (Xt − Xt−2)/At). dXt+2 is the change in the level of the variable X from year t + 2 to year t, divided by 
total assets in year t (dXt+2 = (Xt+2 − Xt)/At). Market Value of Firm is the market value of the firm, which is defined 
as the sum of the market value of equity, the book value of short-term debt, and the book value of long-term debt. 
Union Membership is defined as the ratio of the total number of trade union members to the total number of paid 
employees in a country. Cash is cash and marketable securities. Earnings is earnings, which is defined as earnings 
before extraordinary items plus interest, deferred tax credits, and investment tax credits. A is total assets. R&D is the 
research and development expenses. Dividends is dividends. Interest Expense is the interest expenses. Net Assets is 
non-cash assets, which is defined as total assets minus cash and marketable securities. Year Dummy Variables are 
the dummy variables for the years in the sample and not reported in the table. Industry Dummy Variables are the 
dummy variables for the industries defined by two-digit SIC codes and not reported in the table. Country Dummy 
Variables are the dummy variables for the countries in the sample and not reported in the table. The standard errors 
are clustered at the firm level. The p–value is noted in the parentheses. Panel B shows the difference in the 
coefficients of Cash between the two sub-groups.  
Panel A. Regressions 
 
 Market Value of Firmt 
 
Union Membership  
< Median 
Union Membership  
≥ Median 
Intercept 1.238 1.233 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Cash t 1.454 1.006 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Earnings t -0.794 -0.360 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
dEarnings t 1.474 0.911 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
dEarnings t+2 -0.514 -0.330 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
R&D t 1.027 0.919 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
dR&D t 3.929 2.567 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
dR&D t+2 3.410 2.138 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Dividends t 11.152 7.618 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
dDividends t -0.044 0.359 
 (0.89) (0.05) 
dDividends t+2 4.990 3.204 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Interest Expense t 3.315 3.455 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
dInterest Expense t -0.238 -1.640 
 (0.18) (0.01) 
dInterest Expense t+2 0.696 0.447 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
dNet Assets t 0.031 0.046 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
dNet Assets t+2 0.261 0.169 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
dMarket Value of Firm t+2 -0.024 -0.007 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Year Dummy Variables YES YES 
Industry Dummy Variables YES YES 
Country Dummy Variables YES YES 
Number of Observations 129215 122732 





Panel B. Difference in the Coefficients of Cash 
 
The following table shows the difference in the coefficients of Cash between the two sub-groups separated by 











Table 2-10 Corporate Cash Holdings and Profitability 
This table shows OLS regressions for the sub-groups separated by union membership. We use a sample of 355715 
firm-year observations from 66 countries between 1992 and 2013. Panel A shows the regressions. ROA is defined 
as the ratio of EBIT to total assets. Union Membership is defined as the ratio of the total number of trade union 
members to the total number of paid employees in a country. Corporate Cash Holdings is defined as the ratio of 
cash and marketable securities to non-cash assets, where non-cash assets is calculated as total assets minus cash 
and marketable securities. Size is defined as natural logarithm of non-cash assets. Tobin’s Q is defined as market 
value of equity plus non-cash assets minus book value of equity, divided by non-cash assets. Leverage is defined 
as the ratio of long-term debts to non-cash assets. Capital Expenditures is defined as the ratio of capital 
expenditures to non-cash assets. Dividends is defined as the ratio of dividends to non-cash assets. Cash Flow is 
defined as income after interest, and taxes, but before depreciation and provisions for common and/or preferred 
dividends, divided by non-cash assets R&D is defined as the ratio of research and development expenses to non-
cash assets. Net Working Capital is defined as the ratio of working capital minus cash and marketable securities 
to non-cash assets. Year Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the years in the sample and not reported 
in the table. Industry Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the industries defined by two-digit SIC codes 
and not reported in the table. Country Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the countries in the sample 
and not reported in the table. The standard errors are clustered at the firm level. The p–value is noted in the 
parentheses. Panel B shows the difference in the coefficients of Corporate Cash Holdings between the two sub-
groups. 
Panel A. Regressions 
           ROA 
 
Union Membership  
< Median 
Union Membership  
≥ Median 
Intercept -0.463 -0.198  
(0.01) (0.01) 
Corporate Cash Holdings 0.031 0.003  
(0.01) (0.01) 
Size 0.030 0.013 
  (0.01) (0.01) 
Tobin’s Q 0.002 0.007 
  (0.01) (0.01) 
Leverage -0.068 -0.025 
  (0.01) (0.01) 
Capital Expenditure 0.061 0.040 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Dividends 0.309 2.079 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Cash Flow -0.719 -0.237 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
R&D 0.210 0.085 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Net Working Capital -0.148 -0.135 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Year Dummy Variables YES YES 
Industry Dummy Variables YES YES 
Country Dummy Variables YES YES 
Number of Observations 177400 178315 
Adjusted R-square 0.42 0.37 
 
Panel B. Difference in the Coefficients of Corporate Cash Holdings 
The following table shows the difference in the coefficients of Corporate Cash Holdings between the two sub-
groups separated by union membership and reports the p-value of the t-test in the parentheses. 
 








Table 2-11 Corporate Cash Holdings and Labor Costs 
This table shows OLS regressions about corporate cash holdings and labor costs for the sub-groups separated by 
union membership. We use a sample of 77380 firm-year observations from 63 countries between 1992 and 2013. 
Panel A shows the regressions. Log (Average Labor Costs) is defined as the logarithm of average labor costs, 
where average labor costs are the ratio of staff expenses to the number of employees. Union Membership is defined 
as the ratio of the total number of trade union members to the total number of paid employees in a country. 
Corporate Cash Holdings is defined as the ratio of cash and marketable securities to assets. Size is defined as the 
logarithm of market value of assets. Leverage is defined as the ratio of long-term debts to market value of assets. 
Average Sales per Employee is the ratio of sales to the number of employees. Tobin’s Q is defined as market value 
of equity plus assets minus book value of equity, divided by assets. Tangibility is the ratio of plant, property and 
equipment to assets. Year Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the years in the sample and not reported 
in the table. Industry Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the industries defined by two-digit SIC codes 
and not reported in the table. Country Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the countries in the sample 
and not reported in the table. The standard errors are clustered at the firm level. The p–value is noted in the 
parentheses. Panel B shows the difference in the coefficients of Corporate Cash Holdings between the two sub-
groups. 
 
Panel A. Regressions 
 






Intercept 7.193 7.630  
(0.01) (0.01) 
Corporate Cash Holdings 0.334 0.504  
(0.01) (0.01) 
Size -0.009 0.001  
(0.01) (0.69) 
Leverage -0.018 0.092  
(0.65) (0.04) 
Average Sales per Employee 0.464 0.428  
(0.01) (0.01) 
Tobin’s Q 0.001 0.008  
(0.82) (0.08) 
Tangibility -0.043 0.007  
(0.10) (0.81) 
Year Dummy Variables YES YES 
Industry Dummy Variables YES YES 
Country Dummy Variables YES YES 
Number of Observations 38981 38399 
Adjusted R-square 0.56 0.43 
 
 
Panel B. Difference in the Coefficients of Corporate Cash Holdings 
 
The following table shows the difference in the coefficients of Corporate Cash Holdings between the two sub-
groups separated by union membership and reports the p-value of the t-test in the parentheses. 
 








Table 2-12 Corporate Cash Holdings and Strikes & Lockouts: Country-level Analysis 
This table shows an OLS regression on the country-level analysis about Corporate Cash Holdings and Strikes & 
Lockouts. We convert all firm-level variables into country-level variables by taking the average of the variables 
across the countries. The sample includes 781 country-year observations between 1992 and 2013 from 52 countries. 
Strikes & Lockouts are defined as the total number of strikes and lockouts in a country. Corporate Cash Holdings 
is defined as the ratio of cash and marketable securities to non-cash assets, where non-cash assets is calculated as 
total assets minus cash and marketable securities. Labor Force is defined as the sum of all persons of working age 
who are employed and those who are unemployed. Size is defined as natural logarithm of non-cash assets. Tobin’s 
Q is defined as market value of equity plus non-cash assets minus book value of equity, divided by non-cash assets. 
Leverage is defined as the ratio of long-term debts to non-cash assets. Capital Expenditures is defined as the ratio 
of capital expenditures to non-cash assets. Dividends is defined as the ratio of dividends to non-cash assets. Cash 
Flow is defined as income after interest, and taxes, but before depreciation and provisions for common and/or 
preferred dividends, divided by non-cash assets R&D is defined as the ratio of research and development expenses 
to non-cash assets. Net Working Capital is defined as the ratio of working capital minus cash and marketable 
securities to non-cash assets. Cash flow Volatility is defined as the standard deviation of the median of Cash Flow 
in an industry classified by two-digit SIC codes in the prior 5 years. Year Dummy Variables are the dummy 
variables for the years in the sample and not reported in the table. Industry Dummy Variables are the dummy 
variables for the industries defined by two-digit SIC codes and not reported in the table. Country Dummy Variables 
are the dummy variables for the countries in the sample and not reported in the table. The p-value is noted in the 
parentheses. 
 
 Log (Country-level Strikes & Lockouts + 1) 
Intercept 9.855  
(0.01) 
Country-level Corporate Cash Holdings 0.616  
(0.08) 
Log (Country-level Labor Force) -0.384 
 (0.01) 
Country-level Size 0.220  
(0.03) 
Country-level Tobin’s Q 0.043  
(0.53) 
Country-level Leverage 0.544  
(0.60) 
Country-level Capital Expenditure -0.447  
(0.81) 
Country-level Dividends 2.446  
(0.36) 
Country-level Cash Flow -0.437  
(0.69) 
Country-level R&D 10.301  
(0.03) 
Country-level Net Working Capital 1.612  
(0.07) 
Country-level Cash Flow Volatility -4.705  
(0.10) 
Year Dummy Variables YES 
Industry Dummy Variables YES 
Country Dummy Variables YES 
Number of Observations 781 







Table 2-13 Robustness Check: Gender Gap 
This table shows the second-stage regressions of the 2SLS estimation for the sub-groups separated by the Gender 
Gap. We use a sample of 355715 firm-year observations from 66 countries between 1992 and 2013. Panel A shows 
the regressions. Gender Gap index is from the World Economic Forum and is constructed based on the equality 
between women and men across four key areas: health, education, economy and politics (see text for details). 
Corporate Cash Holdings is defined as the ratio of cash and marketable securities to non-cash assets, where non-
cash assets is calculated as total assets minus cash and marketable securities. Union Membership is defined as the 
ratio of the total number of trade union members to the total number of paid employees in a country. Size is defined 
as natural logarithm of non-cash assets. Tobin’s Q is defined as market value of equity plus non-cash assets minus 
book value of equity, divided by non-cash assets. Leverage is defined as the ratio of long-term debts to non-cash 
assets. Capital Expenditures is defined as the ratio of capital expenditures to non-cash assets. Dividends is defined 
as the ratio of dividends to non-cash assets. Cash Flow is defined as income after interest, and taxes, but before 
depreciation and provisions for common and/or preferred dividends, divided by non-cash assets R&D is defined 
as the ratio of research and development expenses to non-cash assets. Net Working Capital is defined as the ratio 
of working capital minus cash and marketable securities to non-cash assets. Industry Cash Flow Volatility is 
defined as the standard deviation of the median of Cash Flow in an industry classified by two-digit SIC codes in 
the prior 5 years. Year Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the years in the sample and not reported in 
the table. Industry Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the industries defined by two-digit SIC codes 
and not reported in the table. Country Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the countries in the sample 
and not reported in the table. The standard errors are clustered at the firm level. The p–value is noted in the 
parentheses. Panel B shows the difference in the coefficients of Union Membership between the two sub-groups. 
Panel A. Regressions 
 Corporate Cash Holdings 
 Second Stage of 2SLS 
 Gender Gap < Median Gender Gap≥ Median 
Intercept 3.092 4.085 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Union Membership -1.263 -1.264 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Size -0.130 -0.160 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Tobin’s Q 0.015 0.018 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Leverage -0.060 -0.125 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Capital Expenditure 1.192 0.739 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Dividends 3.124 2.223 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Cash Flow -0.010 -0.601 
 (0.27) (0.01) 
R&D 4.495 3.437 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Net Working Capital -0.800 -1.146 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Industry Cash Flow Volatility -0.155 0.673 
  (0.01) (0.01) 
Year Dummy Variables YES YES 
Industry Dummy Variables YES YES 
Country Dummy Variables YES YES 
Number of Observations 239191 116524 
Adjusted R-square 0.40 0.39 
Over-identifying Restrictions Test (p-value) 0.18 0.63 
Hausman Test (p-value) 0.01 0.01 
 
Panel B. Difference in the Coefficients of Union Membership 
The following table shows the difference in the coefficients of Union Membership between the two sub-groups 
separated by Gender Gap and reports the p-value of the t-test in the parentheses. 
 






Table 2-14 Robustness Check: Collective Bargaining Coverage Rate 
 
This table shows the robustness check by using Bargaining Coverage Rate as an alternative measure of bargaining 
power. We use a sample of 219720 firm-year observations from 55 countries between 2000 and 2013. Panel A 
shows the determinants of the Corporate Cash Holdings. We report the OLS regression and the second stage of 
two-stage least square estimation. Corporate Cash Holdings is defined as the ratio of cash and marketable 
securities to non-cash assets, where non-cash assets is calculated as total assets minus cash and marketable 
securities. Collective Bargaining Coverage Rate is calculated as the number of employees whose pay and/or 
conditions of employment are determined by one or more collective agreement(s) in a country divided by the total 
number of employees in that country.  Size is defined as natural logarithm of non-cash assets. Tobin’s Q is defined 
as market value of equity plus non-cash assets minus book value of equity, divided by non-cash assets. Leverage 
is defined as the ratio of long-term debts to non-cash assets. Capital Expenditures is defined as the ratio of capital 
expenditures to non-cash assets. Dividends is defined as the ratio of dividends to non-cash assets. Cash Flow is 
defined as income after interest, and taxes, but before depreciation and provisions for common and/or preferred 
dividends, divided by non-cash assets R&D is defined as the ratio of research and development expenses to non-
cash assets. Net Working Capital is defined as the ratio of working capital minus cash and marketable securities 
to non-cash assets. Industry Cash Flow Volatility is defined as the standard deviation of the median of Cash Flow 
in an industry classified by two-digit SIC codes in the prior 5 years. Year Dummy Variables are the dummy 
variables for the years in the sample and not reported in the table. Industry Dummy Variables are the dummy 
variables for the industries defined by two-digit SIC codes and not reported in the table. Country Dummy Variables 
are the dummy variables for the countries in the sample and not reported in the table. The p-value is noted in the 
parentheses. 
 
Panel B shows OLS regressions about the market value of corporate cash holdings for the sub-groups separated 
by Collective Bargaining Coverage Rate. We use a sample of 163788 firm-year observations from 55 countries 
between 2000 and 2013. For each independent variable Xt is the level of the variable X in year t, divided by total 
assets in year t. dXt is the change in the level of the variable X from year t - 2 to year t, divided by total assets in 
year t (dXt = (Xt − Xt−2)/At). dXt+2 is the change in the level of the variable X from year t + 2 to year t, divided 
by total assets in year t (dXt+2 = (Xt+2 − Xt)/A¬t). Market Value of Firm is the market value of the firm, which 
is defined as the sum of the market value of equity, the book value of short-term debt, and the book value of long-
term debt.  Cash is cash and marketable securities. Earnings is earnings, which is defined as earnings before 
extraordinary items plus interest, deferred tax credits, and investment tax credits. A is total assets. R&D is the 
research and development expenses. Dividends is dividends. Interest Expense is the interest expenses. Net Assets 
is non-cash assets, which is defined as total assets minus cash and marketable securities. Year Dummy Variables 
are the dummy variables for the years in the sample and not reported in the table. Industry Dummy Variables are 
the dummy variables for the industries defined by two-digit SIC codes and not reported in the table. Country 
Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the countries in the sample and not reported in the table. The p-
value is noted in the parentheses. Panel C shows the difference in the coefficients of Corporate Cash Holdings 













Table 2-14 (Continued) 
 
 
Panel A. Collective Bargaining Coverage Rate and Corporate Cash Holdings 
 
 Corporate Cash Holdings 
 OLS The Second Stage of 2SLS 
Intercept 3.321 3.450 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Collective Bargaining Coverage Rate -0.234 -1.063 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Size -0.139 -0.140 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Tobin’s Q 0.022 0.021 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Leverage -0.146 -0.159 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Capital Expenditure 1.038 1.050 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Dividends 2.325 2.367 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Cash Flow -0.362 -0.362 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
R&D 3.870 3.842 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Net Working Capital -1.028 -1.032 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Industry Cash Flow Volatility 0.426 0.414 
  (0.01) (0.01) 
Year Dummy Variables YES YES 
Industry Dummy Variables YES YES 
Country Dummy Variables YES YES 
Number of Observations 290565 290565 
Adjusted R-square 0.41 0.41 
Over-identifying Restrictions Test  0.31 






Table 2-14 (Continued) 
 
Panel B. Market Value of Cash - Regressions 
 
 Market Value of Firmt 
 
Collective Bargaining Coverage Rate  
< Median 
Collective Bargaining Coverage Rate  
≥ Median 
Intercept 1.462 1.134 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Cash t 1.485 1.054 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Earnings t -0.754 -0.361 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
dEarnings t 1.548 0.737 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
dEarnings t+2 -0.518 -0.338 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
R&D t 0.995 0.891 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
dR&D t 4.029 2.299 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
dR&D t+2 3.303 1.854 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Dividends t 10.746 9.014 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
dDividends t 0.758 0.079 
 (0.04) (0.64) 
dDividends t+2 4.970 3.617 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Interest Expense t 3.192 1.620 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
dInterest Expense t -0.065 0.506 
 (0.74) (0.01) 
dInterest Expense t+2 0.653 0.625 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
dNet Assets t 0.030 0.065 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
dNet Assets t+2 0.261 0.184 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
dMarket Value of Firm t+2 -0.018 -0.021 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Year Dummy Variables YES YES 
Industry Dummy Variables YES YES 
Country Dummy Variables YES YES 
Number of Observations 111493 106870 
Adjusted R-square 0.37 0.34 
 
Panel C. Market Value of Cash - Difference in the Coefficients of Cash 
 
The following table shows the difference in the coefficients of Cash between the two sub-groups separated by 
Collective Bargaining Coverage Rate and reports the p-value of the t-test in the parentheses. 
 







Chapter 3 Labor Unions and Dividends: Evidence 
from International data 
3.1 Introduction 
Labor union represents the benefits of workers strengthen the bargaining power of 
employees in collective bargaining. The presence of labor unions has impacts on firms’ 
financial policies. For example, Freeman (1986) suggests that some firms take costly measures 
to prevent union organizing and hiring consultants. Several other measures are also taken to 
improve bargaining benefits, such as underfunding pension plans (Ippolito 1985). Furthermore, 
firms strategically use financial policies as bargaining tools against labor unions. For instance, 
firms tend to lower liquidity in their balance sheet to gain better bargaining positions. Bronars 
and Deere (1991) state that firms strategically increase leverage to shelter income by issuing 
debt rather than increasing labor wages when there are labor unions. Further, Matsa (2010) 
finds that a firm with the external finance constraints has an incentive to use the cash flow 
demands of debt service to improve its bargaining position with workers 
In this chapter, we study the relation between labor unions and dividends in the 
international setting. Our paper is motivated by the following three reasons.  First, dividend 
policy is an essential corporate policy in the international setting. Pinkowits, Stulz and 
Williamson (2006) argue that firms in countries with poor investment protection pay dividends 
to get more private benefits by using international data from 35 countries. Payout dividends 
reduce the financial resources available to a firm, which also reduces the resources available 
for potential collective bargaining organized by labor unions. It implies that a firm may 
strategically choose corporate dividend policy with the presence of labor unions. For example, 
suppose a firm has a lot of cash holdings, labor unions recognize this and may organize the 




cash by using dividends, this reduces cash holdings in the firm and can reduce the likelihood 
of the occurrence of the collective bargaining organized by labor unions. 
Second, previous literature has examined how labor unions affect dividends by using the 
US data. For example, (e.g., Chen et al., 2015; He et al., 2016; Chino, 2016). Since labor unions 
exist in many countries around the world, the previous literature has found that there is a 
substantial difference between US and other countries in the world. For example, Visser (2006) 
examines the data of labor unions in 24 countries, and finds that the union density ranges from 
8.1% to 78.0% in 2001. Among them, the union density in the US is 12.8%, ranking at the 22nd 
place. It implies that the unionization rates between the US data and the international data are 
significantly different. Therefore, if we use the international data of labor unions, there will be 
a larger cross-section variation in the data. This can provide a more effective research setting 
on the relation between labor unions and dividends. This motivates us to conduct the research 
in the international setting.  
Third, the previous literature has found different results in terms of the relation between 
labor unions corporate financial policies by using US data and international data separately. 
For example, Matsa (2010) uses the US data and finds that there is a positive relation between 
the strength of labor unions and leverage with the presence of external financial constraints, 
and he interprets the results as the supporting evidence for the bargaining hypothesis. However, 
Simintzi, Vig and Volpin (2015) find the opposite results with the international data. They find 
that there is a negative relation between union density and leverage, and argue that this is not 
consistent with the theory of debt as a bargaining tool. Instead, they argue that the employment 
protection increases operating leverage and crowds out financial leverage. Therefore, it is 
possible that the impact of labor unions on corporate policies are different between the US data 
and the international data. This motivates us to examine the relation between labor unions and 




We develop two hypotheses. First, the bargaining hypothesis argues that firms 
strategically choose dividends to gain the bargaining advantage against labor unions. On one 
hand, when a firm has a higher payout, this can increase the risk of the shortage of corporate 
liquidity. As a result, labor unions will decrease their demands for benefits from the firm due 
to the consideration of bankruptcy risk. On the other hand, suppose a firm has higher dividends, 
this may send out a positive signal about future profitability. Moreover, this may also reveal 
that the firm is less financially constrained. To avoid this positive signaling situation which 
may increase the likelihood of the occurrence of collective bargaining organized by labor 
unions, a firm will reduce the dividends to prevent sending out this kind of positive signals. 
Therefore, the bargaining hypothesis can affect the relation between labor unions and dividends 
in two possible directions through two different mechanisms.  
Second, the operating leverage hypothesis suggests that stronger labor unions increase 
both operating risk and rigidity of labor costs, and that these two effects lead to dividends based 
on the trade-off perspective. Suppose a firm has stronger labor unions, the firm will have higher 
expenditures due to the higher rigidity of labor costs. According to the trade-off perspective, 
the firm needs to hold more cash to meet the demand of higher expenditures. Moreover, 
stronger labor unions are also associated with a higher operating risk. According to the trade-
off perspective, the firm also needs to hold more cash due to the precautionary motive. In this 
case, the firm will reduce the dividends to accumulate corporate cash holdings. Therefore, the 
operating leverage hypothesis predicts that there is a negative relation between the strength of 
labor unions and dividends.  
We use a sample of 355715 firm-year observations from 66 countries in our empirical 
analysis. We use the country-level union membership to measure the bargaining power of labor 
unions across countries that is defined as total number of trade union members to the total 




apply the instrumental variables approach in our analysis to study the relation between union 
membership and dividends. In addition, we conduct the relevant tests to ensure our instruments 
are valid and exogenous. 
We find that firms use dividends to gain bargaining position to labor unions. When there 
is higher union membership in a country, firms tend to pay more dividends. Our results show 
that a one standard deviation increase in the country-level union membership leads to a 0.019 
increase in the level of dividends payout, corresponding to an increase in dividends with a dollar 
value of 3.033 million dollars. In addition, we divide our sample into sub-groups concerned 
with characteristics that can affect the bargaining power of labor unions. We find that the 
positive relation between country-level union membership and dividends is stronger for firms 
in countries with weaker employment protection legislation and for firms in countries with a 
higher degree of labor bargaining centralization.  
Because of this positive relation, we conduct event study about how the country-level 
union membership affects the around the date of dividend change. We find that the 
announcement return is higher for firms in a country with higher union membership around the 
announcement date of dividend increase, and lower for firms in a country with lower union 
membership around the announcement date of dividend decrease. Moreover, we examine how 
labor unions affect the operating performance around the event of dividend changes. We find 
that the net ROA change is positively correlated with the union membership around the event 
date of dividend increase, and negatively correlated with the union membership around the 
event date of dividend decrease. 
Our findings are consistent with the bargaining hypothesis from the perspective of the 
availability of resources. They imply that a strategically choose dividends to gain bargaining 




Our paper makes several contributions. First, the existed paper show that there are mixed 
results of the study about the relation between dividends and labor unions. Chen et al (2015) 
find that the likelihood of share repurchases are lower when the labor power from labor unions 
are stronger, because firms tend to avoid the higher leverage ratios with US data. He et al. (2016) 
use the election data and find that a firm’s payout ratio is lower in the following years after the 
union election passes than the firms fail in the union election. However, Chino (2016) argue 
that there are significant heterogenous effects of unionization on payout, and these effects are 
negative for low-profitability firms and positive for high-profitability firms. Due to these 
different results, we conduct analysis with international data and find labor unions generally 
increase dividends because unions play an essential role in the collective bargaining. 
Second, our research extends the literature on dividends in the international setting. There 
is a large literature on dividends using US data, European data and international data. Among 
the previous papers that use international data, Chay and Suh (2009) and Hoberg and Prabhala 
(2009) find out a negative relation between dividend payout and future cash flow in U.S. and 
international markets. Pinkowitz, Stultz and Willianms (2006) find that shareholders pay out 
dividends to gain private benefits in a country with poor investor protection across 35 countries. 
La Porta et al. (2000) use data from 33 countries to test the agency model of dividends. They 
argue that the stronger minority shareholder rights are associated with higher dividend payouts. 
To our knowledge, no previous paper has examined the relation between labor unions and 
dividends in the international setting.  
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the hypotheses. Section 3 
describes the data and the variables. Section 4 discusses the methodology. Section 5 presents 
the results of large sample analysis. Section 6 shows the results of smaller sample analysis. 




3.2 Literature Review 
We review the comprehensive literature about dividends in this section.  
Since Allen and Michaely (2003); DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Skinner (2008); Mensa, 
Michaely and Schmalz (2016) have already review the existing literature about dividends from 
1956. We aim to review the literature only relative to our study about labor unions and 
dividends, instead of demonstrating a complete literature review of the whole history about 
dividends development. Therefore, this section focuses on the signaling theory and agency 
theory which is relevant to our research and review little literature about the tax effects.  
The seminal study about dividends is established by Lintner (1956), and Miller and 
Modigliani (1961). Lintner (1956) interview 28 listed companies with different financial 
characteristics about the corporate dividend decisions. He demonstrates three main findings: 
first, firms set a stable dividend policy and adjust the policy suppressed to previous dividend 
payments when necessary. Second, firms’ earnings are the most critical determinant of change 
in corporate dividend policy. Third, firms tend to smooth the dividend policy and prefer to 
change other financial policies rather than adjust the dividend payments. Accordingly, Lintner 
develop the partial adjustment model to describe the determinants of dividend payments, which 
is widely used in subsequent study about corporate dividend policy. For example, Fama and 
Babiak (1968) conduct various test on Lintner’s partial adjustment model by using the data of 
392 major industrial firms from 1946 to 1964. They find evidence that Lintner’s model 
performed well in dividend prediction for individual firms. Moreover, Allen, Bernardo and 
Welch (2000) find evidence supporting the dividend smoothing idea when they study firms’ 
ownership of institutional investors. Since institutional investors are more favour of stocks 
paying dividends because they have more information about firms’ quality than individual 
investors. If a firm mitigates dividend payments, it leads to institutional investors loss because 




Recently, Leary and Michaely (2011) show that the smoothing trend of dividend payments is 
increasing in US companies since the 1930s. Since share repurchases accounting for a 
substantial proportion of firms’ payout policy in the past two decades, there are less dividend 
changes after the popularity of share repurchase. Dewenter and Warther (1998), and Michaely 
and Roberts (2012) provide more evidence from Japan and UK separately. 
Before Miller and Modigliani (1961) 27 , economists believed that higher dividend 
payments are associated to higher value of firms. For example, Gordon (1959) claims that the 
value of a firm is determined by the dividend payment in the next year and investors’ required 
rate of return. Miller and Modigliani (1961) first propose that a firm’s dividend policy is 
irrelevant to the value of this firm in a perfect and complete capital market. Instead, firms’ value 
is affected by the optimal investment. They emphasize that investors can create their own 
homemade dividend policy by trading equity properly, because there is a tradeoff between 
dividends at two individual dates. Therefore, the net dividends are concerned as the residual of 
the return of investment and retained earnings for the future growth opportunities.  
However, MM’s model is based on the assumptions of perfect markets with no taxes, 
symmetric information, no transaction costs, complete markets and no agency problems. 
Obviously, stock price reacts to dividend changes in real world. Subsequent economists raise 
various issues about relaxing these assumptions and conduct intensive studies about dividend 
policies in the real world. For example, Black (1976) includes tax and transaction costs in his 
analysis and introduces two puzzles about the dividend irrelevance theory: why firms pay 
substantial dividends and why investors buy stocks of firms paying dividends?   
Over decades of studies, financial economists propose two main theories about firms’ 
dividend policy: signaling theory and agency theory. 
                              




3.2.1 Signaling theory 
Since Lintner (1956) propose that firms tend to smooth the dividend payments, dividend 
change is considered as a signal of firms’ prospects.  Besides, unlike the assumption in Miller 
and Modigliani (1961), capital markets are imperfect, there is information asymmetry problems 
between investors and insiders. Managers use dividend policy as a signal to convey information 
about future profitability to shareholders. Therefore, signaling theory predict a positive relation 
between dividends and firms’ future profitability. 
There is amber literature provides theoretic supports to signaling theory. For example, 
Bhattacharya (1979) theoretically analysis the signaling effects of managers on investors in 
imperfect markets with asymmetry information problem. He argues that dividend payments are 
costly in that paying dividends leads to extra transaction costs; only good firms send signals to 
investors by dividend payments while bad firms cannot afford these signals. It inspires investors 
to believe firms announcing higher dividends are associated higher market value. Moreover, 
John and Williams (1985) note that managers have superior information than investors under 
the assumption of taxed dividends. Investors increase their ownership of these firms only when 
their benefits from firms’ future better performance are high enough to cover the costs of tax. 
In equilibrium of their signaling model, firms optimally increase dividends when mangers 
expect higher future cash flows which provide benefits more than the costs. Another essential 
theoretical model of signaling theory comes from Miller and Rock (1985), they include the 
distortion costs of investments in his study as the extra costs of dividend payments which are 
used to signaling firms’ profitability. They show that firms invest in projects and then use the 
cash flow from these projects to finance dividend payments and other new investments.  
Financial economists also conduct empirical studies on the signaling theory, but they find 
mixed results. Some researchers find no or modest relation between dividends and earnings 




the hypothesis that dividend policy predicts future earnings over the sample of dividend 
payments in 310 firms between 1946 and 1968. He finds that the magnitude of future earnings 
changes related to dividends changes is small, although the coefficient is positive.28 Moreover, 
Benartzi, Michaely and Thaler (1997) show that dividend changes are associated with earnings 
changes in current year and last year, while future earnings in firms whom do not change 
dividends are more likely to decrease than in firms whom increase dividends.  
Some literature even finds opposite results of signaling theory. For example, Benartzi, 
Michaely, and Thaler (1997) find firms’ earnings increases after dividend cuts in following two 
years. Healy and Palepu (1988) also find similar results. Grullon, Michaely and Swaminathan 
(2002) find that both future earnings and firms’ profitability decrease after dividend increases. 
DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Skinner (1996) investigate 145 firms listed in NYSE whom 
experienced consecutive earnings growth for more than nine years and then stop to decline in 
it. They show that 68.3% of firms increase dividends in the year that the firms’ earnings start 
decreasing because managers still expect earnings growth in future. They argue that dividend 
changes do not convey reliable information of future earnings and dividend changes are not 
useful signals to outside investors. 
There are also literauture find empirical evidence supporting the signaling theory. For 
example, Brickley (1983) selects 35 firms with dividends increases more than 20% and 
construct a sample to test the relation of earnings growth and dividend changes. He finds 
significant earnings growth in the year and after the year of dividend increase. Healy and 
Palepus (1988) also find significant increase in earnings in the following two years of dividend 
initiates while decrease in earnings after omitting dividend payments with a small sample of 
172 firms. Moreover, Kaestner and Liu (1998) also find consistent results with signaling theory. 
                              





They find the size of dividend payments is the most important determinant of the variat ion of 
firms’ stock price responding to the signal of the dividend announcement. Recently, Guay and 
Harford (2000); Jagannathan, Stephens and Weismach (2000); Nissim and Ziv (2001); Koch 
and Sun (2004) and Lie (2005) support the signaling theory with consistent empirical results 
over larger samples. For example, Nissim and Ziv (2001) demonstrate strong signaling effects 
of dividend announcements on firms’ earnings changes over a sample of 10,666 observations. 
However, Grullon, Michaely, Thaler, and Benartzi (2005) argue that it is more rationale to use 
the nonlinear patterns with Fama and French (2000) model in the measure of earnings, rather 
than the mean reversion which is used by Nissim and Ziv (2001). They find there is no relation 
between dividend changes and future earnings and suggest that dividend increase is not a 
reliable signal of firms’ future profitability. Therefore, the overall accumulated literature about 
signaling theory on future earnings is still controversy. 
The literature on the market response to the dividend signaling is enormous. Michaely, 
Thaler and Womack (1995) examine the market reactions to the initiates and omissions of 
dividend payments over all NYSE listed firms from 1964 to 1988. They find that the stock price 
increases over 3% after the initiates and decreases 7% after omissions, these changes are 
stronger than the stock price changes after earnings changes. Benartzi, Michaely, and Thaler 
(1997) show that there is significant abnormal return in the year before the dividend changes 
with and in the next three years after the dividend changes. Firms have -28.1% (8.6%) abnormal 
return in the previous one year of dividend cuts (increase), and they have -15.3% (8.0%) 
cumulative abnormal return in following three years after dividend omissions (increase). 
Grullon, Michaely and Swaminathan (2002) also find similar results over another sample 
period of 1967-1993. It is controversy that dividend policy signals the future information as 




In sum, there is no officially accepted signaling model because it is difficult to find a 
model which can explain all the mixed results.  
3.2.2 Agency theory 
Modigliani and Miller (1961) assume that there is no agency problem in the perfect 
markets and prop that only investments affect firms’ value. However, there are conflicts of 
managers’ interests and shareholders’ interests in our real world which lead to agency costs 
from cash distribution.29 Dividend policy is no longer irrelevant to firms’ value that can be used 
to lower the cash reserves that lower agency costs. Therefore, agency theory predicts a negative 
relation between dividends and agency costs. 
Financial economists study the agency theory of dividend policy with theoretical analysis. 
For example, Easterbrook (1984) propose two sources of agency costs of dividends: the 
monitoring of managers and the risk aversion on the part of managers. He explains that 
managers are risk averse, and they tend to invest in safe projects with lower risks and lower 
returns while shareholders prefer to take risky projects for higher expected return. He argues 
that dividend payments can reduce both these two costs. In terms of monitoring costs, when 
firms’ internal funds are payout as dividends, managers seek external funds to finance projects. 
Consequently, more relevant participants in the process of external financing such as creditors 
will monitor managers’ behavior. In terms of risk aversion issue, dividends mitigate managers’ 
risks by encouraging the equity financing. In the two lines, dividend payments lower the agency 
costs. Jensen (1986) develops the free cash flow hypothesis about the agency problems 
associated to dividend policy. In free cash flow hypothesis, he argues that the surplus after 
financing profitable projects becomes free cash flow which lead to agency problems. He 
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highlights the benefits of paying dividends because dividend payments decrease the free cash 
flow after investments.  
Financial economists produce abundant empirical papers on the agency theory. For 
example, Rozeff (1982) state that there is a tradeoff between the lower agency costs and the 
higher transaction costs of external financing when firms raise dividends. Firms pursue the 
optimal dividends with minimum total costs of agency problems and transaction of external 
funds. Llyod, Jahera and Page (1985) include firms’ size in Rozeff’s (1982) tradeoff model by 
using the data of 957 US firms in 1984. Their results are consistent to Rozeff (1982) and they 
argue that size is also very important in the analysis of dividend policy. Rao and White (1994) 
apply the data of 66 private US firms in the tradeoff model to study the agency theory in private 
firms. They find consistent results and argue that it is because private firms also are under 
monitoring of bankers, accountants and so on.  
Moreover, La Porta et al. (2000) use two models to examine the relation of dividends 
policy and agency costs over a sample of 4103 firms from 33 countries. In the outcome model, 
dividends are the outcome of the better legal protection to investors who can claim dividends 
from managers. In the substitute model, dividends are the substitute for effective legal 
protection and firms with in a country with more moral hazard will pay more dividends to gain 
reputation among investors for future financing demands. Their findings add evidence of 
agency theory from international data.  
Inspired by La Porta et al. (2000), subsequent researchers pay more attention to the 
relation of dividend policy and governance mechanisms. For example, Fenn and Liang (2001) 
examine the management ownership and payout policy by using a sample of 1100 nonfinancial 
firms from Standard & Poor’s 1500 in a period of 1993 to 1997. They find a positive relation 
between the management ownership and dividend payments and argue that firms use dividend 




the relation between the institutional ownership and payout policy in US listed firms during the 
sample period of 1980-1996. They find institutional investors prefer firms have dividend 
payments rather than firms do not pay dividends. However, they find no evidence that the level 
of dividends is associated with institutional ownership. In addition, Michaely and Roberts 
(2012) provide evidence supporting agency theory from UK firms when they compare the 
dividend smoothing phenomenon in public firms and private firms. They find public firms pay 
more dividends than private firms, because there are more agency problems in public firms.  
More recently, Acharya and Lambrecht (2013) examine the income and payout 
smoothing when there is asymmetry information between investors and managers. Although 
managers set a smooth dividend policy to meet shareholders’ demands, they tend to decrease 
the future expectation of income by distorting production when they have more information 
about firms’ income. The level of underproduction problem is negatively related to the 
management ownership. Lambrecht and Myers (2012, 2017) present a dynamic model to test 
the interaction among investments, payout policy and debt. They assume that managers are risk 
averse, so that firms are underinvested because the agency problem between shareholders and 
managers.  
Financial economists also apply the agency theory in the empirical research linking firms’ 
dividend policy to nonfinancial stakeholders such as labor unions. However, early studies find 
modest effects of labor unions on dividend policy. For example, DeAngelo and DeAngelo 
(1990, 1991) conduct case studies about the labor concessions in US firms and find weak 
evidence that firms may decrease dividend payments to extract wage concessions from 
collective bargaining with labor unions. In addition, Matsa (2006) find insignificant relation 
between unionization rate and firms’ dividends. Chino (2015) state that the relation between 
labor unions and payout policy is determined by firms’ profitability. He finds labor unions have 




profitability. He argues that his results support the agency theory that firms payout dividends 
to prevent agency problems when there are internal liquidity reserves in firms with high 
profitability.  
3.2.3 Other theories  
3.2.3.1 Residual theory 
According to Miller and Modigliani (1961), firms pay out dividends after their cash flows 
satisfy all financing demands of profitable investments.  In this line, dividends can be viewed 
as the residual of earnings and investments. Firms first guarantee the financing demands of 
investments, then they set dividend policy with the remaining cash flows. The residual theory 
implies that firms strategically cut dividends to finance investments. Therefore, the residual 
theory predict that investments have negative effects on firms’ dividend policy. 
There are some literature supporting the negative relation. For example, Alli, Khan, and 
Ramirez (1993) test the relation between firms’ capital expenditure and dividend policy and 
find that dividends are negatively associated with capital expenditure. They argue that their 
results are consistent with the residual theory. For another example, Slater and Zwirlein (1996) 
find, within a sample consisting of S&P 400 Industrial Index firms between 1986 and 1989, 
that dividend payout is negatively related with investment.  
The costs of external financing present an explanation for the negative effects of 
investments on dividends. In line of financing hierarchy theory, external financing is costly and 
will reduce firms’ value. Firms reduce dividends to avoid the costs of external financing. For 
example, Fama and French (2001, 2002). In Fama and French (2001), they observe a significant 
drop from 66.5% in 1978 to 20.8% in 1999 for the proportion of US firms who pay cash 
dividends. This is because that the new firms with low profitability but more growth 
opportunities account for increasing proportion of the listed firms. These newly listed firms 




liquidity to do so. In another paper, Fama and French (2002) exploit the relation of dividends 
and debt to test the trade-off theory and pecking order theory. They find that firms pay out more 
dividends when there are less profitable projects and less growth opportunities because firms 
have incentives to avoid costly external finance, which is consistent with the financing 
hierarchy theory.  
More empirical paper combines the residual theory with the agency theory, because the 
negative effects of investments on dividends as predicted in residual theory are associated with 
lower agency costs. For example, Lang and Litzenberger (1989) use Tobin’s Q as a measure of 
the overinvestment to test the market response to the dividend announcements between 1979 
and 1984. They find that firms with Q<1 who have less growth opportunities corresponding to 
lower agency problem react with higher abnormal return on dividend announcement than firms 
with Q>1 who have more growth opportunities and severe agency problems. Grullon, Michaely 
and Swaminathan (2002) present that higher dividend payments reduce firms’ systematic risk 
and firms’ capital expenditures decrease in the year after the dividends increase over the sample 
period of 1967-1993. They suggest that firms end the growth process and reach the maturity 
stage with less investment opportunities and more free cash flows, so that firms increase 
dividends to decrease free cash flows in that these surplus cash leads to agency costs. Michaely 
and Roberts (2012) also provide evidence from private firms by using data from UK firms. they 
find private firms set dividend policy after their investment decisions have been made. 
However, recent studies show that dividends are not the simply the residual of cash flows 
after satisfying the investments demands. For example, Brav, Graham, Harvey, and Michaely 
(2005) survey 384 managers to understand the managers’ motives of making payout policy 
decisions. They argue some managers even give up profitable investments before they cut 




3.2.3.2 Executive stock option hypothesis 
According to the formula of Black and Scholes (1973), dividend policy affects the price 
of stock options, because the underlying stock price decreases after the dividend payments. As 
a result, managers have the incentive to reduce dividends to protect their own wealth of stock 
options. Accordingly, the executive stock option hypothesis predicts a negative relation 
between managerial stock options and dividends. For example, Lambert, Lanen and Larcker 
(1989) investigate how initial adoption of stock options for executives affect firms’ dividend 
policy by using the data of 221 US firms who adopted options since 1949. They find that the 
higher current dividend payments will decrease the expected dividends in the future. This 
motives managers who have stock options to reduce dividends to protect their own wealth with 
the adoption of stock options for executives. 
3.2.3.3 Catering hypothesis 
The above research assumes that people are rational to make financial decisions, however, 
behavior finance suggests that people have irrational behaviors and provide another explanation 
of dividend policy.30 For example, based on the self-control theory proposed by Thaler and 
Shefrin (1981) and Shefrin and Statman (1984), Barberis and Thaler (2003) propose an open 
question regarding why investors are happy to accept the dividend policy given that a higher 
tax rate is associated with dividend than capital gain tax rate associated with repurchase. One 
of the explanations proposed by the behavior finance is that investors have self-control problem 
so that they prefer dividends to deal with their self-control problem. Barberis and Thaler (2003) 
state that dividend payments can help people “only consume the dividend, but don’t touch the 
portfolio capital”. 
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Baker and Wurgler (2004) propose the catering hypothesis of dividends by using the US 
data over a period of 1962-2000. They find that managers pay dividends to cater to investors’ 
preference. They argue that when investor put a stock premium on dividend payers, firms pay 
dividend to cater to such demand of investors. However, when an investor prefers non-dividend 
payers, firms do not pay dividend.  
3.2.4 Tax 
There is an extensive traditional literature about the tax perspective for dividends. 
Various theories have been proposed in this literature. However, Brav, Graham, Harvey and 
Michaely (2004) argue that tax plays only of second importance in the role of determining firms’ 
dividend policy, so we don’t focus on the tax effect in our study, we only briefly review the 
literature about tax.31 For example, Miller and Modigliani (1961) propose the clientele effects 
from the tax perspective for dividends. They argue that investors choose firms with different 
dividend policies according to their different marginal tax rates. Miller and Scholes (1978) 
develop a dynamic model of the tax clientele effect on dividends. Subsequently, Kalay (1982) 
conduct an empirical test of this model by using the data of ex-dividend day stock price with a 
sample of 2,540 cash dividends payments between 1966 and 1967 and argue that the results are 
consistent with tax induced clientele effect . of MM model. 
3.3 Hypothesis 
We develop the hypotheses in this section. 
3.3.1 Bargaining hypothesis 
We argue that labor unions can affect dividends from the bargaining perspective through 
two channels.  
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3.2.1.1 The channel through the availability of resources and bankruptcy risk 
It has been found in literature that corporate financial policies are affected by the 
collective bargaining. For example, it has been recognized widely that leverage is affected by 
potential bargaining between a firm and labor unions (e.g., Baldwin, 1983; Bronars and Deere, 
1991; Perotti and Spier, 1993; Matsa, 2010). In terms of other corporate financial policies, 
Klasa, Maxwell and Ortiz-Molina (2009) find that corporate cash holdings are affected by the 
bargaining power of labor unions. In this literature, the common rationale is that when a firm 
increases its bankruptcy risk through various corporate financial policies, this can strengthen a 
firm’s bargaining position because the bankruptcy is costly for employees. As a result, 
employees will accept the lower wage with either the increase in leverage or the reduction in 
cash holdings.  
A firm can reduce the availability of resources through increasing or decreasing dividend 
payments. Guay and Harford (2000) find that firms increase dividends when they experience 
relatively permanent cash-flow shocks. This change in dividends affect the financial resources 
available for bargaining between firms and labor unions over a longer period. Moreover, 
Jagannathan, Stephens and Weisbach (2000) find that dividend policy is a non-flexible policy 
that affect the future financial resources. It also strengthens the bargaining power of firms in 
future collective bargaining with labor unions. When a firm pays more dividends, this also 
increases the bankruptcy risk which plays an important role in the collective bargaining as 
indicated in the above rationale. For example, Chino (2016) finds that firms with higher 
profitability has a higher payout with the presence of strong labor unions, and argues that this 
is consistent with the rent extraction hypothesis that firms use payout policies to reduce the rent 
extracted by potential collective bargaining of labor unions. Following this mechanism, we 




dividends due to the consideration from the bargaining perspective. Therefore, we have the 
following hypothesis.  
Hypothesis 1A: The bargaining hypothesis predicts that there is a positive relation 
between labor unions and dividends through the channel of availability of resources and 
bankruptcy risk. 
3.2.1.2 The channel through the signaling effect 
It has been extensively discussed in the literature about the signaling role of dividends. 
Vermaelen (1981) argues that firms can use share repurchases to signal future profitability. 
Miller and Rock (1985) find that firms use the decrease in dividend to signal investment 
opportunity. In this literature, a firm can send out credible signals through change in dividends.  
Moreover, it has been widely recognized in the corporate finance literature that dividend 
payments are related with a firm’s financial constraints. For example, Fazzari, Glenn, and 
Bruce. (1988) use the dividend payments of a firm to measure the degree of financial constraints. 
For other examples, Campello, Graham, and Harvey (2010); Hadlock and Pierce (2010) also 
use dividend payments as a measure of financial constraints.  
When a firm increases dividend payments, labor unions may view this as a signal of 
positive future profitability or a lower degree of financial constraints due to the above 
mechanisms. In this case, labor unions will increase the demand of resources from the firm 
because they will think that the firm either has good potential of future profitability or a lower 
degree of financial constraints.  
By foreseeing this mechanism, a firm will reduce the dividend payments to avoid the 
above situation where the dividend payments send out a signal to encourage the higher demand 
from labor unions. We expect that this situation is more likely to occur with the presence of 




collective bargaining after viewing the dividends change as a signal. Therefore, we have the 
following hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 1B: The bargaining hypothesis predicts that there is a negative relation 
between labor unions and dividends through the channel of signaling. 
3.2.2 Operating leverage hypothesis 
Labor unions try to increase their benefits from firms’ operating income. Firms increase 
labor costs because of the threats from labor unions. It leads to higher operating leverage. Chen, 
Kacperczyk, and Ortiz-Molina (2011) find evidence that the presence of labor unions decreases 
the operating flexibility and increases cost of equity of firms. 
The higher union membership increases the operating risk of a firm, so this firm have to 
keep some financial resources. Simintzi, Vig and Volpin (2015) find that the higher union 
density is associated to higher labor costs which increases the higher operating leverage and 
lower financial leverage. Furthermore, He et al. (2016) find firms tend to keep a lower payout 
ratio in order to give signals labor force that firms prefer to finance investment rather than pay 
out to shareholders. 
If a firm has more dividend payments, it may have insufficient financial resources to 
withstand the operating risk. Given this operating leverage risk from labor unions, we expect 
that a firm will pay out less dividends when there is higher union membership. 
Hypothesis 2: The operating leverage hypothesis predicts that there is negative relation 
between labor unions and the dividend payments. 
3.2.3 Combining the hypotheses 
We use the following table to show the hypotheses developed above. In the table, a 
positive sign “+” indicates a positive relation between the strength of labor unions and the 





The relationship between the strength of labor unions and the dividends 
The bargaining hypothesis The operating leverage hypothesis 
The availability of resources The signaling effect  
+ − − 
 
3.4 Data and Variables 
We describe data and variables in this section. 
3.4.1 Data 
We get the data from the following sources. We use Compustat North America database 
to get the financial data for US and Canadian firms. We use Compustat Global database to get 
the financial data for firms in other countries. We get the stock return data from the CRSP 
database for US and Canadian firms. We get the stock return data from Datastream database 
for firms in other countries. We also get the data of stock market index in each country from 
Datastream database. We convert the data in foreign currencies to the corresponding data in 
U.S. dollars by using the monthly exchange rates from Compustat Global database. We get the 
country-level data of union membership from ILOStat database maintained by International 
Labor Organization.  
The sample period is from 1992 to 2013. The data starts from 1992 because we need to 
use the data in the prior five years to calculate the industry cash flow volatility, while the data 
in Compustat Global database starts from 1987. We follow the literature (e.g., Pinkowitz, Stulz 
and Williamson, 2013) and exclude firms with less than 5 million U.S. dollars in total assets or 
market capitalization. We also follow the literature and exclude financial firms (SIC codes 
between 6000 and 6999). We exclude the observations with incomplete data. Our final sample 
consists of 42777 firms with 355715 firm-year observations from 66 countries.  
3.4.2 Variables 
3.4.2.1 Union Membership 
We construct a variable Union Membership to measure the bargaining power of labor 




to the total number of paid employees in a country. A higher level of this variable indicates a 
stronger bargaining power of labor unions in a country. 
3.4.2.2 Dividends 
The variable Dividends is defined as the ratio of dividends to assets. 
3.4.2.3 Control Variables 
We include control variables as follows. We use natural logarithm of total assets as a 
measure of Size. We calculate the variable Tobin’s Q as market value of equity plus total assets 
minus book value of equity, divided by total assets. We use the ratio of long-term debts to total 
assets as a measure of Leverage. We use the ratio of capital expenditures to total assets as a 
measure of Capital Expenditures. We define the variable Cash Flow as income after interest, 
and taxes, but before depreciation and provisions for common and/or preferred dividends, 
divided by total assets. We use the ratio of research and development expenses to total assets 
as a measure of R&D. We calculate the variable Net Working Capital is calculated as the ratio 
of working capital minus cash and marketable securities to total assets. Industry Cash Flow 
Volatility is calculated as the standard deviation of the median of Cash Flow in an industry 
classified by two-digit SIC codes in the prior 5 years. We also include year dummy variables, 
industry dummy variables and country dummy variables in our regressions. We include the 
country dummy variables to control the time-invariant characteristics in different countries. As 
discussed in Chapter 2, other country variables, such as shareholder rights and so on, have 
already been controlled by the country dummy variables.  
3.5 Methodology 
We discuss the method to mitigate the potential endogeneity problem in this section. We 




3.5.1 Discussion about potential endogeneity problem  
We argue that the endogeneity problem can stem from the reverse causality problem. For 
example, suppose firms in a country generally pay more dividends to shareholders. According 
to the signaling theory (e.g., Vermaelen, 1980), this may be regarded as a signal that the firms 
perform better in that country. Consequently, the workers in that country may ask for an 
increase in their wages and other benefits given the observed better performance signalled by 
higher dividend payments. To achieve a better collective bargaining, the workers tend to join 
labor unions to have a better bargaining position. This will result in a higher country-level union 
membership. In this argument, it is the higher dividends that drives the higher union 
membership. 
3.5.2 Instrumental Variables 
In the literature of labor economics, both the gender of the workers (e.g., Hirsch, 1980; 
Hirsch, 1982) and the age of the workers (e.g., Scoville, 1971) have been found as the 
determinants of the union membership. We follow the literature (e.g., Chen, Kacperczyk and 
Ortiz-Molina, 2011) and use these two variables as the instrumental variables. We believe that 
these two variables do not affect a firm’s dividend payments directly and conduct the two-stage 
least squares estimation (2SLS) in our study.  
We use two country-level variables as the instrumental variables. We construct a variable 
to measure the gender of the workers in a country. The variable is called Fraction of Female 
Workers and it is calculated as the ratio of female workers to total workers in the country that 
a firm belongs to. We also construct a variable as the measure of the average age of the workers 
in a country. The variable is called Average Age of the Workers and it is defined as the mean 
of the age of all the workers in that country. We obtain the data of workers’ gender and age 




no previous paper has directly connected gender or age to a firm’s dividend payments from a 
theoretical point of view.   
To investigate the relevance and the strength of the instrumental variables, we examine 
the first-stage F-test (Stock, Wright and Yogo 2002) and the partial R2 variables (e.g., Shea, 
1997) in our first-stage estimation. Then, in the second stage, we examine whether the 
instruments are exogenous by using the over-identifying restrictions test. We also use the 
Hausman (1978) test to examine whether the coefficients of 2SLS estimation are significantly 
different from the OLS estimation. 
3.6 Results - Large sample 
We conduct the large sample analysis and report the empirical results in this section. First, 
we report univariate statistics and the results of OLS regressions on the determinants of 
dividends. Then, we show the results of the two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimation. We also 
report the results of sub-samples separated by Employment Protection Legislation and labor 
bargaining centralization. Furthermore, we conduct further analysis about how the labor unions 
affect the relation between the dividends and firms’ profitability, as well as labor costs. Finally, 
we report the results of robustness checks. 
3.6.1 Univariate statistics 
Table 3-1 shows the univariate statistics. We report the univariate statistics of the 
variables in Panel A. The mean and the median of the variable Dividends is 0.0104 and 0.0000. 
The mean of the variable Union Membership is 0.2548 and the median is 0.1860. We describe 
the country-level Dividends and Union Membership in Panel B. The statistics in Panel B further 
justify our motivation to conduct the analysis in the international setting. We find that the Union 
Membership in US is 0.1289, while it is significantly lower than the average Union 




Figure 3-1 illustrates the average dividend payments between 1992 and 2013 in 66 
countries. The deeper the colour in a country in the world map indicates that dividends are 
higher in that country. This pattern is consistent with the findings in Visser (2006). The 
significant difference in the magnitude of dividends between US and the average level of Union 
Membership around the world motivates us to conduct the analysis with international data.  
3.6.2 The determinants of dividends and the likelihood of dividend payouts 
Table 3-2 reports the regressions of determinants of dividends and the likelihood of 
dividend payouts. Column 1 uses OLS regressions to examine the relation between country-
level union membership and dividends. We follow the literature and add firm-specific 
characteristics as control variables in the regressions. We also add year dummy variables, 
industry dummy variables and country dummy variables in the regression. The coefficient of 
Union Membership is 0.002 (p-value = 0.01) with the dependent variable is Dividends. Column 
2 uses tobit model to examine the likelihood of dividend payouts. The variable Dividend 
Likelihood is positive and continuous for firms pay out dividends and is equal to 0 for firms 
doesn’t pay out dividends. The coefficient of Union Membership is 0.052 (p-value = 0.01) with 
the dependent variable is Dividend Likelihood. Column 3 reports the results of OLS regressions 
with the data of non-US firms. The coefficient of Union Membership is 0.003 (p-value = 0.01) 
with the dependent variable is Dividends.  
The results are consistent with the interpretation that there are more dividends from firms 
in a country with higher union membership. This is consistent with our Hypothesis 1A that 
predicts a negative relation between the strength of labor unions and the level of dividends. The 
findings support the bargaining role of dividends in the international setting.  
3.6.3 Country-level regression 
To better investigate how the country-level Union Membership affect firms’ dividend 




financial data in each country. Because the different number of firms in countries takes different 
weight in the firm-level regression. Instead of using firm-level variables in Table 3-2, we 
convert all firm-level variables into country-level variables by taking the average of the 
variables across the countries in a year. We have 974 country-year observations in our country-
level analysis.  
Table 3-3 reports the results. In Column1, the coefficient of Union Membership is 0.009 
(p-value = 0.01) where the dependent variable is Country-level Dividends. In Column 2, the 
coefficient of Union Membership is 0.010 (p-value = 0.03) for Non-US firms. 
Consistent with the firm-level results in Table 3-2, our results imply that the country-
level dividends are lower when there is a higher country-level Union Membership. Our results 
support the Hypothesis 1A.  
3.6.4 First-stage regression 
Table 3-4 reports the first-stage regression of the 2SLS estimation. We include the two 
instrumental variables, year dummy variables, industry dummy variables, country dummy and 
other control variables in the independent variables. The coefficient of the instrumental variable 
Fraction of Female Workers is 1.537 (p-value = 0.01) and the coefficient of Average Age of 
the Workers is -0.006 (p-value = 0.01). The p-value of partial F-statistic is 0.01, indicating that 
the instruments are not weak. The partial R-square is 0.37, indicating that the instruments have 
a reasonable strength. 
3.6.5 Union membership and dividends 
We report the second stage of 2SLS estimation in Table 3-5. The dependent variable is 
Dividends, while the independent variable is the predicted union membership and the same 
control variables in the first stage of 2SLS. The coefficient of Union Membership in this column 
is 0.077 (p-value = 0.01). We conduct the over-identifying restrictions test and find that the p-




exogenous and valid. We also conduct the Hausman test and find the p-value of the F-statistic 
is significant (p-value = 0.01).  This means our 2SLS estimate is significantly different from 
the OLS estimate in Table 3-2. Therefore, it is proper to use the 2SLS estimates instead of OLS 
estimates to mitigate the endogeneity problems in our research. Column 3 reports the results of 
non-US firms, the coefficient of Union Membership is 0.079 (p-value = 0.01). 
Our results are also more economically significant than the OLS results, because the 
economic magnitude of the 2SLS estimates describes how the variation of union membership 
affect the value of dividends. We find that the standard deviation of Union Membership is 
0.2503 and the median of non-cash assets is 159.65 million dollars from Table 3-1, we find a 
one standard deviation increase in Union Membership results to a 0.019 increase (=0.077 * 
0.2503) in the level of dividends payments, corresponding to an increase in dividends payments 
with a dollar value of 3.033 million dollars (=0.019 * 159.65). 
The results in Table 3-5 are consistent with Hypothesis 1A that there is a positive relation 
between labor unions and dividends. 
3.6.6 Employment protection legislation 
Concerned about the different labor laws in different countries, we include the 
Employment Protection Legislation in our research to consider the effects of the protection of 
labor’s rights and benefits. Similar with Chapter 2, we get the data of Employment Protection 
Legislation (EPL) indicator from OECD for its 35 member countries. The higher EPL means 
the general employment protection in firms in this country is better.  
Since the better employment protection indicates more costly of labor adjustments, a 
higher EPL means higher operating leverage for firms in this country. On one hand, the 
bargaining hypothesis predicts that firms pay a higher level of dividends to get a better 
bargaining position when there are stronger labor unions. On the other hand, while higher EPL 




withstand higher operating risks. Therefore, the positive effects of labor unions on dividends 
can be offset in some degree by the negative effects associated with higher operating leverage. 
As we discussed in Hypothesis 2, we expect the positive relation between union membership 
and dividends is stronger (weaker) for firms in a country with lower (higher) EPL. 
We divide the sample into two sub-groups with a firm in a country with higher (lower) 
level of employment protection if the EPL indicator of that country is above (below) the median. 
Table 3-6 shows the results of OLS regressions and the second stage of 2SLS estimations of 
dividend payments for these two sub-groups in Panel A and Panel B separately. 
In Table 3-6 Panel A, we report the OLS regressions of dividends in Column 1 and 2. 
The coefficient of Union Membership in Column 1 is 0.102 (p-value = 0.01) for the sub-group 
of firms in a country with lower level of employment protection. The coefficient of Union 
membership in Column 2 is 0.008 (p-value = 0.01) for the sub-group of firms in a country with 
higher level of employment protection. We conduct a t-test of the difference in the coefficients 
of Union Membership between the two sub-groups separated by the EPL indicator, and report 
the results in Panel B. We find that the coefficients of these two sub-groups are significantly 
different with the difference is 0.094 (p-value = 0.01). We report the results of second stage of 
2SLS estimations in Column 3 and 4. The coefficient of Union Membership in Column 3 is 
0.225 (p-value = 0.01) for the sub-group of firms in a country with lower level of employment 
protection. The coefficient of Union Membership in Column 4 is 0.007 (p-value = 0.01) for 
sub-group of firms in a country with higher employment protection. The over-identifying 
restrictions and the Hauseman test show that the results of the 2SLS estimates are more proper 
to draw implications. Our results in Column 3 and 4 show that the interpretation of bargaining 
effect of the positive relation is weaker for the sub-group with higher EPL due to the offset 




Union Membership between the two sub-groups separated by the EPL indicator. The difference 
is 0.218 (p-value = 0.01). 
Therefore, the results in Table 3-6 imply that the positive relation between dividends and 
union membership is stronger (weaker) when a firm is in a country with a lower (higher) level 
of employment protection. This is consistent with both Hypothesis 1A and Hypothesis 2. 
3.6.7 Labor bargaining centralization 
Previous paper also uses the degree of labor bargaining centralization to measure the 
power of collective bargaining (Simintzi, Vig, and Volpin, 2015). We obtain the data of labor 
bargaining centralization from the Institutional Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage Setting, 
State Intervention and Social Pacts (ICTWSS) database. We use the country-level variable 
Centralization in our research, which is a continuous variable ranging from 0 to 1.  
A higher level of Centralization indicates higher power of collective bargaining in a 
country, because a collective bargaining will have a broader impact and will be more centrally 
coordinated in a country. Therefore, we expect that the positive relation between dividends and 
union membership is stronger (weaker) when a firm is in a country with a higher (lower) level 
of Centralization.  
In Table 3-7 Panel A, we report the OLS regressions of dividends in Column 1 and 2. 
The coefficient of Union Membership in Column 1 is 0.064 (p-value = 0.01) for the sub-group 
of firms in a country with lower level of labor bargaining centralization. The coefficient of 
Union membership in Column 2 is 0.242 (p-value = 0.01) for the sub-group of firms in a country 
with higher level of labor bargaining centralization. We conduct a t-test of the difference in the 
coefficients of Union Membership between the two sub-groups separated by the EPL indicator, 
and report the results in Panel B. We find that the coefficients of these two sub-groups are 
significantly different with the difference is -0.178 (p-value = 0.01). We report the results of 




Column 3 is 0.199 (p-value = 0.01) for the sub-group of firms in a country with lower level of 
labor bargaining centralization. The coefficient of Union Membership in Column 4 is 0.472 (p-
value = 0.01) for sub-group of firms in a country with higher labor bargaining centralization. 
The over-identifying restrictions and the Hauseman test show that the results of the 2SLS 
estimates are more proper to draw implications. Our results in Column 3 and 4 show that the 
interpretation of bargaining effect of the positive relation is stronger for the sub-group with 
higher labor bargaining centralization due to the higher bargaining power of labor unions. We 
also conduct the t-test of the difference in the coefficients of Union Membership between the 
two sub-groups separated by the labor bargaining centralization. The difference is -0.273 (p-
value = 0.01). 
Therefore, the results in Table 3-7 imply that the positive relation between dividends and 
union membership is stronger (weaker) when a firm is in a country with a higher (lower) level 
of Centralization. This is consistent with Hypothesis 1A. 
3.7 Results – Smaller sample 
To further understand the positive relation between union membership and dividends in 
the large sample study, we conduct the analysis for a smaller sample of dividend change. We 
use the methodology of event study to examine this smaller sample. While the large sample 
analysis examines the level of dividends, the smaller sample analysis allows us to examine firm 
performance associated with the dividends. Moreover, an additional benefit of conducting such 
analysis is to reduce the endogeneity problem by studying how union membership affects the 
relation between the change in dividends and the change in firm performance.  
We construct a sample of dividend increases and dividend decreases with international 
data. We obtain the data of ordinary cash dividend payments from CRSP database for US firms 
and from Compustat Global database for firms in other countries. We compare two adjacent 




payment is higher (lower) than the former dividend payment. 32 We get a sample of 56466 
dividend increase events and 31816 dividends decrease events in 55 countries. 33 
3.7.1 Variables 
We describe the variables in smaller sample analysis in this section. 
3.7.1.1 Announcement return 
We follow the literature (e.g. Brown and Warner, 1985) and calculate the announcement 
return of dividend increase (decrease) event by using the cumulative abnormal return over days 
(-3, +3) around the announcement date. The cumulative abnormal return is calculated based on 
the following market model. 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑚,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                                                      (3) 
where 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the stock return of stock i; 𝑅𝑚,𝑡 is the return of a stock market index in the 
country where stock i belongs to. 
We get the data of stock market indices of different countries from Datastream database.34 
To estimate the market model, we use a firm’s daily return and the return on its corresponding 
stock market index over days -200 to -20, where day 0 is the event date.  
3.7.1.2 Change in operating performance 
We use the net change in ROA as a measure of the change in firm performance around 
the dividend increases (decreases). ROA is defined as the ratio of EBIT to assets. We calculate 
the change in ROA from year t-1 to year t+1. We define Net Change in ROA as the difference 
between an event firm’s change in ROA and its matched comparable firm’s change in ROA 
from year t-1 to year t+1. 
                              
32 A firm may pay dividends in different frequency, such as quarterly, semi-annually or annually. We compare 
two adjacent dividend payments based on a firm’s own dividend payment frequency. 
33 Appendix 3-2 reports the univariate statistics of smaller sample. 
34 For example, we use FTSE 100 index as the market index for UK stocks, and we use TOPIX Index as the market 





We use two methods to find out the comparable firms. First, we choose the comparable 
firms based on the matching by industry, size and M/B. We rank all non-event firms in the 
same industry as an event firm based on the difference in size and M/B, and choose a non-event 
firm as a comparable firm if the sum of the percentage difference in size and the percentage 
difference in M/B between the non-event firm and the event firm is smallest in the industry. 
Second, we choose the comparable firms based on the method of propensity score matching. 
We first run a probit model based on size, M/B, cash flow, R&D, etc35. We calculate the 
propensity score of each non-event firm. Then we match each event firm to a non-event firm 
in the same country requiring that the non-event firm has minimum difference in propensity 
score.  
3.7.2 Results about dividend changes events 
We report the results of smaller sample analysis. First, we report the regressions about 
the announcement return around dividend changes. Next, we conduct the analysis on the change 
in operating performance around the events. 
3.7.2.1 Announcement return 
Table 3-8 and Table 3-9 show the results of the market reaction around dividend increases 
and decreases. The dependent variables are the announcement returns in these tables.  
Table 3-8 reports the results about the event of dividend increases. Column 1 shows that 
the coefficient of Union Membership is 0.008 (p-value = 0.04) when the dependent variable is 
the cumulative abnormal returns over days (-1, +1) around the announcement date of dividend 
increases. It shows that there is positive relation between announcement return and Union 
Membership, indicating that shareholders have more positive reaction when dividends are 
increased by a firm in a country with higher Union Membership. It implies that when a firm 
                              




increases dividend payment, it reduces the resources available for potential collective 
bargaining. This is beneficial for shareholders and it is associated with positive market reaction. 
This is more prominent for the firms in a country with higher union membership. We find 
similar results when the dependent variables are the cumulative abnormal returns over days (-
3, +3) around the announcement date in Column 2 and the cumulative abnormal returns over 
days (-5, +5) around the announcement date in Column 3. The coefficient of Union 
Membership is 0.011 (p-value = 0.05) in Column 2 and 0.010 (p-value = 0.06) in Column 3.  
Table 3-9 shows the results about the dividend decreases. We have consistent results 
when the dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal returns over days (-1, +1) in Column 
1, (-3, +3) in Column 2 and (-5, +5) in Column 3 around the announcement. The coefficient of 
Union Membership is -0.008 (p-value = 0.03) in Column 1, -0.011 (p-value = 0.02) in Column 
2 and -0.015 (p-value = 0.07) in Column 3. It shows that there is negative relation between the 
announcement return around the event of dividend decreases and implying that shareholders 
have more negative reaction when the dividend decrease is made by a firm in a country with 
higher union membership.  
Our results in Table 3-8 and Table 3-9 indicate that the announcement return is higher 
(lower) when a dividend increase (decrease) is made by a firm in a country with higher union 
membership. It implies that when a firm increases dividends, it reduces the resources available 
for potential collective bargaining. Labor unions accept a lower level of wage in that there may 
be liquidity shortage, provided that bankruptcy is costly for employees, that leads to lower 
operating costs. This is beneficial for shareholders and it is associated with positive market 
reaction with dividend increases. This is more prominent for the firms in a country with higher 
union membership. When a firm decreases dividends, labor unions tend to organize collective 
bargaining because they can get more wages and other benefits from the saving of cash flow 




negative reaction of shareholders to dividend decrease in a country with higher union 
membership. This is consistent with the bargaining hypothesis. 
3.7.2.2 Change in operating performance 
Table 3-10 and Table 3-11 show the results of the change in operating performance 
around the events of dividend increases and dividend decreases.  
Table 3-10 reports the results about dividend increases. The dependent variable in 
Column 1 is the Change in ROA from year t-1 to year t+1. The coefficient of Union 
Membership is 0.029 (p-value = 0.01). It implies that there is a positive relation between Union 
Membership and the change in operating performance around the event of dividend increases. 
The dependent variables in Columns 2 and Column 3 are the Net Change in ROA, which is 
defined as the difference between an event firm’s change in ROA and its comparable firm’s 
change in ROA from year t-1 to year t+1. The coefficient of Union Membership in Column 2 
is 0.018 (p-value = 0.03), indicating that firms in countries with higher union membership have 
a higher net change in operating performance around the event of dividend increases. It implies 
a similar rationale that a dividend increase reduces the resources available for potential 
collective bargaining, and it is more beneficial for the operating performance of the firms in a 
country with higher union membership. We have similar results in Column 3, the coefficient 
of Union Membership is 0.017 (p-value = 0.01) when we use the propensity score matching 
method. 
Table 3-11 shows the results about dividend decreases. We have consistent results when 
the dependent variable is Change in ROA form year t-1 to year t+1 in column 1 and the 
dependent variable is Net Change in ROA form year t-1 to year t+1 based on the Size & M/B 
matching method in the same industry in Column 2 and based on the propensity score matching 
method in Column 3 separately. The coefficient of Union Membership is -0.008 (p-value = 




Column 3. It implies that there is negative relation between Union Membership and the change 
in operating performance around the event of dividend decreases. 
Firms in countries with higher union membership have a higher net change in operating 
performance around the event of dividend increases. Because dividend increase reduces the 
resources available for potential collective bargaining. Labor unions accept a lower level of 
wage in that there may be liquidity shortage, provided that bankruptcy is costly for employees, 
that leads to lower operating costs. It is more beneficial for the operating performance of the 
firms in a country with higher union membership. When a firm decreases dividends, labor 
unions tend to organize collective bargaining because they can get more wages and other 
benefits from the saving of cash flow from dividend decreases. The higher labor costs increases 
operating costs that leads to more negative reaction of shareholders to dividend decrease in 
country with higher union membership. Our results in Table 3-10 and Table 3-11 are consistent 
with the interpretation that there is a positive (negative) relationship between Union 
Membership and the change in operating performance around the events of dividend increases 
(decreases). This is consistent with our bargaining hypothesis. 
3.8 Further analysis 
We conduct further analysis in this section to study the relation between labor unions and 
dividends. 
3.8.1 Dividends and labor costs 
We investigate how labor unions affect the relation between dividends and labor costs in 
this section. Yu (2010) state that dividends are negatively associated with labor wages, because 
dividend payments reduce the cash reserves available for collective bargaining. Accordingly, 
firms tend to pay out more dividends to lower wage claims when the country-level labor unions 
are stronger in that labor unions strengthen the bargaining power of employees. Consequently, 




dividends to labor costs are stronger for firms in a country with higher union membership, and 
are weaker for firms in a country with lower union membership.  
Similar with Chapter 2, we follow Chemmanur, Cheng and Zhang (2013) and use the 
logarithm of the ratio of staff expenses to the number of employees as the measurement of labor 
costs. We construct a sub-sample of 77380 firm-year observations. We divide the sample into 
two sub-groups separated by country-level union membership. A firm is in a country with 
higher (lower) union membership if its country-level union membership is above (below) the 
median. 
Table 3-12 shows the results. In Panel A, we report the OLS regressions in Column 1 and 
2. The coefficient of Dividends in Column 1 is -0.267 (p-value = 0.07) for the sub-group of 
firms with lower country-level union membership. The coefficient of Dividends in Column 2 
is -0.350 (p-value = 0.01) for the sub-group of firms with higher country-level union 
membership. The negative coefficients imply that there is a negative relation between dividends 
and labor costs. We conduct a t-test of the difference in the coefficients of Dividends between 
the two sub-groups separated by union membership, and report the results in Panel B. We find 
that the difference is 0.170 (p-value = 0.01). The significant difference implies that the 
coefficient of Dividends for the sub-group of firms with lower country-level union membership 
is significantly higher than the coefficient of Dividends for the sub-group of firms with higher 
country-level union membership. 
Therefore, the results in Table 3-12 imply that the negative relation between dividends 
and labor costs is stronger (weaker) for firms in a country with higher (lower) union 
membership. The higher country-level union membership, firms’ bargaining power against 
labor unions weakens. In this situation, firms pay more dividends to reduce the internal 
resources available for collective bargaining and they can claim that they have insufficient 




employees. Consequently, firms gain bargaining benefits with higher dividends in collective 
bargaining against labor unions and reduce the labor costs. The negative effects of dividend 
payments on labor costs are stronger in a country with higher union membership. The results 
support the bargaining hypothesis and are consistent with the Hypothesis 1A. 
3.8.2 Dividends and strikes & lockouts 
As discussed in 2.6.12, strikes are used as bargaining tool by labor unions in wage 
negotiations. Labor unions can get less benefits when firms decrease their internal funds by 
increasing dividend payments. To study whether dividend policy influences the country-level 
strikes and lockouts, we conduct further analysis by using the proxy of the intensity of strikes 
and lockouts in a country. The higher dividend payments in firms, there may be less strikes 
organized by labor unions, because labor unions have less incentive to use strikes to strengthen 
their bargaining power in wage negotiations due to the lower available financial resources in 
firms. We expect that the relation between dividends and the country-level strikes & lockouts 
is negative. Labor unions are less likely to organize strikes in a country when firms have more 
dividend payments and less internal resources. 
Similar with Chapter 2, we get the data of strikes & lockouts from the International Labor 
Organization and construct a variable called Log (Country-level Strikes & Lockouts + 1). We 
obtain the data on labor force from International Labor Organization as an additional control 
variable. We conduct the country-level analysis in a similar way as Table 3-3. We convert all 
firm-level variables into country-level variables by taking the average of the variables across 
the countries. 
We report the results in Table 3-13. The dependent variable is the Log (Country-level 
Strikes & Lockouts + 1).  The coefficient of the variable Country-level Dividends is -9.218 (p-
value = 0.08). The negative coefficient indicates that there is a negative relation between strikes 




internal financial resources that can be extracted by labor unions. Labor unions have fewer 
incentives to organize strikes to gain bargaining power in wage negotiations. Therefore, the 
results in Table 3-12 support the bargaining hypothesis in that fewer strikes are organized by 
labor unions as bargaining tool in wage negotiations when firms have more dividend payments. 
3.8.3 The validity of instrumental variables 
As discussed in Chapter 2, we collect the data of gender gap from World Economic 
Forum to test the validity of instrumental variables. It has been found that the average salary of 
female workers is lower compared with male workers. On one hand, the average lower level of 
salary for female workers in a country implies that firms’ wage payments are lower in a country 
with more female workers. Firms have more cash reserves and have the incentive to increase 
dividends due to the free cash flow problem. On the other hand, the coefficient of Fraction of 
Female Workers in Table 3-4 is positive, which means more female workers are associated 
with higher union membership. This leads to a positive relation between dividends and union 
membership in that the gender pay gap.  
Similar with 2.7.1, we construct the variable of Gender Gap and divide our sample into 
two sub-groups based on the median. A firm is in a country with lower (higher) gender gap if 
the index is above (below) the median. The higher index means that female and male are more 
equal in a country.  
Table 3-13 shows the results. We show the second stage of two 2SLS estimation for 
brevity. Column 1 shows that the coefficient of Union Membership is 0.023 (p-value = 0.01), 
and Column 2 shows that such coefficient is 0.111 (p-value = 0.01). We conduct t-test and find 
that the difference is -0.088 (p-value = 0.94). The results imply that after we control for the 
gender gap, we still find that firms in countries with higher union membership have more 




are not entirely driven by the gender pay gap and that they are consistent with our bargaining 
hypothesis. 
3.8.4 Collective bargaining coverage 
We also conduct the robustness check by using the collective bargaining coverage rate as 
alternative measure for the bargaining power of labor unions. Similar with Chapter 2, the 
collective bargaining coverage rate include the workers who are not union members but are 
covered by labor unions and we collect the data from the ICTWSS database. The data of 
collective bargaining coverage rate are recorded in intervals. We use the data available in the 
closest precedent year as a proxy for the Collective Bargaining Coverage Rate when the data is 
missing in a year. We construct the variable Collective Bargaining Coverage Rate defined as 
the percentage of workers who are covered by the collective bargaining agreements for all 
workers.  
We show the results about Collective Bargaining Coverage Rate in Table 3-15. We use 
the similar specifications as in previous tables. In Panel A, Column 1 shows the results of OLS 
regression and Column 2 shows the results of the second stage of 2SLS estimates when the 
dependent variable is Dividends. The coefficient of Collective Bargaining Coverage Rate is 
0.009 (p-value = 0.01) in Column 1 and is 0.016 (p-value = 0.01) in Column 2 when the 
dependent variable is Dividends. The results are similar with the previous tables that there is a 
positive relation between Collective Bargaining Coverage Rate and dividends. We conduct the 
test on the relation between announcement return around the events of dividends changes and 
the Collective Bargaining Coverage Rate. In Panel B, we report the announcement return over 
days around the date of the event of dividends changes. The coefficient of Collective 
Bargaining Coverage Rate is 0.010 (p-value = 0.01) in Column 1, is 0.011 (p-value = 0.01) in 
Column 2 and is 0.012 (p-value = 0.01) in Column 3 with the dependent variable is the 




date of dividend increases. The coefficient of Collective Bargaining Coverage Rate is -0.024 
(p-value = 0.02) in Column 4, is -0.046 (p-value = 0.04) in Column 5 and is -0.055 (p-value = 
0.01) in Column 6 with the dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal returns over days (-
1, +1), (-3, +3) and (-5, +5) around the announcement date of dividend decreases.  
Our results are consistent with the previous tables in that the positive relation between 
the announcement return around the event of dividend increases, and that the negative relation 
between the announcement return around the event of dividend decreases. Therefore, we find 
similar results when we use collective bargaining coverage rate as alternative proxy for 
bargaining power of labor unions. 
3.9 Conclusion 
This chapter finds significant relations between labor unions and dividends in the 
international setting. We test the two opposite effects of labor unions on a firm’s dividend 
payments from both bargaining perspective and operating leverage perspective. We find 
significant effects of the bargaining power from labor unions, that firms in countries with higher 
union membership pay more dividends.  
We use the country-level union membership as the measure of the bargaining power of 
labor unions across countries in our large sample analysis. We use two-stage least square 
estimation accompanied with the econometrics tests for the validity of the instruments and the 
specification. However, we find evidence of the presence of opposite effects of operating 
leverage from labor unions on dividends. We divide our sample into two sub-groups with 
employment protection legislation higher or lower the median. We find the positive relationship 
is weaker for firms in countries with higher employment protection legislation. 
Moreover, we construct a smaller sample to do the event study about how the country-
level union membership affect the around the date of dividend increase and dividend decrease. 




positively affect the announcement return of the events of dividend increases, and negatively 
affect the announcement return of the events of dividend decreases. In terms of the operating 
performance around the events, we find positive relation between union membership and net 
ROA change around the event date of dividend increases, and negative relation between union 
membership and net ROA change around the event date of dividend decreases. 
In addition, we find the positive relation between dividends and labor costs is weaker for 
firms in countries with lower union membership. Furthermore, we find that the number of 
strikes & lockouts is lower in countries with more dividend payments. Also, we collective 
bargaining coverage rate to construct the robustness check and find consistent results. 
Our findings are consistent with the bargaining hypothesis, and we conclude that firms 
strategically choose dividend payments to gain the bargaining position with labor in the 




Appendix 3-1 Market Equity Indices 
This table shows the market equity indices used in the market model shown in Equation (3) in Section 3.7.1 and 
4.7.1 to calculate the cumulative abnormal return (see the text for details). 
 
Country Datastream Code Equity Index 
Argentina ARGMERV ARGENTINA MERVAL 
Australia ASX200I Standard and Poor's / Australian Stock Exchange 200 
Austria ATXINDX ATX - Austrian Traded Index 
Belgium BGBEL20 Belgium 20 
Bulgaria BSSOFIX Bulgaria Stock Exchange Sofix 
Canada TTOCOMP Standard and Poor's / Toronto Stock Exchange Composite Index 
China CHSASHR Shanghai Stock Exchange A Share 
Colombia COLIGBC Colombia Igbc Index 
Czech Republic CZPXIDX Prague Stock Exchange PX 
Croatia CTCROBE Croatia Crobex 
Cyprus CYPMAPM Cyprus General 
Denmark DKKFXIN OMX Copenhagen (OMXC20) 
Egypt EGHFINC Egypt Hermes Financial 
Estonia ESTALSE OMX Tallinn (Omxt) 
Finland HEXINDX OMX Helsinki (OMXH) 
France FRCAC40 France CAC 40 
Germany DAXINDX DAX 30 Performance 
Greece GRAGENL Athex Composite 
Hong Kong HNGKNGI Hang Seng 
Hungary BUXINDX Budapest (BUX) 
Iceland ICEXALL OMX Iceland All Share 
India ICRI500 Nifty 500 
Indonesia JAKCOMP Jakarta Index Composite 
Ireland ISEQUIT Ireland Stock Exchange Overall (Iseq) 
Israel ISTA100 Israel Ta 125 
Italy FTSEMIB FTSE MIB Index 
Japan TOKYOSE TOPIX 
Kuwait KWKICGN Kuwait KIC General 
Luxembourg LUXGENI Luxembourg Stock Exchange General 
Malaysia FBMKLCI FTSE Bursa Malaysia KLCI 
Mexico MXIPC35 Mexico IPC (Bolsa) 
Morocco MASIIDX Morocco All Share (Masi) 
Netherlands AMSTEOE Euronext Amsterdam AEX Index (AEX) 
New Zealand NZ50CAP Standard and Poor's / NZX 50 
Pakistan PKSE100 Karachi Stock Exchange 100 
Peru PEGENRL Standard and Poor's / BVL General (Igbvl) 
Philippines PSECOMP Philippines Stock Exchange I (Psei) 
Portugal POPSI20 Portugal PSI-20 
Russia RSRTSIN Russia RTS Index 






Appendix 1 (Continued) 
 
  
Country Datastream Code Equity Index 
Slovenia SLOETOP Slovenian Blue Chip (SBI Top) 
Slovakia SXSAX16 Slovakia SAX 16 
South Africa JSEOVER FTSE / JSE All Share 
South Korea KORCOMP Korea Stock Exchange Composite (KOSPI) 
Spain IBEX35I IBEX 35 
Sri Lanka SRALLSH Colombo Stock Exchange All Share 
Sweden SWEDOMX OMX Stockholm 30 (OMXS30) 
Switzerland SWISSMI Swiss Market (SMI) 
Thailand BNGKSET Bangkok S.E.T. 
Turkey TRKISTB Bist National 100 




Appendix 3-2 Univariate Statistics – Smaller Sample 
This table shows univariate statistics of smaller sample. We use a sample of 56466 events of dividends increase 
from 55 countries and a sample of 31816 events of dividends decrease from 55 countries between 1992 and 2013. 
Panel A reports univariate statistics for the sample of the events of dividend increases. Panel B reports univariate 
statistics for the sample of the events of dividend decreases. CAR (-1, +1) is the cumulative abnormal return over 
days (-1, +1) around the announcement days. CAR (-3, +3) is the cumulative abnormal return over days (-3, +3) 
around the announcement days. CAR (-5, +5) is the cumulative abnormal return over days (-5, +5) around the 
announcement days. The cumulative abnormal return is calculated based on the market model. We use a firm’s 
daily return and the return on its corresponding stock market index over days -200 to -20, where day 0 is the event 
date. Union Membership is defined as the ratio of the total number of trade union members to the total number of 
paid employees in a country. Size is defined as natural logarithm of assets. Tobin’s Q is defined as market value of 
equity plus assets minus book value of equity, divided by assets. Leverage is defined as the ratio of long-term 
debts to assets. Capital Expenditures is defined as the ratio of capital expenditures to assets. Cash Flow is defined 
as income after interest, and taxes, but before depreciation and provisions for common and/or preferred dividends, 
divided by assets. R&D is defined as the ratio of research and development expenses to assets. Working Capital is 
defined as the ratio of current assets minus current to assets. Industry Cash Flow Volatility is defined as the 
standard deviation of the median of Cash Flow in an industry classified by two-digit SIC codes in the prior 5 years. 
Cash is defined as the ratio of cash and marketable securities to assets.  
 
Panel A: Univariate Statistics for the Events of Dividend Increases 
 







CAR (-1, +1) 0.009 0.005 -0.016 0.031 0.050 
CAR (-3, +3) 0.012 0.007 -0.024 0.044 0.068 
CAR (-5, +5) 0.013 0.008 -0.031 0.053 0.080 
Union Membership 0.218 0.143 0.114 0.245 0.183 
Size 20.279 20.172 18.823 21.635 1.939 
Tobin’s Q 1.687 1.375 1.081 1.913 1.075 
Leverage 0.152 0.120 0.019 0.242 0.146 
Capital Expenditures 0.058 0.042 0.024 0.074 0.053 
Cash Flow 0.066 0.057 0.033 0.092 0.058 
R&D 0.010 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.028 
Working Capital 0.183 0.162 0.033 0.306 0.196 
Industry Cash Flow Volatility 0.056 0.050 0.038 0.074 0.025 




Panel B: Univariate Statistics for the Events of Dividend Decreases 
 







CAR (-1, +1) 0.001 0.000 -0.022 0.022 0.051 
CAR (-3, +3) 0.002 0.000 -0.033 0.034 0.069 
CAR (-5, +5) 0.003 0.000 -0.040 0.042 0.081 
Union Membership 0.240 0.191 0.151 0.247 0.165 
Size 20.019 19.855 18.776 21.131 1.740 
Tobin’s Q 1.402 1.119 0.907 1.487 1.037 
Leverage 0.123 0.090 0.012 0.193 0.127 
Capital Expenditures 0.050 0.037 0.021 0.062 0.048 
Cash Flow 0.041 0.032 0.013 0.063 0.061 
R&D 0.010 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.026 
Working Capital 0.191 0.177 0.051 0.318 0.198 
Industry Cash Flow Volatility 0.055 0.050 0.037 0.070 0.023 







Appendix 3-3 Propensity Score Matching – The Events of Dividend Increase/ Decrease 
This table shows the logistic regression about the likelihood that a firm increases (decreases) the payment of 
dividends. We use a sample of 36149 (18494) events of dividend increase (decrease) from 46 countries between 
1992 and 2013. Column 1 shows the logistic regression for the events of dividends increase. The dependent 
variable is 1 if an event of dividend increase takes place and is 0 otherwise. Size is defined as natural logarithm of 
assets. Tobin’s Q is defined as market value of equity plus assets minus book value of equity, divided by assets. 
Leverage is defined as the ratio of long-term debts to assets. Cash Flow is defined as income after interest, and 
taxes, but before depreciation and provisions for common and/or preferred dividends, divided by assets. R&D is 
defined as the ratio of research and development expenses to assets. Capital Expenditures is defined as the ratio 
of capital expenditures to assets. Industry Cash Flow Volatility is defined as the standard deviation of the median 
of Cash Flow in an industry classified by two-digit SIC codes in the prior 5 years. Working Capital is defined as 
the ratio of current assets minus current to assets Sales Growth is defined as the percentage change of sale over 
the previous year. Retained Earnings is defined as the ratio of retained earnings over total assets. Column 2 shows 
the logistic regression for the events of dividends decrease. The dependent variable is 1 if an event of dividend 
decrease takes place and is 0 otherwise. The p–value is noted in the parentheses.  
 
 Dividend Increase=1 Dividend Decrease=1 
Intercept -8.472 -6.344 
  (0.01) (0.01) 
Size 0.296 0.183 
  (0.01) (0.01) 
Tobin’s Q -0.022 -0.094 
  (0.01) (0.01) 
Cash Flow 6.929 3.431 
  (0.01) (0.01) 
R&D -2.884 -3.963 
  (0.01) (0.01) 
Capital Expenditure -0.566 1.285 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Industry Cash Flow Volatility 0.873 -2.137 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Leverage 0.425 -0.577 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Working Capital 0.062 0.189 
 (0.07) (0.01) 
Sales Growth -0.129 -0.231 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Retained Earnings 0.668 0.220 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Number of Observations 355715 355715 








Table 3-1 Univariate Statistics 
 
This table shows univariate statistics. We use a sample of 355715 firm-year observations from 66 countries 
between 1992 and 2013. Panel A reports univariate statistics. Dividends is defined as the ratio of dividends to 
assets. Union Membership is defined as the ratio of the total number of trade union members to the total number 
of paid employees in a country. Size is defined as natural logarithm of assets. Tobin’s Q is defined as market value 
of equity plus assets minus book value of equity, divided by assets. Leverage is defined as the ratio of long-term 
debts to assets. Capital Expenditures is defined as the ratio of capital expenditures to assets. Cash Flow is defined 
as income after interest, and taxes, but before depreciation and provisions for common and/or preferred dividends, 
divided by assets. R&D is defined as the ratio of research and development expenses to assets. Working Capital 
is defined as the ratio of current assets minus current to assets. Industry Cash Flow Volatility is defined as the 
standard deviation of the median of Cash Flow in an industry classified by two-digit SIC codes in the prior 5 years. 
Fraction of Female Workers is defined as the fraction of female workers in the country a firm belongs to. Average 
Age of the Workers is the average age of the workers in the country a firm belongs to. Employment Protection 
Legislation is the OECD indicators of employment protection legislation that measure the procedures and costs 
involved in dismissing individuals or groups of workers and the procedures involved in hiring workers on fixed-
term or temporary work agency contracts in a country. Centralization is an indicator of the degree of labor 
bargaining centralization in a country from the Institutional Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage Setting, State 
Intervention and Social Pacts (ICTWSS) database. Panel B reports dividends and union membership by countries. 
The mean of dividends, total payout and union membership in a country are reported in the panel. 
 
Panel A. Univariate Statistics 
 







Dividends 0.010 0.000 0.000 0.011 0.022 
Union Membership 0.255 0.186 0.129 0.279 0.250 
Size 19.239 19.080 17.894 20.409 1.873 
Tobin’s Q 1.713 1.244 0.958 1.849 1.456 
Leverage 0.127 0.071 0.001 0.202 0.152 
Capital Expenditures 0.057 0.037 0.017 0.069 0.066 
Cash Flow -0.012 0.027 -0.014 0.065 0.181 
R&D 0.025 0.000 0.000 0.012 0.074 
Working Capital 0.203 0.179 0.037 0.352 0.246 
Industry Cash Flow Volatility 0.061 0.057 0.040 0.077 0.026 
Fraction of Female Workers 0.439 0.454 0.419 0.464 0.038 
Average Age of the Workers 39.718 39.557 38.335 40.962 2.133 
Employment Protection Legislation 1.362 1.369 0.257 2.194 0.970 







Panel B. Dividends and Union Membership by Countries 
 
Country Dividends Union Membership Country Dividends Union Membership 
Argentina 0.008 0.382 Malaysia 0.013 0.103 
Australia 0.018 0.214 Malta 0.026 0.546 
Austria 0.011 0.341 Mauritius 0.017 0.257 
Belgium 0.009 0.543 Mexico 0.006 0.159 
Brazil 0.014 0.253 Namibia 0.074 0.304 
Bulgaria 0.002 0.166 Netherlands 0.017 0.217 
Canada 0.010 0.288 New Zealand 0.020 0.217 
Chile 0.007 0.144 Norway 0.013 0.544 
China 0.007 0.459 Peru 0.009 0.042 
Colombia 0.009 0.165 Philippines 0.009 0.145 
Croatia 0.002 0.328 Poland 0.003 0.152 
Cyprus 0.010 0.530 Portugal 0.006 0.215 
Czech Republic 0.003 0.241 Russia 0.005 0.317 
Denmark 0.015 0.710 Serbia 0.000 0.279 
Egypt 0.009 0.275 Singapore 0.013 0.183 
Estonia 0.022 0.092 Slovakia 0.003 0.256 
Finland 0.027 0.726 Slovenia 0.007 0.319 
France 0.005 0.079 South Africa 0.015 0.338 
Germany 0.011 0.225 South Korea 0.006 0.104 
Greece 0.010 0.243 Spain 0.012 0.167 
Hungary 0.015 0.193 Sri Lanka 0.018 0.142 
Iceland 0.004 0.835 Sweden 0.022 0.741 
India 0.013 0.175 Switzerland 0.014 0.193 
Indonesia 0.005 0.152 Tanzania 0.046 0.202 
Ireland 0.012 0.369 Thailand 0.010 0.029 
Israel 0.010 0.373 Trinidad and Tobago 0.021 0.210 
Italy 0.007 0.350 Turkey 0.007 0.072 
Japan 0.007 0.201 Ukraine 0.000 0.647 
Kazakhstan 0.001 0.423 United Kingdom 0.020 0.294 
Kuwait 0.028 0.023 United States 0.010 0.129 
Latvia 0.006 0.164 Vietnam 0.003 0.146 
Lithuania 0.010 0.108 Zambia 0.035 0.057 














Table 3-2 Union Membership and Dividends 
This table shows regressions about union membership, dividends and the likelihood of dividend payouts. We use 
a sample of 355715 firm-year observations from 66 countries between 1992 and 2013. Dividends is defined as the 
ratio of dividends to assets. Dividend Likelihood is positive and continuous for firms pay out dividends and is 
equal to 0 for firms doesn’t pay out dividends. Union Membership is defined as the ratio of the total number of 
trade union members to the total number of paid employees in a country. Size is defined as natural logarithm of 
assets. Tobin’s Q is defined as market value of equity plus assets minus book value of equity, divided by assets. 
Leverage is defined as the ratio of long-term debts to assets. Capital Expenditures is defined as the ratio of capital 
expenditures to assets. Cash Flow is defined as income after interest, and taxes, but before depreciation and 
provisions for common and/or preferred dividends, divided by assets. R&D is defined as the ratio of research and 
development expenses to assets. Working Capital is defined as the ratio of current assets minus current to assets. 
Industry Cash Flow Volatility is defined as the standard deviation of the median of Cash Flow in an industry 
classified by two-digit SIC codes in the prior 5 years. Year Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the 
years in the sample and not reported in the table. Industry Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the 
industries defined by two-digit SIC codes and not reported in the table. Country Dummy Variables are the dummy 
variables for the countries in the sample and not reported in the table. The p–value is noted in the parentheses. 
 
 Dividends Dividend Likelihood Dividends 
 Full sample Full sample Non-US firms 
Intercept -0.013 -0.078 -0.001 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) 
Union Membership 0.002 0.052 0.003 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Size 0.001 0.003 0.000 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Tobin’s Q 0.002 0.003 0.002 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Leverage -0.008 -0.013 -0.007 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Capital Expenditure -0.001 0.004 0.004 
 (0.34) (0.01) (0.01) 
Cash Flow 0.021 0.069 0.036 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
R&D 0.006 0.006 0.012 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Working Capital 0.002 0.005 0.005 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Industry Cash Flow Volatility -0.046 -0.119 -0.039 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Year Dummy Variables YES YES YES 
Industry Dummy Variables YES YES YES 
Country Dummy Variables YES YES YES 
Number of Observations 355715 355715 262326 







Table 3-3 Union Membership and Dividends: Country-level Analysis 
 
This table shows an OLS regression on the country-level analysis about union membership and dividends. We 
convert all firm-level variables into country-level variables by taking the average of the variables across the 
countries. The sample includes 974 country-year observations between 1992 and 2013. Dividends is defined as 
the ratio of dividends to assets. Union Membership is defined as the ratio of the total number of trade union 
members to the total number of paid employees in a country. Size is defined as natural logarithm of assets. Tobin’s 
Q is defined as market value of equity plus assets minus book value of equity, divided by assets. Leverage is 
defined as the ratio of long-term debts to assets. Capital Expenditures is defined as the ratio of capital expenditures 
to assets. Cash Flow is defined as income after interest, and taxes, but before depreciation and provisions for 
common and/or preferred dividends, divided by assets. R&D is defined as the ratio of research and development 
expenses to assets. Working Capital is defined as the ratio of current assets minus current to assets. Cash flow 
Volatility is defined as the standard deviation of the median of Cash Flow in an industry classified by two-digit 
SIC codes in the prior 5 years. Year Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the years in the sample and 
not reported in the table. Industry Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the industries defined by two-
digit SIC codes and not reported in the table. Country Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the countries 
in the sample and not reported in the table. The p-value is noted in the parentheses. 
 
 Country-level Dividends 
 Full sample Non-US firms 
Intercept 0.012 0.039  
(0.51) (0.02) 
Union Membership 0.009 0.010  
(0.01) (0.03) 
Country-level Size -0.001 -0.002  
(0.01) (0.01) 
Country-level Tobin’s Q -0.001 -0.001  
(0.11) (0.03) 
Country-level Leverage -0.031 -0.027  
(0.01) (0.01) 
Country-level Capital Expenditure -0.020 -0.010  
(0.21) (0.50) 
Country-level Cash Flow 0.064 0.060  
(0.01) (0.01) 
Country-level R&D 0.112 0.120  
(0.01) (0.01) 
Country-level Working Capital 0.000 0.005  
(1.01) (0.39) 
Country-level Cash Flow Volatility 0.073 0.090  
(0.41) (0.29) 
Year Dummy Variables YES YES 
Industry Dummy Variables YES YES 
Country Dummy Variables YES YES 
Number of Observations 974 952 






Table 3-4 Two-stage Least Square Estimation: First Stage 
This table shows the first stage of two-stage least square estimation. We use a sample of 355715 firm-year 
observations from 66 countries between 1992 and 2013. Union Membership is defined as the ratio of the total 
number of trade union members to the total number of paid employees in a country. Fraction of Female Workers 
is defined as the fraction of female workers in the country a firm belongs to. Average Age of the Workers is the 
average age of the workers in the country a firm belongs to. Size is defined as natural logarithm of assets. Tobin’s 
Q is defined as market value of equity plus assets minus book value of equity, divided by assets. Leverage is 
defined as the ratio of long-term debts to assets. Capital Expenditures is defined as the ratio of capital expenditures 
to assets. Cash Flow is defined as income after interest, and taxes, but before depreciation and provisions for 
common and/or preferred dividends, divided by assets. R&D is defined as the ratio of research and development 
expenses to assets. Working Capital is defined as the ratio of current assets minus current to assets. Industry Cash 
Flow Volatility is defined as the standard deviation of the median of Cash Flow in an industry classified by two-
digit SIC codes in the prior 5 years. Year Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the years in the sample 
and not reported in the table. Industry Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the industries defined by 
two-digit SIC codes and not reported in the table. Country Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the 
countries in the sample and not reported in the table. The p–value is noted in the parentheses. 
 
 Union Membership 
Intercept -0.426  
(0.01) 
Fraction of Female Workers 1.537  
(0.01) 
Average Age of the Workers -0.006  
(0.01) 
Size 0.000  
(0.01) 
Tobin’s Q -0.001  
(0.01) 
Leverage -0.008  
(0.01) 
Capital Expenditure -0.016  
(0.01) 
Cash Flow 0.000  
(0.71) 
R&D 0.009  
(0.01) 
Working Capital -0.013  
(0.01) 
Industry Cash Flow Volatility -0.183 
 (0.01) 
Year Dummy Variables YES 
Industry Dummy Variables YES 
Country Dummy Variables YES 
Number of Observations 355715 
Adjusted R-square 0.89 
Partial F-statistic (p-value) 0.01 






Table 3-5 Two-stage Least Square Estimation: Second Stage 
This table shows the second stage of two-stage least square estimation. We use a sample of 355715 firm-year 
observations from 66 countries between 1992 and 2013.  Dividends is defined as the ratio of dividends to assets. 
Union Membership is defined as the ratio of the total number of trade union members to the total number of paid 
employees in a country. Size is defined as natural logarithm of assets. Tobin’s Q is defined as market value of 
equity plus assets minus book value of equity, divided by assets. Leverage is defined as the ratio of long-term 
debts to assets. Capital Expenditures is defined as the ratio of capital expenditures to assets. Cash Flow is defined 
as income after interest, and taxes, but before depreciation and provisions for common and/or preferred dividends, 
divided by assets. R&D is defined as the ratio of research and development expenses to assets. Working Capital 
is defined as the ratio of current assets minus current to assets. Industry Cash Flow Volatility is defined as the 
standard deviation of the median of Cash Flow in an industry classified by two-digit SIC codes in the prior 5 years.  
Year Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the years in the sample and not reported in the table. Industry 
Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the industries defined by two-digit SIC codes and not reported in 
the table. Country Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the countries in the sample and not reported in 
the table. The p–value is noted in the parentheses.  
 
 Dividends 
 Full sample Non-US firms 
Intercept -0.023 -0.022 
  (0.01) (0.01) 
Union Membership 0.077 0.079 
  (0.01) (0.01) 
Size 0.001 0.001 
  (0.01) (0.01) 
Tobin’s Q 0.004 0.002 
  (0.01) (0.01) 
Leverage -0.010 -0.013 
  (0.01) (0.01) 
Capital Expenditure 0.000 0.006 
 (0.64) (0.01) 
Cash Flow 0.017 0.039 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
R&D -0.027 -0.002 
 (0.01) (0.05) 
Working Capital 0.003 0.006 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Industry Cash Flow Volatility -0.034 -0.041 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Year Dummy Variables YES YES 
Industry Dummy Variables YES YES 
Country Dummy Variables YES YES 
Number of Observations 355715 262326 
Adjusted R-square 0.12 0.18 
Over-identifying Restrictions Test (p-value) 0.23 0.41 






Table 3-6 Employment Protection Legislation 
 
This table shows OLS regressions and the second-stage regressions of the 2SLS estimation for the sub-groups separated by the 
employment protection legislation. We use a sample of 281691 firm-year observations from 41 countries between 1992 and 2013. Panel 
A shows the regressions of Dividends. Dividends is defined as the ratio of dividends to assets. Employment Protection Legislation is the 
OECD indicators of employment protection legislation that measure the procedures and costs involved in dismissing individuals or 
groups of workers and the procedures involved in hiring workers on fixed-term or temporary work agency contracts in a country. Union 
Membership is defined as the ratio of the total number of trade union members to the total number of paid employees in a country. Size 
is defined as natural logarithm of assets. Tobin’s Q is defined as market value of equity plus assets minus book value of equity, divided 
by assets. Leverage is defined as the ratio of long-term debts to assets. Capital Expenditures is defined as the ratio of capital expenditures 
to assets. Cash Flow is defined as income after interest, and taxes, but before depreciation and provisions for common and/or preferred 
dividends, divided by assets. R&D is defined as the ratio of research and development expenses to assets. Working Capital is defined 
as the ratio of current assets minus current to assets. Industry Cash Flow Volatility is defined as the standard deviation of the median of 
Cash Flow in an industry classified by two-digit SIC codes in the prior 5 years.  Year Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for 
the years in the sample and not reported in the table. Industry Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the industries defined by 
two-digit SIC codes and not reported in the table. Country Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the countries in the sample 
and not reported in the table. The p–value is noted in the parentheses. Panel B shows the difference in the coefficients of Union 
Membership between the two sub-groups. 
 
Panel A. Regressions of Dividends 
 
 Dividends 
 OLS The Second Stage of 2SLS 
 EPL < Median EPL ≥ Median EPL < Median EPL ≥ Median 
Intercept -0.017 -0.008 -0.080 0.004 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Union Membership 0.102 0.008 0.225 0.007 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Size 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Tobin’s Q 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.002 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Leverage -0.005 -0.013 -0.005 -0.008 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Capital Expenditure -0.009 -0.001 -0.009 0.001 
 (0.01) (0.40) (0.01) (0.49) 
Cash Flow 0.011 0.041 0.011 0.040 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
R&D -0.002 0.004 -0.002 0.020 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Working Capital -0.005 0.004 -0.005 0.004 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Industry Cash Flow Volatility -0.038 -0.034 -0.034 -0.038 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Year Dummy Variables YES YES YES YES 
Industry Dummy Variables YES YES YES YES 
Country Dummy Variables YES YES YES YES 
Number of Observations 158647 123044 158647 123044 
Adjusted R-square 0.09 0.24 0.10 0.16 
Over-identifying Restrictions Test (p-value)   0.48 0.36 
Hausman Test (p-value)   0.01 0.01  
 
Panel B. Difference in the Coefficients of Union Membership 
 
The following table shows the difference in the coefficients of Union Membership between the two sub-groups separated by 
EPL and reports the p-value of the t-test in the parentheses. 
 
 Union Membership 
 OLS Second Stage of 2SLS Estimation 
Difference 0.094 0.218 




 Table 3-7 Labor Bargaining Centralization 
 
This table shows OLS regressions and the second-stage regressions of the 2SLS estimation for the sub-groups separated by the labor 
bargaining centralization. We use a sample of 253238 firm-year observations from 32 countries between 1992 and 2013. Panel A shows 
the regressions of Dividends. Dividends is defined as the ratio of dividends to assets. Centralization is an indicator of the degree of labor 
bargaining centralization in a country from the Institutional Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage Setting, State Intervention and Social 
Pacts (ICTWSS) database. Union Membership is defined as the ratio of the total number of trade union members to the total number of 
paid employees in a country. Size is defined as natural logarithm of assets. Tobin’s Q is defined as market value of equity plus assets 
minus book value of equity, divided by assets. Leverage is defined as the ratio of long-term debts to assets. Capital Expenditures is 
defined as the ratio of capital expenditures to assets. Cash Flow is defined as income after interest, and taxes, but before depreciation 
and provisions for common and/or preferred dividends, divided by assets. R&D is defined as the ratio of research and development 
expenses to assets. Working Capital is defined as the ratio of current assets minus current to assets. Industry Cash Flow Volatility is 
defined as the standard deviation of the median of Cash Flow in an industry classified by two-digit SIC codes in the prior 5 years.  Year 
Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the years in the sample and not reported in the table. Industry Dummy Variables are the 
dummy variables for the industries defined by two-digit SIC codes and not reported in the table. Country Dummy Variables are the 
dummy variables for the countries in the sample and not reported in the table. The p–value is noted in the parentheses. Panel B shows 
the difference in the coefficients of Union Membership between the two sub-groups. 
 
Panel A. Regressions of Dividends 
 
 Dividends 










Intercept -0.041 -0.031 -0.102 -0.123 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Union Membership 0.064 0.242 0.199 0.472 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Size 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Tobin’s Q 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.002 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Leverage -0.012 -0.005 -0.011 -0.005 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Capital Expenditure -0.007 -0.002 -0.006 -0.003 
 (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) 
Cash Flow 0.035 0.008 0.035 0.008 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
R&D -0.002 -0.004 -0.003 -0.004 
 (0.84) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
Working Capital 0.004 -0.005 0.004 -0.005 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Industry Cash Flow Volatility -0.063 -0.008 -0.047 -0.009 
  (0.01) (0.24) (0.01) (0.18) 
Year Dummy Variables YES YES YES YES 
Industry Dummy Variables YES YES YES YES 
Country Dummy Variables YES YES YES YES 
Number of Observations 126099 127139 126099 127139 
Adjusted R-square 0.20 0.10 0.20 0.10 
Over-identifying Restrictions Test (p-value)   0.58 0.39 
Hausman Test (p-value)   0.01 0.01  
 
Panel B. Difference in the Coefficients of Union Membership 
The following table shows the difference in the coefficients of Union Membership between the two sub-groups separated by 
Centralization and reports the p-value of the t-test in the parentheses. 
 Union Membership 
 OLS Second Stage of 2SLS Estimation 
Difference -0.178 -0.273 






Table 3-8 Announcement Return: The Increase of Dividends 
This table shows the regressions about the announcement return of the increase of dividends. We use a sample of 
56466 events of dividends increase from 55 countries between 1992 and 2013. CAR (-1, +1) is the cumulative 
abnormal return over days (-1, +1) around the announcement days. CAR (-3, +3) is the cumulative abnormal return 
over days (-3, +3) around the announcement days. CAR (-5, +5) is the cumulative abnormal return over days (-5, 
+5) around the announcement days. The cumulative abnormal return is calculated based on the market model. We 
use a firm’s daily return and the return on its corresponding stock market index over days -200 to -20, where day 
0 is the event date. Union Membership is defined as the ratio of the total number of trade union members to the 
total number of paid employees in a country. Size is defined as natural logarithm of assets. Tobin’s Q is defined as 
market value of equity plus assets minus book value of equity, divided by assets. Leverage is defined as the ratio 
of long-term debts to assets. Capital Expenditures is defined as the ratio of capital expenditures to assets. Cash 
Flow is defined as income after interest, and taxes, but before depreciation and provisions for common and/or 
preferred dividends, divided by assets. R&D is defined as the ratio of research and development expenses to assets. 
Working Capital is defined as the ratio of current assets minus current to assets. Industry Cash Flow Volatility is 
defined as the standard deviation of the median of Cash Flow in an industry classified by two-digit SIC codes in 
the prior 5 years. Cash is defined as the ratio of cash and marketable securities to assets. Year Dummy Variables 
are the dummy variables for the years in the sample and not reported in the table. Industry Dummy Variables are 
the dummy variables for the industries defined by two-digit SIC codes and not reported in the table. Country 
Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the countries in the sample and not reported in the table. The p–
value is noted in the parentheses.  
 
 CAR (-1, +1) CAR (-3, +3) CAR (-5, +5) 
Intercept 0.053 0.055 0.048 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Union Membership 0.008 0.011 0.010 
  (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) 
Size -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Tobin’s Q -0.003 -0.004 -0.005 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Leverage 0.002 0.003 0.004 
  (0.21) (0.24) (0.14) 
Capital Expenditure -0.012 -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.01) (0.63) (0.70) 
Cash Flow 0.019 0.030 0.040 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
R&D 0.008 0.006 0.001 
 (0.34) (0.62) (0.92) 
Working Capital -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.59) (0.39) (0.43) 
Industry Cash Flow Volatility -0.019 -0.016 -0.033 
 (0.39) (0.60) (0.36) 
Cash 0.001 0.003 0.003 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
Year Dummy Variables YES YES YES 
Industry Dummy Variables YES YES YES 
Country Dummy Variables YES YES YES 
Number of Observations 56466 56466 56466 







Table 3-9 Announcement Return: The Decrease of Dividends 
 
This table shows the regressions about the announcement return of the decrease of dividends. We use a sample of 
31816 events of dividends decrease from 55 countries between 1992 and 2013. CAR (-1, +1) is the cumulative 
abnormal return over days (-1, +1) around the announcement days. CAR (-3, +3) is the cumulative abnormal return 
over days (-3, +3) around the announcement days. CAR (-5, +5) is the cumulative abnormal return over days (-5, 
+5) around the announcement days. The cumulative abnormal return is calculated based on the market model. We 
use a firm’s daily return and the return on its corresponding stock market index over days -200 to -20, where day 
0 is the event date. Union Membership is defined as the ratio of the total number of trade union members to the 
total number of paid employees in a country. Size is defined as natural logarithm of assets. Tobin’s Q is defined as 
market value of equity plus assets minus book value of equity, divided by assets. Leverage is defined as the ratio 
of long-term debts to assets. Capital Expenditures is defined as the ratio of capital expenditures to assets. Cash 
Flow is defined as income after interest, and taxes, but before depreciation and provisions for common and/or 
preferred dividends, divided by assets. R&D is defined as the ratio of research and development expenses to assets. 
Working Capital is defined as the ratio of current assets minus current to assets. Industry Cash Flow Volatility is 
defined as the standard deviation of the median of Cash Flow in an industry classified by two-digit SIC codes in 
the prior 5 years. Cash is defined as the ratio of cash and marketable securities to assets. Year Dummy Variables 
are the dummy variables for the years in the sample and not reported in the table. Industry Dummy Variables are 
the dummy variables for the industries defined by two-digit SIC codes and not reported in the table. Country 
Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the countries in the sample and not reported in the table. The p–
value is noted in the parentheses.  
 
 CAR (-1, +1) CAR (-3, +3) CAR (-5, +5) 
Intercept 0.019 0.027 0.040 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Union Membership -0.008 -0.011 -0.015 
  (0.03) (0.02) (0.07) 
Size 0.000 0.000 -0.001 
  (0.02) (0.09) (0.02) 
Tobin’s Q -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Leverage 0.001 0.002 0.003 
  (0.72) (0.57) (0.53) 
Capital Expenditure -0.020 -0.028 -0.029 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Cash Flow 0.021 0.018 0.017 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.06) 
R&D 0.015 0.015 -0.030 
 (0.25) (0.37) (0.14) 
Working Capital -0.001 0.000 -0.003 
 (0.56) (0.87) (0.34) 
Industry Cash Flow Volatility -0.007 -0.036 -0.013 
 (0.85) (0.45) (0.81) 
Cash 0.001 0.000 0.001 
 (0.24) (0.70) (0.60) 
Year Dummy Variables YES YES YES 
Industry Dummy Variables YES YES YES 
Country Dummy Variables YES YES YES 
Number of Observations 31816 31816 31816 







Table 3-10 Change in Operating Performance: Dividend Increases 
 
This table shows the regressions about the change in operating performance around the event of dividend increases. 
We use a sample of 56466 events of dividend increases from 55 countries between 1992 and 2013. ΔROA is the 
change in ROA from year t-1 to year t+1, where ROA is defined as the ratio of EBIT to assets. ΔNet ROA is 
defined as the difference between an event firm’s change in ROA and its matched comparable firm’s change in 
ROA from year t-1 to year t+1. We get comparable firms based on the matching with size and M/B in the same 
industry (Column 2) and propensity score matching (Column 3). Union Membership is defined as the ratio of the 
total number of trade union members to the total number of paid employees in a country. Size is defined as natural 
logarithm of assets. Tobin’s Q is defined as market value of equity plus assets minus book value of equity, divided 
by assets. Leverage is defined as the ratio of long-term debts to assets. Capital Expenditures is defined as the ratio 
of capital expenditures to assets. R&D is defined as the ratio of research and development expenses to assets. 
Working Capital is defined as the ratio of current assets minus current to assets. Industry Cash Flow Volatility is 
defined as the standard deviation of the median of Cash Flow in an industry classified by two-digit SIC codes in 
the prior 5 years. Year Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the years in the sample and not reported in 
the table. Industry Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the industries defined by two-digit SIC codes 
and not reported in the table. Country Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the countries in the sample 
and not reported in the table. The p–value is noted in the parentheses.  
 
 ΔROA ΔNet ROA 




Intercept 0.005 0.068 -0.007 
  (0.33) (0.01) (0.37) 
Union Membership 0.029 0.018 0.017 
  (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) 
Size 0.001 -0.002 0.001 
  (0.29) (0.01) (0.01) 
Tobin’s Q 0.007 0.012 0.007 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Leverage 0.003 -0.001 -0.003 
  (0.21) (0.88) (0.35) 
Capital Expenditure -0.038 -0.016 -0.047 
 (0.01) (0.12) (0.01) 
R&D 0.051 0.007 0.047 
 (0.01) (0.71) (0.01) 
Working Capital 0.002 0.001 0.001 
 (0.22) (0.59) (0.60) 
Industry Cash Flow Volatility 0.043 -0.056 -0.011 
 (0.08) (0.25) (0.76) 
ROA t-1 -0.344 -0.310 -0.381 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Year Dummy Variables YES YES YES 
Industry Dummy Variables YES YES YES 
Country Dummy Variables YES YES YES 
Number of Observations 50459 50459 52436 






Table 3-11 Change in Operating Performance: Dividend Decreases 
 
This table shows the regressions about the change in operating performance around the event of dividend decreases. 
We use a sample of 31816 events of dividends decrease from 55 countries between 1992 and 2013. ΔROA is the 
change in ROA from year t-1 to year t+1, where ROA is defined as the ratio of EBIT to assets. ΔNet ROA is 
defined as the difference between an event firm’s change in ROA and its matched comparable firm’s change in 
ROA from year t-1 to year t+1. We get comparable firms based on the matching with size and M/B in the same 
industry (Column 2) and propensity score matching (Column 3). Union Membership is defined as the ratio of the 
total number of trade union members to the total number of paid employees in a country. Size is defined as natural 
logarithm of assets. Tobin’s Q is defined as market value of equity plus assets minus book value of equity, divided 
by assets. Leverage is defined as the ratio of long-term debts to assets. Capital Expenditures is defined as the ratio 
of capital expenditures to assets. R&D is defined as the ratio of research and development expenses to assets. 
Working Capital is defined as the ratio of current assets minus current to assets. Cash flow Volatility is defined as 
the standard deviation of the median of Cash Flow in an industry classified by two-digit SIC codes in the prior 5 
years. Year Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the years in the sample and not reported in the table. 
Industry Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the industries defined by two-digit SIC codes and not 
reported in the table. Country Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the countries in the sample and not 
reported in the table. The p–value is noted in the parentheses.  
 
 ΔROA ΔNet ROA 




Intercept 0.007 0.010 0.002 
  (0.27) (0.37) (0.85) 
Union Membership -0.008 -0.016 -0.009 
  (0.06) (0.04) (0.02) 
Size 0.001 0.001 0.001 
  (0.16) (0.50) (0.03) 
Tobin’s Q 0.002 0.007 0.004 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Leverage 0.008 0.010 0.003 
  (0.01) (0.06) (0.47) 
Capital Expenditure -0.022 0.017 0.005 
 (0.01) (0.18) (0.64) 
R&D 0.065 0.112 0.001 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.99) 
Working Capital 0.001 0.002 0.004 
 (0.88) (0.60) (0.17) 
Industry Cash Flow Volatility -0.042 0.014 -0.062 
 (0.22) (0.83) (0.22) 
ROA t-1 -0.350 -0.315 -0.413 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Year Dummy Variables YES YES YES 
Industry Dummy Variables YES YES YES 
Country Dummy Variables YES YES YES 
Number of Observations 28290 28920 30080 







Table 3-12 Dividends and Labor Costs 
This table shows OLS regressions about dividends and labor costs for the sub-groups separated by union 
membership. We use a sample of 77380 firm-year observations from 63 countries between 1992 and 2013. Panel 
A shows the regressions. Log (Average Labor Costs) is defined as the logarithm of average labor costs, where 
average labor costs are the ratio of staff expenses to the number of employees. Union Membership is defined as 
the ratio of the total number of trade union members to the total number of paid employees in a country. Dividends 
is defined as the ratio of dividends to assets. Size is defined as the logarithm of market value of assets. Leverage 
is defined as the ratio of long-term debts to market value of assets. Average Sales per Employee is the ratio of sales 
to the number of employees. Tobin’s Q is defined as market value of equity plus assets minus book value of equity, 
divided by assets. Tangibility is the ratio of plant, property and equipment to assets. Year Dummy Variables are 
the dummy variables for the years in the sample and not reported in the table. Industry Dummy Variables are the 
dummy variables for the industries defined by two-digit SIC codes and not reported in the table. Country Dummy 
Variables are the dummy variables for the countries in the sample and not reported in the table. The standard errors 
are clustered at the firm level. The p–value is noted in the parentheses. Panel B shows the difference in the 
coefficients of Corporate Cash Holdings between the two sub-groups. 
 
Panel A. Regressions 
 






Intercept 5.962 7.763  
(0.01) (0.01) 
Dividends -0.267 -0.350  
(0.07) (0.01) 
Size 0.038 0.003  
(0.01) (0.33) 
Leverage 0.141 -0.008  
(0.01) (0.84) 
Average Sales per Employee 0.672 0.431  
(0.01) (0.01) 
Tobin’s Q -0.005 0.021  
(0.35) (0.01) 
Tangibility -0.344 -0.085  
(0.01) (0.01) 
Year Dummy Variables YES YES 
Industry Dummy Variables YES YES 
Country Dummy Variables YES YES 
Number of Observations 38981 38399 
Adjusted R-square 0.50 0.45 
 
Panel B. Difference in the Coefficients of Dividends 
 
The following table shows the difference in the coefficients of Dividends between the two sub-groups separated 










Table 3-13 Dividends and Strikes & Lockouts: Country-level Analysis 
This table shows an OLS regression on the country-level analysis about Dividends and Strikes & Lockouts. We convert 
all firm-level variables into country-level variables by taking the average of the variables across the countries. The sample 
includes 781 country-year observations between 1992 and 2013 from 52 countries. Strikes & Lockouts are defined as the 
total number of strikes and lockouts in a country. Dividends is defined as the ratio of dividends to assets. Labor Force is 
defined as the sum of all persons of working age who are employed and those who are unemployed. Size is defined as 
natural logarithm of assets. Tobin’s Q is defined as market value of equity plus assets minus book value of equity, divided 
by assets. Leverage is defined as the ratio of long-term debts to assets. Capital Expenditures is defined as the ratio of 
capital expenditures to assets. Dividends is defined as the ratio of dividends to assets. Cash Flow is defined as income 
after interest, and taxes, but before depreciation and provisions for common and/or preferred dividends, divided by assets. 
R&D is defined as the ratio of research and development expenses to assets. Working Capital is defined as the ratio of 
working capital and marketable securities to assets. Cash flow Volatility is defined as the standard deviation of the median 
of Cash Flow in an industry classified by two-digit SIC codes in the prior 5 years. Year Dummy Variables are the dummy 
variables for the years in the sample and not reported in the table. Industry Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for 
the industries defined by two-digit SIC codes and not reported in the table. Country Dummy Variables are the dummy 
variables for the countries in the sample and not reported in the table. The p-value is noted in the parentheses. 
 
 Log (Country-level Strikes & Lockouts + 1) 
Intercept -26.667  
(0.01) 
Country-level Dividends -9.218  
(0.08) 
Log (Country-level Labor Force) 1.432 
 (0.01) 
Country-level Size 0.099 
 (0.33) 
Country-level Tobin’s Q -0.078 
 (0.24) 
Country-level Leverage -1.994  
(0.12) 
Country-level Capital Expenditure -2.192  
(0.34) 
Country-level Cash Flow 1.368  
(0.32) 
Country-level R&D 5.155  
(0.39) 
Country-level Working Capital -0.363  
(0.68) 
Country-level Cash Flow Volatility -3.300  
(0.80) 
Year Dummy Variables YES 
Industry Dummy Variables YES 
Country Dummy Variables YES 
Number of Observations 781 








Table 3-14 Robustness Check: Gender Gap 
This table shows the second-stage regressions of the 2SLS estimation for the sub-groups separated by the Gender 
Gap. We use a sample of 355715 firm-year observations from 66 countries between 1992 and 2013. Panel A 
shows the regressions. Gender Gap index is from the World Economic Forum and is constructed based on the 
equality between women and men across four key areas: health, education, economy and politics (see text for 
details). Dividends is defined as the ratio of dividends to assets.  Union Membership is defined as the ratio of the 
total number of trade union members to the total number of paid employees in a country. Size is defined as natural 
logarithm of assets. Tobin’s Q is defined as market value of equity plus assets minus book value of equity, 
divided by assets. Leverage is defined as the ratio of long-term debts to assets. Capital Expenditures is defined 
as the ratio of capital expenditures to assets. Cash Flow is defined as income after interest, and taxes, but before 
depreciation and provisions for common and/or preferred dividends, divided by assets. R&D is defined as the 
ratio of research and development expenses to assets. Working Capital is defined as the ratio of current assets 
minus current to assets. Cash Flow Volatility is defined as the standard deviation of the median of Cash Flow in 
an industry classified by two-digit SIC codes in the prior 5 years. Year Dummy Variables are the dummy 
variables for the years in the sample and not reported in the table. Industry Dummy Variables are the dummy 
variables for the industries defined by two-digit SIC codes and not reported in the table. Country Dummy 
Variables are the dummy variables for the countries in the sample and not reported in the table. The standard 
errors are clustered at the firm level. The p–value is noted in the parentheses. Panel B shows the difference in 
the coefficients of Union Membership between the two sub-groups. 
 
Panel A. Regressions 
 
 Dividends 
 Second Stage of 2SLS 
 




Intercept -0.012 -0.039 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Union Membership 0.023 0.111 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Size 0.001 0.001 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Tobin’s Q 0.001 0.003 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Leverage -0.012 -0.007 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Capital Expenditure 0.012 -0.008 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Cash Flow 0.030 0.018 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
R&D 0.010 0.004 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Working Capital 0.007 -0.005 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Industry Cash Flow Volatility -0.042 -0.036 
  (0.01) (0.01) 
Year Dummy Variables YES YES 
Industry Dummy Variables YES YES 
Country Dummy Variables YES YES 
Number of Observations 239191 116524 
Adjusted R-square 0.17 0.12 
Over-identifying Restrictions Test (p-value) 0.26 0.41 
Hausman Test (p-value) 0.01 0.01 
 
 
Panel B. Difference in the Coefficients of Union Membership 
The following table shows the difference in the coefficients of Union Membership between the two sub-groups 
separated by Gender Gap and reports the p-value of the t-test in the parentheses. 
 






 Table 3-15 Robustness Check: Collective Bargaining Coverage Rate 
 
This table shows the robustness check by using Bargaining Coverage Rate as an alternative measure of bargaining power. We use a 
sample of 326262 firm-year observations from 55 countries between 2000 and 2013. In Panel A, we report the OLS regression and 
the second stage of two-stage least square estimation. Dividends is defined as the ratio of dividends to assets. Total Payout is defined 
as the ratio of the sum of dividends and share repurchases to assets. Collective Bargaining Coverage Rate is calculated as the number 
of employees whose pay and/or conditions of employment are determined by one or more collective agreement(s) in a country divided 
by the total number of employees in that country.  Size is defined as natural logarithm of assets. Tobin’s Q is defined as market value 
of equity plus assets minus book value of equity, divided by assets. Leverage is defined as the ratio of long-term debts to assets. 
Capital Expenditures is defined as the ratio of capital expenditures to assets. Cash Flow is defined as income after interest, and taxes, 
but before depreciation and provisions for common and/or preferred dividends, divided by assets. R&D is defined as the ratio of 
research and development expenses to assets. Working Capital is defined as the ratio of current assets minus current to assets. Industry 
Cash Flow Volatility is defined as the standard deviation of the median of Cash Flow in an industry classified by two-digit SIC codes 
in the prior 5 years. Cash is defined as the ratio of cash and marketable securities to assets. Year Dummy Variables are the dummy 
variables for the years in the sample and not reported in the table. Industry Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the industries 
defined by two-digit SIC codes and not reported in the table. Country Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the countries in 
the sample and not reported in the table. Panel B report the regressions about the announcement return around the event of dividend 
increases and dividend decreases. The p-value is noted in the parentheses. The p-value is noted in the parentheses. 
 
Panel A. Collective Bargaining Coverage Rate and Corporate Payout 
 
 Dividends 
 OLS The Second Stage of 2SLS 
Intercept -0.006 -0.003 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Collective Bargaining Coverage Rate 0.009 0.016 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Size 0.001 0.001 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Tobin’s Q 0.002 0.002 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Leverage -0.010 -0.008 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Capital Expenditure 0.001 0.002 
 (0.04) (0.01) 
Cash Flow 0.020 0.020 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
R&D 0.007 0.010 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Working Capital 0.001 0.001 
 (0.05) (0.03) 
Industry Cash Flow Volatility -0.072 -0.064 
  (0.01) (0.01) 
Year Dummy Variables YES YES 
Industry Dummy Variables YES YES 
Country Dummy Variables YES YES 
Number of Observations 326262 326262 
Adjusted R-square 0.12 0.10 
Over-identifying Restrictions Test  0.28 











 Dividend Increases Dividend Decreases 
 CAR  
(-1, +1) 
CAR 
 (-3, +3) 
CAR 




 (-3, +3) 
CAR 
 (-5, +5) 
Intercept 0.050 0.053 0.057 0.020 0.033 0.052 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Collective Bargaining Coverage Rate 0.010 0.011 0.012 -0.024 -0.046 -0.055 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.04) (0.01) 
Size -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 0.001 0.001 -0.001 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.17) (0.48) (0.12) 
Tobin’s Q -0.002 -0.003 -0.004 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Leverage 0.003 0.004 0.005 0.001 0.003 0.005 
  (0.19) (0.15) (0.08) (0.61) (0.42) (0.24) 
Capital Expenditure -0.014 -0.004 -0.007 -0.025 -0.039 -0.045 
 (0.01) (0.60) (0.41) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Cash Flow 0.014 0.026 0.033 0.018 0.010 0.011 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.24) (0.23) 
R&D 0.009 0.001 -0.007 0.017 0.014 -0.027 
 (0.34) (0.95) (0.61) (0.19) (0.42) (0.19) 
Working Capital -0.001 -0.003 -0.003 -0.001 0.001 -0.003 
 (0.45) (0.18) (0.29) (0.57) (0.89) (0.35) 
Industry Cash Flow Volatility -0.012 -0.017 -0.029 -0.009 -0.029 -0.007 
 (0.60) (0.59) (0.43) (0.80) (0.56) (0.91) 
Cash 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.06) (0.01) (0.02) (0.22) (0.83) (0.62) 
Year Dummy Variables YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry Dummy Variables YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country Dummy Variables YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Number of Observations 49079 49079 49079 26332 26332 26332 




Chapter 4 Labor Unions and Share Repurchases: 
Evidence from International data 
4.1 Introduction 
Dividends and share repurchases are two main methods for firms to distribute financial 
resources all around the world. As discussed in chapter 3, firms use dividends as a bargaining 
tool against labor unions across countries. Share repurchase is also used as a flexible way in 
collective bargaining in the world. However, few financial economists explore the relation 
between share repurchases and labor unions in the international setting.  
Share repurchases grow rapidly during the 1980s and 1990s in many countries Grullon 
and Michaely (2004) state that the value of share repurchases firstly exceed that in dividends 
payment in US industrial companies in 1999 and 2000. Share repurchases also increase in 
Canada (Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen, 2000), United Kingdom (Oswald and Young, 
2004) and other European countries (Eije and Megginson, 2008). In Japan and Sweden, share 
repurchases are prohibited before but are allowed in open markets since the 1990s (Tong, and 
Bremer, 2016; Tran, and Weigardh, 2013). 36  Corresponding with the popularity of share 
repurchases around the world, financial economists conduct extensive research about the share 
repurchases. However, most papers focus on US markets (e.g., Comment, and Jarrell, 1991; 
Grullon, and Michaely, 2002; Skinner, 2008). 
Motivated by previous studies, this chapter investigates the relation between labor unions 
and share repurchases in the international setting. First, share repurchases play a significant 
role in firms' financial policies all around the world. Share repurchases reduce the resources 
available to a firm, which also reduce the resources available for potential collective bargaining 
                              




organized by labor unions. It implies that a firm may strategically choose share repurchases 
with the presence of labor unions. For example, suppose a firm has a lot of cash holdings, labor 
unions recognize this and may organize the collective bargaining to get more benefits for the 
workers. Then suppose a firm pays out the cash by share repurchases, this reduces cash holdings 
in the firm and reduce the likelihood of the occurrence of the collective bargaining organized 
by labor unions. 
Second, previous literature has examined how labor unions affect share repurchases by 
using the US data (e.g., Chen, Chen, and Wang, 2015). Since labor unions exist in many 
countries around the world, as discussed in previous chapters, there is a substantial difference 
between the US and other countries in the world. Therefore, it is meaningful to use a more 
effective research setting on the relation between labor unions and share repurchases in 
international settings. 
Third, previous literature has found different results in terms of the relation between labor 
unions and corporate financial policies by using US data and international data separately. As 
discussed in previous chapters, Matsa (2010) and Simintzi, Vig, and Volpin (2015) find the 
opposite results about leverage by using US data and the international data separately. 
Therefore, it is possible that the impacts of labor unions on share repurchases are different 
between the US data and the international data. This motivates us to examine the relation 
between labor unions and share repurchases in the international setting.  
This chapter develops two hypotheses. First, the bargaining hypothesis argues that firms 
strategically choose share repurchases to gain the bargaining positions against labor unions. On 
one hand, when a firm repurchase more stocks, it increases the risk of the shortage of corporate 
liquidity. As a result, labor unions will decrease their demands for benefits from the firm due 
to the consideration of bankruptcy risk. On the other hand, suppose a firm has a higher level of 




also reveal that the firm is less financially constrained. To avoid this positive signaling which 
increases the likelihood of the occurrence of collective bargaining organized by labor unions, 
a firm will reduce the share repurchases to prevent sending out such kind of positive signals. 
Therefore, the bargaining hypothesis predicts that the relation between labor unions and share 
repurchases in two possible directions through two different mechanisms. 
Second, the operating leverage hypothesis suggests that stronger labor unions increase 
both operating risk and rigidity of labor costs, leading to lower share repurchases based on the 
trade-off perspective. Because with the presence of strong labor unions, a firm will have higher 
expenditures due to the higher rigidity of labor costs. According to the trade-off perspective, 
the firm needs to hold more cash to meet the demand for higher expenditures. Meanwhile, the 
strong labor unions are also associated with a higher operating risk. Accordingly, this firm also 
needs to hold more cash due to the precautionary motive. In this case, this firm will reduce the 
share repurchases. Therefore, the operating leverage hypothesis predicts that there is a negative 
relation between the strength of labor unions and share repurchases. 
We use a sample of 355715 firm-year observations from 66 countries in our empirical 
analysis. We use the country-level union membership to measure the bargaining power of labor 
unions across countries. It is defined as total number of trade union members to the total number 
of paid employees in a country. In terms of the potential endogeneity problem, we apply the 
instrumental variables approach in our analysis to study the relation between union membership 
and share repurchases. In addition, we conduct the relevant tests to ensure our instruments are 
valid and exogenous.  
We find that firms use share repurchases to gain bargaining position to labor unions. 
When there is higher union membership in a country, firms tend to have more share repurchases. 
Our results show that a one standard deviation increase in the country-level union membership 




total payout, corresponding to an increase in share repurchases with a dollar value of 1.600 
million dollars and an increase in total payout with a dollar value of 3.876 million dollars. In 
addition, we divide our sample into sub-groups concerned with characteristics that can affect 
the bargaining power of labor unions. We find that the positive relation between country-level 
union membership and share repurchases is stronger for firms in countries with weaker 
employment protection legislation and firms in countries with a higher degree of labor 
bargaining centralization.   
Because of this positive relation, we conduct event study about how the country-level 
union membership affects the market response around the date of share repurchase. We find 
that the announcement return is higher for firms in a country with higher union membership 
around the announcement date of share repurchase. Moreover, we examine how labor unions 
affect the operating performance around the event of share repurchases. We find that the net 
ROA change is positively correlated with the union membership around the event date of share 
repurchase.  
Our findings are consistent with the bargaining hypothesis from the perspective of the 
availability of resources. They imply that a strategically choose share repurchases to gain 
bargaining advantage against labor unions in the international setting.  
We contribute to the literature from the following aspects. First, our results based on 
international data are different from the results in the previous literature based on US data. For 
example, Chen, Chen and Wang (2015) find a negative relation between the level of firms' 
share repurchases and labor power measured by unionization rates with US data. Moreover, 
they find a negative relation between labor power and both the announcement returns and the 
operating performance of the event of share repurchases. Their interpretation of their results is 
that firms are less likely to repurchase shares with the presence of stronger labor unions because 




positions. However, our paper finds the opposite results. We find that firms have a higher level 
of share repurchases with the presence of stronger labor unions by using international data. In 
addition, we find that the announcement returns and the operating performance of the event of 
share repurchases are higher with the presence of stronger labor unions. Our interpretation of 
our results is that firms strategically use share repurchase to gain bargaining positions with the 
labor because share repurchases will lower the resources available for collective bargaining. 
Therefore, the findings of our paper are opposite the findings of Chen, Chen and Wang (2015).   
Second, we add to the literature of share repurchases in corporate finance by providing a 
new piece of evidence in the international setting. In the literature of corporate repurchases, 
most papers use US data, while only a limited number of papers study share repurchases in the 
international setting. For example, Manconi, Peyer and Vermaelen (2015) investigate share 
repurchases across countries from the perspectives of market timing, governance quality and 
regulations. Our research differs from their paper because we study share repurchases from the 
perspective of the bargaining between labor unions and firms. For another example, Eije and 
Megginson (2008) examine the payout policy in 15 members of European Union, they examine 
the level of share repurchases and find that financial reporting frequency and privatization 
affect both the level of share repurchases and the likelihood that a firm conducts share 
repurchases. Our paper differs from their paper, because we focus on the relation between labor 
unions and share repurchases, and we examine not only the level but also the value impact 
associated with the announcement of share repurchases in a broader sample with the data from 
66 countries.  
Broadly speaking, our paper also contributes to the literature by presenting a new piece 
of evidence regarding the comparison of the findings between US data and international data 
in the field of collective bargaining with labor. For example, Matsa (2010) finds positive 




leverage to get stronger bargaining positions. However, Simintzi, Vig, and Volpin (2015) find 
opposite results and argue that leverage is not regarded as a bargaining tool in the international 
data. For another example, as we discussed in Chapter 2, while Klasa, Maxwell and Ortiz-
Molina (2009) find that there is a negative relation between corporate cash holdings and labor 
unions using US data, we find similar results of such a negative relation by using the 
international data. From these two examples, the findings in previous literature reveal that the 
results may be either different or similar when US data or international data are used, and that 
there is not a systematic pattern. Therefore, it is meaningful to conduct another research on the 
relation between labor power and share repurchases in the international setting, although Chen, 
Chen, and Wang (2015) have already examined this issue with US data.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature. Section 3 develops 
the hypotheses. Section 4 describes the data and the variables. Section 5 discusses the 
methodology. Section 6 presents the results of large sample analysis. Section 7 shows the 
results of smaller sample analysis. Section 8 describes robustness check. Section 9 concludes 
this chapter. 
4.2 Literature Review 
Grullon and Michaely (2004) point out that the total value of share repurchases exceeds 
the value of dividend payments in US industrial companies in 1999. Share repurchases attract 
dramatic attention from financial economists. 
Existed literature notes that firms repurchase stocks under the similar mechanism as 
dividend payments that both dividend payments and share repurchase are used to distribute 
cash to shareholders. Accordingly, theories about share repurchase are related to the theories 
about dividends. Based on the seminal study of Lintner (1956) and Miller and Modigliani 
(1961), financial economists develop the signaling theory and the agency theory. However, 




buyback shares to distribute transient and temporary cash flows while they pay out dividends 
to distribute the permanent cash flows. Firms use share repurchases as a more flexible substitute 
for dividend payments. There is also some paper study the dividend substitution theory about 
share repurchases.  
Therefore, this section reviews the literature about two main theories related to share 
repurchases: signaling theory, agency theory.  
4.2.1 Signaling theory 
Similar to the literature about dividend policy, financial economists build the signaling 
theory about share repurchases. Managers buyback stocks to signal future profitability and 
undervaluation of this firm. Vermealen (1981) proposes the signaling theory in the literature of 
share repurchase based on two assumptions: information asymmetry and undervaluation. He 
describes the share repurchase activities as positive signals to shareholders. He examines the 
stock price around the announcement date of share repurchase and finds a significant level of 
increase in the stock price around that date.  
Early literature tries to find evidence supporting the signaling theory of share repurchases 
by connecting future earnings growth to share repurchase announcements. For example, Dann 
(1981) studies 143 cash tender offers made by 122 US firms between 1962 and 1976 to test 
firms’ value change affected by share repurchases. He finds that the value of firms increases in 
the day of tender offer announcement due to the positive signaling effects of share repurchases. 
Ofer and Thakor (1987) compare the different effects of dividend payments and share 
repurchases on signaling firms’ value by a theoretical model. They show that the market 
response of share price to dividend announcements is weaker than that to share repurchase 
announcements. They suggest that managers can use dividends or share repurchases to correct 
the undervaluation of firms’ stocks in different situations. Dann, Masulis and Mayers (1991) 




US firms from 1969 to 1978. They find that analysts’ forecast errors and firms’ earnings 
surprises are positive related to the tender offer announcement. They show that the increases in 
firms’ quarterly earnings reports lead to positive stock price reactions and argue that is because 
firms’ tender offer announcements are positive signals. Bartov (1991) also find consistent 
results with signaling theory by using the data of open market share repurchases and state it is 
a “weak” evidence because they find positive stock price reactions to share repurchases in that 
year.  
 More literature finds positive market reaction to the announcements of share repurchases 
because the stock price is undervalued. For example, Comment and Jarrell (1991) propose that 
there are three types of share repurchases in the US: Dutch auction self-tender offer, fixed price 
self-tender and open market share repurchase. They compare the positive effects of signals 
among these three methods and argue that the fixed price self-tenders send the strongest signals 
of undervaluation. Following the comparison methods of Ofer and Thakor (1987), Choi and 
Chen (1997) add timing, industry and the cash distribution amount in control variables and find 
the market response to repurchase tender offer announcements stronger than the response to 
dividend increases. Stephens and Weisbach (1998) support the signaling theory by examining 
the abnormal return of share repurchase announcement date and emphasize that firm size is an 
important negative determination of the abnormal return of the announcement day. More 
recently, Liu and Swanson (2016) find that firms buyback stocks to provide price support with 
a sample of US firms over the period of 2003-2014. They find that there are positive abnormal 
returns after managers repurchase stocks that are motivated by price support. Because managers 
are confident about firms’ stock prices and would provide price support to stocks by share 
repurchases. Damien, Michael and Alfred (2011) also find evidence from Australian data.  
However, some literature shows that share repurchases are not positive signals to 




send a negative signal to shareholders because firms in emerging industries may not find other 
more profitable investments than themselves. For another example, Chan, Ikenberry, Lee, and 
Wang (2010) use the data of US firms that announce share repurchases in open markets between 
1980 and 2000 and argue that announcements of share repurchases may convey false signals 
when managers under the pressure of current low stock price. They find that managers in firms 
with poor earnings quality experience heavy pressure and they announce share repurchases 
only to give a boost to share price.  
4.2.2 Agency theory and free cash flow theory 
The rationale of agency theory of share repurchases is also similar to the agency theory 
of dividends discussed above in Section 3.2.2. As another way to distribute cash, share 
repurchases also reduce the free cash flow and decrease the agency costs.  
Howe, He, and Kao (1992) investigate in whether tend offer share repurchases decrease 
the agency problems for the years 1979 to 1989 by using the similar methodology of Lang and 
Litzenberger (1989). However, they find that there is no significant difference in market 
reaction to share repurchase announcements across firms with different Tobin’s Q. They argue 
that firms repurchase shares are not for the purpose of lowering agency costs. However, Perfect, 
Peterson, and Peterson (1995) find significant difference of market reaction to share repurchase 
announcements between firms with high Tobin’s Q and low Tobin’s Q under similar 
methodology of Lang and Litzenberger (1989). They use the mean of Tobin's Q over three 
years prior to the repurchase announcement instead of the current Tobin's Q which is used in 
Howe, He and Kao (1992). They find firms with high Tobin's Q have weaker market reaction 
to share repurchases than firms with low Tobin's Q, and argue that it is consistent with agency 
theory. Vafeas and Joy (1995) find empirical evidence from open market repurchases by using 
162 share repurchases from The Wall Street Journal from 1985 to 1991. They find the abnormal 




less agency costs. Nohel and Tarhan (1998) find similar results from both fixed-price and 
Dutch-auction tender offers between 1978 and 1991by using the methodology of Lang and 
Litzenberger (1989). Evans, Evans & Gentry (2003) extend the sample period to 1978 to 1995 
on The Wall Street Index and find that firms’ free cash flows significantly decreases after share 
repurchases which is consistent to the agency theory. Grullon and Michaely (2004) find that 
the announcements of share repurchase in open markets are not associated to operating 
performance growth and argue this is inconsistent with the signaling theory which predicts 
positive earnings growth following the share repurchases. However, they find positive effects 
of share repurchase announcements on the market reaction and the effects are stronger in firms 
are more likely to overinvest. They argue this is consistent with the free cash flow theory of 
share repurchase. 
Recently, Jagannathan and Stephens (2003) compare financial characteristics and market 
performance between frequently repurchasing firms to occasionally repurchasing firms for the 
period of 1986-1996. They note that firms occasionally repurchase stocks in open markets have 
more operating income volatility, lower institutional ownership and more abnormal return after 
announcements of share repurchases. They argue that the high abnormal return indicates that 
share repurchase decreases the agency costs. Padgett and Wang (2007) also find significant 
positive effects of announcements of share repurchases on firms' stock price by using the data 
of UK firms from 1999 to 2004. Oswald and Young (2007) also use data of firms listed in 
London Stock Exchange between 1995 to 2003 and find firms with lower managerial 
ownership are under stronger board monitoring so that they have better operating performance 
after share repurchase announcements due to the lower level of agency problems. Chahine, 
Zeidan and Dairy (2012) provide more evidence from corporate governance.  
However, different from the traditional agency theory in payout policy and residual 




propensity of share repurchases in firms whose EPS is far from analysts’ forecast but have not 
repurchased stocks is sharply higher than firms whose EPS “just beat” analysts’ forecast. They 
argue that there may be a tradeoff between investments and share repurchases when managers 
have the incentive to meet analysts’ forecast. Since share repurchase leads to positive market 
response of earnings per share (EPS) increases, managers strategically lower the employment 
and investments to repurchase stocks in open market. As a result, managers meet the analysts’ 
EPS forecast by share repurchasing.  
4.2.3 Other Theories 
4.2.3.1 Dividend substitution hypothesis 
Managers use repurchase instead of dividend payments to distribute cash to shareholders 
because repurchases are more flexible. Brav, Graham, Harvey, and Michaely (2005) survey 
384 financial executives and highlight that executives prefer repurchases because of the 
flexibility. Jagannathan, Stephens, and Weisbach (2000), and Guay and Harford (2000) also 
point that firms buyback shares to distribute transient and temporary cash flows while they pay 
out dividends to distribute the permanent cash flows. Firms use share repurchases as a more 
flexible substitute for dividend payments. In addition, Evans, Evans & Gentry (2003) argue 
that firms decrease dividends may lead to heavy penalty so that firms use share repurchase 
when there is excess cash to avoid dividends adjustments. Therefore, firms use share repurchase 
as a flexible substitute of dividends.  
Allen and Michaely (2003) state that dividends increases approximately 15% per year 
before mid-1980s and this growth rate declines to average 6% per year after mid-1980s because 
firms are substituting share repurchases for dividends as their payout policy. In 1999, the value 
of share repurchases arrived at the same level of dividend payments. However, Dunsby (1995) 
compares the dividend payments between firms with share repurchase activities and firms do 




no less than comparable firms although there are increasing share repurchase activities in his 
sample period. Fama and French (2001) have also observed the increasing share repurchase 
since 1978. They suggest that firms generally increase total payout, especially large and 
profitable firms which results in the repurchase growth. Fenn and Liang (2001) find evidence 
supporting the dividend substitution theory by using US data from 1993 to 1997. They find 
management stock options are negatively related to dividend payments while are positively 
related to share repurchases. The opposite relations therefore inspire managers to use share 
repurchases to attribute cash instead of dividend payments.   
According to Jagannathan, Stephens and Weisbach (2000), and Guay and Harford (2000), 
firms prefer share repurchase to attribute transient cash flows. Gasper, Massa, Matos and Patgiri 
(2004) study US firms over a period of 1984-2000 and find firms with more short-term 
institutional investors prefer to share repurchases rather than dividend payments. They also 
state that the abnormal return of share repurchases are higher than that of dividend payments. 
Chay and Suh (2008) examine the relation of firms' payout method decision and cash flow 
volatility in the US between 1994 and 2005. They find firms with high cash-flow volatility 
prefer share repurchase because dividend payments are sticky. They argue this is consistent 
with Grullon and Michaely (2002), and Grullon and Michaely (2002) which predict that firms 
repurchase shares but do not pay dividends have higher operating profitability. Lee and Suh 
(2011) study the payout policy in seven main countries from 1998 to 2006. They find that share 
repurchases are used as a flexible way to distribute temporary cash flows across countries, 
although non-US firms have less share repurchase than US firms. Their results are consistent 
to the agency theory and dividend substitution theory.  
However, DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Skinner (2008) emphasize that dividends increase 
with the growth of share repurchases recently because large and mature firms use dividends to 




grow steadily with share repurchases. They find evidence that the ratio of dividends to total 
payout stays stable after 2000 because the free cash flow problems exit. They therefore suggest 
that share repurchases are used as a supplement of dividends.   
4.2.3.2 Executive stock option and repurchase 
As discussed in 3.2.3.2, dividend payments reduce the price of stock options (Lambert, 
Lanen and Larker, 1989). Managers prefer to repurchase stocks rather than to pay out dividends 
to distribute internal funds. As a result, the higher ownership of executive stock options is 
associated with more share repurchases. For example, Fenn and Liang (2001) state that both 
the number of managerial stock options and share repurchases increases over the period of 
1993-1997 in the US. They argue that managers change the composition of payout policy with 
higher share repurchases in that they have incentives to protect the price of their stock options. 
For another example, Kahle (2001) studies the relation between employees’ stock options and 
repurchases by using the data of 5147 share repurchases between 1991 and 1996. She finds that 
firms’ share repurchases are positively affected by all employees’ stock options exercisable and 
the market response to this kind of repurchases is weaker because managers use repurchases to 
maximize their own benefits.  
Moreover, suppose executives have stock options as compensation, when managers 
exercise the stock options, this can increase the total number of shares outstanding. 
Consequently, this will dilute the earnings per share (EPS). To prevent the dilution of EPS, 
firms repurchase shares to reduce the total number of shares outstanding. For example, Jolls 
(1998) examine the dilution loss when firms paid out dividends to distribute cash in 1993. He 
suggests firms increase dividends rather than repurchases experience $345, 000 loss of its value 
due to the dilution. They also find that higher level of stock options is associated with higher 




Weisbenner (2000) also finds that stock options held by top five executives are positively 
related to share repurchases in the US in 1994.   
4.2.3.3 Optimal Capital Structure Hypothesis 
Due to the different taxation between dividends and capital gains, firms repurchase stocks 
to gain lower tax rate. If firms finance the share repurchases with debt, firms may use share 
repurchases to a more desirable capital structure because firms can use repurchase from cheaper 
debt financing to replace the expensive equity financing. For example, Dixon, Palmer, Stradling 
and Woodhead (2008) survey the finance directors of top 200 UK firms. They suggest that 
firms’ finance directors strategically use share repurchases to achieve the optimal capital 
structure. Moreover, Rau and Vermaelen (2002) find that share repurchases in UK firms are 
sensitive to the tax changes. They argue that although most open-market repurchases use excess 
cash rather than debts, firms also benefit from the lower tax rate of capital gains and cash is 
considered as negative debt.  
4.2.3.4 Behavioral finance hypothesis 
Previous literature also uses behavioral finance to study the share repurchases, because 
behavioral finance predicts well in some underreaction and overaction problems which cannot 
be explained by classic theories.  
For example, Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (1995) find that the market reacts 
slowly to share repurchase in a long time. They argue that that the firms' long-term positive 
performance after share repurchases is associated with the market underreaction. However, 
Fama (1998) point out the bad-model problem is more serious in the long-term performance 
after share repurchases in that the market is inefficient. Recently, Cheng, Yan, Zhao, and Gao 
(2015) try to explain the anomaly of market reaction to share repurchases in Taiwan with the 
investor inattention hypothesis. They use the turnover as the proxy of investor inattention 




that the information is not fully reflected by the price. They find that stocks with less previous 
turnover are associated with greater underreaction to the announcements of share repurchases 
and greater long-term positive abnormal return. 
4.3 Hypothesis 
This section describes the hypothesis development. 
4.3.1 Bargaining hypothesis 
Based on bargaining perspective, labor unions have effects on firms’ share repurchases 
in two following ways. 
4.3.1.1 The channel through the availability of resources and bankruptcy risk 
It has been found in literature that corporate financial policies are affected by collective 
bargaining. For example, Matsa (2010) finds labor unions have impacts on a firm’s capital 
structure. Klasa, Maxwell and Ortiz-Molina (2009) find that corporate cash holdings are 
affected by the bargaining power of labor unions. According to this literature, firms 
strategically use various corporate financial policies to increase the bankruptcy risks with the 
presence of labor unions. Because bankruptcy is costly for employees, firms get more 
bargaining benefits from these financial policies. Therefore, labor unions will not claim more 
benefits and even accept lower wages with the variation of capital structure or the cash holdings 
decreases and other change of financial policies.  
A firm can reduce the availability of resources through share repurchases. Guay and 
Harford (2000) state that firms choose to repurchase stocks in order to disburse transient cash-
flow shocks. When a firm conducts a share repurchase program, it reduces the available 
financial resources and obtains a better bargaining position against labor unions. In addition, 
Brav et al. (2005) argue that managers prefer repurchases because they are more flexible than 
dividends from survey data. This flexibility can be used to vary payout to time the equity market. 




bargaining positions with labor unions. When firms conduct a share repurchase program, the 
bankruptcy risk increases. As discussed above, this increased bankruptcy can be used as a 
bargaining tool in the collective bargaining. For example, Chino (2016) finds that firms with 
higher profitability increase their dividend payments to gain bargaining positions when there 
are strong labor unions. He argues that firms use payout policies to reduce the rent extracted by 
potential collective bargaining of labor unions and this is consistent with the rent extraction 
hypothesis. Due to the above mechanism, firms will be expected to strategically increase share 
repurchases to gain bargaining power when there are strong labor unions. Therefore, the 
bargaining hypothesis is developed as followed. 
Hypothesis 1A: The bargaining hypothesis predicts that there is a positive relation 
between labor unions and share repurchases through the channel of availability of resources 
and bankruptcy risk. 
4.3.1.2 The channel through the signaling effect 
Previous literature has discussed the signaling effects of share repurchases. For example, 
Vermaelen (1981) argues that a firm can use share repurchase program to signal future 
profitability. In this literature, a firm can send out credible signals through share repurchases.  
When a firm increases the share repurchases, labor unions may view this as a signal of 
positive future profitability. In this case, labor unions will increase the demand for financial 
benefits from the firm because they will think that this firm has good potential for future 
profitability. 
To avoid the higher demands from labor unions, a firm will strategically reduce share 
repurchases in advance, in that share repurchase programs send out a signal to encourage labor 
unions to increase their benefits claims. In addition, when there are stronger labor unions, this 
mechanism is more likely to occur because a firm can obtain more benefits from this strategical 




Hypothesis 1B: The bargaining hypothesis predicts that there is a negative relation 
between labor unions and share repurchases through the channel of signaling. 
4.3.2 Operating leverage hypothesis 
Chen, Kacperczyk, and Ortiz-Molina (2011) argue that the presence of labor unions 
decreases the operating flexibility and increases the cost of equity of firms. Labor unions try to 
increase their benefits from firms’ operating income. This increases the firms’ fixed labor costs 
because labor unions make wage stickier and layoffs more costly. As a result, firms’ operating 
leverage increases. 
Firms have to keep some financial resources due to when there are strong labor unions 
who increases the operating risk. Simintzi, Vig, and Volpin (2015) find that the higher union 
density leads to higher labor costs which increase the higher operating leverage and lower 
financial leverage. 
If firms have more share repurchases, they may suffer the operating risks due to 
insufficient financial resources. This operating leverage risk promotes firms reduce share 
repurchases when there is higher union membership in a country. 
Hypothesis 2: The operating leverage hypothesis predicts that there is negative relation 
between labor unions and share repurchases.  
Hypothesis 2: The operating leverage hypothesis predicts that there is a negative relation 
between labor unions and share repurchases. 
4.3.3 Combining the hypotheses 
The table below shows the hypothesis developed in the previous discussion. In this table, 
a positive sign “+” implies that the relation between the power of labor unions and the share 
repurchases is positive, while a negative sign “-” implies a negative relation. 
The relationship between the strength of labor unions and share repurchases 
The bargaining hypothesis The operating leverage hypothesis 
The availability of resources The signaling effect  




4.4 Data and Variables 
4.4.1 Data 
The sample comprises international data collected from following sources. The financial 
data of U.S. firms and Canadian firms are obtained from Compustat North America database. 
We obtain the financial data of firms in other countries from Compustat Global database. Since 
the data of non-the US firms use different currencies; The monthly exchange rates are used 
from Compustat Global database to convert these data to corresponding data in U.S. dollars. In 
order to calculate the industry cash flow volatility by using the data of prior five years, the 
sample period is from 1992 to 2013 although the data in Compustat Global database starts from 
1987. The stock return data is obtained from the CRSP database for the US and Canadian firms. 
The stock return data for firms in other countries is obtained from Datastream database. We 
also obtain the data of stock market index in each country from Datastream database. The 
information of share repurchase events is obtained from Thomas One database. The country-
level data of union membership from ILOStat database, which is maintained by the 
International Labor Organization. 
Firms with less than 5 million U.S. dollars in total assets or market capitalization, 
financial firms (SICcodes between 6000 and 6999) and observations with incomplete data are 
excluded. These exclusion procedures follow the literature Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson 
(2013) to ensure that the data collected is valid for the following empirical analysis. After these 
exclusions, the final sample consists of 42777 firms with 355715 firm-year observations from 
66 countries. 
4.4.2 Variables 
4.4.2.1 Union Membership 
The variable Union Membership is calculated as the total number of trade union members 




of the bargaining power of labor unions in a country. A higher level of Union Membership 
implies that the bargaining power of labor unions is higher in this country. 
4.4.2.2 Share Repurchases 
The variable Repurchases is defined as the ratio of repurchases to assets. 
4.4.2.3 Control Variables 
The control variables in this chapter are constructed as follows. Size is defined as the 
natural logarithm of total assets. Tobin’s Q is defined as market value of equity plus total assets 
minus book value of equity, divided by total assets. Leverage is defined as the ratio of long-
term debts to total assets. Capital Expenditures are defined as the ratio of capital expenditures 
to total assets. Dividends are defined as the ratio of dividends to total assets. Cash Flow is 
defined as income after interest, and taxes, but before depreciation and provisions for common 
and/or preferred dividends, divided by assets. R&D is defined as the ratio of research and 
development expenses to total assets. Net Working Capital is defined as the ratio of working 
capital minus cash and marketable securities to total assets. Industry Cash Flow Volatility is 
calculated as the standard deviation of the median of Cash Flow in an industry classified by 
two-digit SIC codes in the prior five years. Year dummy variables, industry dummy variables 
and country dummy variables are also included in regressions. 
To control the time-invariant characteristics across countries, previous literature uses 
different control variables in their study, such as shareholder rights (Dittmar et al., 2003), a 
dummy variable describing whether the law is based common law or civil in a country, the 
level of external capital La Porta et al., 1997), the level of private credit (Levine, Loayza, and 
Beck, 2000). All these variables are time-invariant across countries; it means that they have 





Concerned with the potential endogeneity problem, we use the following methodology 
to address the endogeneity problem.  
4.5.1 Discussion about potential endogeneity problem 
Vermaelen (1981) argues that share repurchase is regarded as a signal that the firm’s 
stock price is underpriced. When a firm repurchases stocks in open market in a country, workers 
have more claims about wage and other benefits from when they observe the positive signal 
from the share repurchase. In order to gain more benefits from collective bargaining, workers 
turn to join labor unions. Consequently, the union membership increases in this country. This 
may lead to the reverse causality problem. From this perspective, more share repurchases in a 
country result in higher country-level union membership. 
4.5.2 Instrumental variables 
According to Hirsh (1980) and Hirsh (1982), the gender of the workers affects union 
membership. Scoville (1971) finds that the age of the workers also has effects union 
membership. There is no evidence that these two variables have effects on a firm's share 
repurchases directly. In the study of the relation between labor unions and firms' costs of equity. 
In Chen, Kacperczyk and Ortiz-Molina (2011), these two variables are used to deal with the 
endogeneity problems as the instrumental variables. Following this literature, these two 
country-level variables are used as the instruments in the two-stage least squares estimation 
(2SLS) applied in the empirical analysis. To our knowledge, neither gender nor age is directly 
used in studies relevant to corporate share repurchases in precious literature. 
One instrumental variable is Fraction of Female Workers measuring the gender of the 
workers in a country. It is defined as the ratio of female workers to total workers in the country 
that a firm belongs to. The data of this variable is obtained from ILOStat database, which is 




The other instrumental variable is Average Age of the Workers measuring the average 
age of the workers in a country. It is defined as the mean of the age of all the workers in that 
country. This data also comes from ILOStat. 
4.5.3 The validity of the instruments and the specification 
To examine the validity of the instrumental variables and the specification, series tests 
are applied in the 2SLS estimations in this chapter. 
Following the literature Stock, Wright and Yogo (2002) and Shea (1997), I conduct the 
F-test and partial R2 variables in the first-stage estimation to test whether the instrumental 
variables are relevant and have enough strength in the 2SLS estimation. Next, in the second 
stage, over-identifying restrictions test are applied to examine whether the instruments are 
exogenous. Following Hausman (1987), I conduct the Hausman test to whether there is a 
significant difference in the estimates between the coefficients of 2SLS estimation and 
coefficients of OLS estimation.   
4.6 Results - Large Sample 
Empirical results of large sample analysis are reported in this section. 
This section starts with the univariate statistics and the OLS regressions on the 
determinants of share repurchases. Next, I report the results of the two-stage least squares 
(2SLS) estimation. Then, I show the results of sub-samples separated by Employment 
Protection Legislation and labor bargaining centralization. In addition, I conduct further 
analysis of the effects of labor unions on the relation between the share repurchases and firms’ 
profitability and labor costs. Finally, I report the results of robustness checks. 
4.6.1 Univariate statistics 
Table 4-1 reports the univariate statistics. Panel A shows the univariate statistics of the 
variables. The mean and the median of the variable Repurchases is 0.0035 and 0.0000 while 




Membership is 0.2548, and the median is 0.1860. Panel B shows the country-level Repurchases 
which is defined as the average of the share repurchases, and the country-level Total Payout, 
which is defined as the mean of dividends and share repurchases for all firms in their countries, 
as well as Union Membership.  
Figure 4-1 illustrates the average share repurchases between 1992 and 2013 in 66 
countries. Figure 4-2 shows the average total payout over the sample period in 66 countries. 
The deeper the colour in a country in the world maps indicates that share repurchases and total 
payout are higher in that country.  
4.6.2 The determinants of share repurchases and the likelihood of share repurchases 
Table 4-2 shows the results of determinants of share repurchases and the likelihood of 
share repurchases. Panel A reports the results of OLS regressions. It examines the relation 
between country-level union membership and share repurchases. We include the firm-level 
characteristics, year dummy variables, industry variables and country dummy variables as 
control variables. All results are clustered in the firm level, according to the literature 
(Fernandes and Gonenc, 2016). P-value is reported in the parentheses of the tables.  
In Panel A, the coefficient Union Membership is 0.002 (p-value = 0.01) with the 
dependent variable is Share Repurchases in Column 1. Column 2 uses probit model to examine 
the likelihood of share repurchases. The variable Share Repurchases Likelihood is 1 for firms 
have share repurchases and is equal to 0 for firms doesn’t have share repurchases. The 
coefficient Union Membership is 0.175 (p-value = 0.01) with the dependent variable is Share 
Repurchases Likelihood in Column 2.  In Column 3, the coefficient of Union Membership is 
0.002 (p-value = 0.01) in non-US firms with the dependent variable is Share repurchases. 
In Panel B, the coefficient Union Membership is 0.002 (p-value = 0.01) with the 
dependent variable is Total Payout in Column 1. Column 2 uses tobit model to examine the 




firms have total payout and is equal to 0 for firms doesn’t have total payout. The coefficient 
Union Membership is 0.075 (p-value = 0.01) with the dependent variable is Total Payout 
Likelihood in Column 2. The significant results imply that firms have more share repurchases 
in countries with higher union membership. This is consistent with the Hypothesis 1A that the 
ratio of labor unions and the level of share repurchases are positively correlated. Therefore, 
firms strategically choose share repurchases to gain bargaining position when there is labor 
unions in this country. 
4.6.3 Country-level regression 
Table 4-3 shows the results of the relation between the country-level Union Membership 
and firms’ share repurchases in that country. I replicate a country-level analysis in Table 4-2 
by using country level variables. All country-level variables are converted from firm-level 
variables in Table 4-2 by using equally weighted financial data in each country. This sample 
contains 974 country-year observations in our country-level analysis. 
The coefficient of Union Membership in Column 1 is 0.003 (p-value = 0.04) where the 
dependent variable is Country-level Share Repurchases. The coefficient of Union Membership 
in Column 2 is 0.012 (p-value = 0.04) where the dependent variable is Country-level Total 
Payout. The coefficient of Union Membership in Column 3 is 0.003 (p-value = 0.03) for Non-
US firms where the dependent variable is Country-level Share Repurchases. It is consistent 
with the results of firm-level analysis in Table 4-2, indicating that there is a negative relation 
between the country-level Repurchases and country-level Union Membership.  It is consistent 
with the Hypothesis 1A.  
4.6.4. First-stage regression 
Table 4-4 shows the first-stage regression of the 2SLS estimation. The independent 
variables contain two instrumental variables, year dummy variables, industry variables, country 




Fraction of Female Workers is 1.537 (p-value = 0.01) and the coefficient of Average Age of 
the Workers is -0.006 (p-value = 0.01). The positive coefficient of Fraction of Female Workers 
indicates that male workers are less likely to join labor unions. This is consistent with the 
findings in Blanchflower (2006) by using international data from 34 countries. The negative 
coefficient of Average Age of the Workers indicates that older workers are less likely to join 
labor unions because they benefit from labor unions in a shorter time period than younger 
workers. It is consistent with the findings in Hirsch (1980). 
4.6.5 Union membership and share repurchases 
Table 4-5 shows the results of the second stage of 2SLS estimation. The dependent 
variable is Share Repurchases, while the independent variable is the predicted union 
membership and the same control variables in the first stage of 2SLS. In Column 1, the 
dependent viable is Share Repurchases. The coefficient of Union Membership is 0.041 (p-value 
= 0.01). The p-value of F-statistics in the over identification is 0.44, indicating that the 
instruments are exogenous and valid in this estimation. In the Hausman test, the p-value of the 
F-statistics is 0.01. This significant p-value indicates that the coefficient of 2SLS estimation is 
significantly different from the OLS estimation in Table 4-2. In Column 2, the dependent 
variable is Total Payout. The coefficient of Union Membership is 0.097 (p-value = 0.01). 
Therefore, the 2SLS estimation is a better method to deal with the endogeneity problem in this 
study. Column 3 shows the results of non-US firms, the coefficient of Union Membership is 
0.042 (p-value = 0.01) with the dependent variable is Share Repurchases. 
Comparing the results in Table 4-2 and Table 4-5, the economic magnitude of the 2SLS 
estimates explains how the variation of union membership affect the value of share repurchases 
is more economically significant than the results in OLS estimates. Table 4-1 shows the 
standard deviation of Union Membership is 0.2503 and the median of non-cash assets is 159.65 




increase (=0.041 * 0.2503) in the level of share repurchases and a 0.024 increase (=0.097 * 
0.2503) in the level of total payout, corresponding to an increase in share repurchases with a 
dollar value of 1.600 million dollars (=0.010 * 159.65) and an increase in total payout with a 
dollar value of 3.876 million dollars (=0.024 * 159.65). 
The results in Table 4-5 are consistent with Hypothesis 1A, indicating that the relation 
between labor unions and share repurchases is positive. 
4.6.6 Employment protection legislation 
Saint-Paul (2002) argues that higher level employment protection increases employees’ 
bargaining power. I use the Employment Protection Legislation as the proxy of the protection 
of labor’s rights and benefits across countries.       
Similar with previous study about cash holdings and dividends, I obtain the data of 
Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) indicator from OECD. A higher lever EPL refers to 
better employment protection in a country. In accordance with the discussion in Hypothesis 2, 
better employment protection in a country increases the labor costs. It increases the operating 
leverage and firms reduce share repurchases to withstand the higher operating risks. These 
negative effects from labor unions on firms’ share repurchases are opposite to the bargaining 
effects. This may offset some positive effects as predicted by bargaining hypothesis. Therefore, 
I expect that the positive effects of union membership on share repurchases are stronger for 
firms in a country with lower EPL and are weaker for firms in a country with higher EPL. 
Table 4-6 shows the results of OLS estimates and the second stage of 2SLS estimations 
of share repurchases and total payout in two sub-groups in Panel A and Panel B, as well as the 
t-test of the difference in the coefficients in Panel C. These two sub-groups are constructed by 
separating firms in a country with higher (lower) level of employment protection when the EPL 




In Panel A, the coefficient of share repurchases in Column 1 is 0.053 (p-value =0.01) for 
the sub-group of firms in a country with lower level of employment protection. The coefficient 
of Union Membership in Column 2 is 0.004 (p-value =0.01) for the sub-groups of firms in a 
country with higher level employment protection. Column 3 and Column 4 show the results of 
the second stage of 2SLS estimations. In Column 3, the coefficient of Union Membership is 
0.087 (p-value = 0.01) for the sub-group of firms in a country with lower level of employment 
protection. In Column 4, the coefficient of Union Membership is 0.003 (p-value = 0.07) for 
sub-group of firms in a country with higher employment protection. The insignificant F-
statistics of over-identifying restrictions and the significant F-statistics of Houseman test show 
that the 2SLS estimations is proper than OLS regressions in this study. Results in Column 3 
and 4 show that the bargaining effects are partially offset by the operating leverage and weaker 
the positive relation between labor unions and share repurchases for firms in a country with 
higher EPL.  
Table 4-6 Panel B report the results of OLS regressions of total payout in Column 1 with 
coefficient is 0.155 (p-value = 0.01) and Column 2 with coefficients is 0.008 (p-value = 0.01) 
for the sub-groups of firms in a country with higher and lower level of employment protection 
separately. We find the difference is 0.147 (p-value = 0.01). For the second stage of 2SLS 
estimates, we have the coefficient of Union Membership is 0.312 (p-value = 0.01) for firms in 
a country with lower employment protection, and the coefficient of Union Membership is 0.007 
(p-value = 0.01) for firms in a country with higher employment protection. The difference of 
the coefficients of Union Membership between the two sub-groups separated by the EPL 
indicator is 0.305 (p-value = 0.01). 
In Panel C, the significant t-statistics reported indicates that the coefficients of Union 




Therefore, results in Table 4-6 indicate that the positive relation between repurchases and 
union membership is stronger for firms in a country with a lower level of employment 
protection, and weaker for firms in a country with a higher level of employment protection. 
These results support both Hypothesis 1A and Hypothesis 2. 
4.6.7 Labor bargaining centralization 
Labor bargaining centralization also measures the collective bargaining power of workers. 
Similar with previous chapters, I get the data of labor bargaining centralization across 51 from 
the ICTWSS database. A higher level of Centralization means collective bargaining in a 
country has broader impacts and is more centrally coordinated in that country, indicating that 
the level of collective bargaining power is higher in that country. Therefore, as discussed in 
Hypothesis 1A, the expected positive relation between corporate payout and union membership 
is stronger for firms in a country with a higher level of Centralization, and weaker for firms in 
a country with a lower level of Centralization.  
Table 4-7 shows the results of OLS and the second stage of 2SLS estimations of share 
repurchases divided in two sub-groups. In Panel A, we report the OLS regressions of in Column 
1 and 2. These two sub-groups are constructed by separating firms in a country with higher 
(lower) level of collective bargaining power when the Centralization indicator of that country 
is higher (lower) than the median. The coefficient of Union Membership in Column 1 is 0.004 
(p-value = 0.44) for the sub-group of firms in a country with lower level of labor bargaining 
centralization. The coefficient of Union membership in Column 2 is 0.061 (p-value = 0.01) for 
the sub-group of firms in a country with higher level of labor bargaining centralization. Column 
3 and Column 4 show the results of the second stage of 2SLS estimations. In Column 3, the 
coefficient of Union Membership is 0.018 (p-value = 0.01) for the sub-group of firms in a 
country with lower level of labor bargaining centralization. In Column 4, the coefficient of 




labor bargaining centralization. The insignificant F-statistics of over-identifying restrictions 
and the significant F-statistics of Houseman test show that the 2SLS estimations is proper than 
OLS regressions in this study.  
Table 4-7 Panel B reports the results of OLS regressions of total payout. In Column 1 
coefficient of Union Membership is 0.061 (p-value = 0.01) and in Column 2, the coefficients 
is 0.302 (p-value = 0.01) for the sub-groups of firms in a country with higher and lower level 
of labor bargaining centralization separately. We find the difference is -0.368 (p-value = 0.01). 
For the second stage of 2SLS estimates, we have the coefficient of Union Membership is 0.217 
(p-value = 0.01) for firms in a country with lower employment protection, and the coefficient 
of Union Membership is 0.585 (p-value = 0.01) for firms in a country with higher labor 
bargaining centralization. The difference of the coefficients of Union Membership between the 
two sub-groups separated by the EPL indicator is -0.368 (p-value = 0.01). 
In Panel C Column 1, the difference of the two coefficients in Panel A Column 1 and 
Column 2 is significant with p-value =0.01. In Column 2, the difference of the two coefficients 
in Panel A Column 3 and Column 4 is 0.218. The significant t-statistics reported indicates that 
the coefficients of Union Membership between the two sub-groups separated by Centralization 
indicator are significantly different.  
Therefore, results in Table 4-7 indicate that the positive relation between share 
repurchases and union membership is stronger for firms in a country with a higher level of 
Centralization, and is weaker for firms in a country with a lower level of Centralization. These 
results support Hypothesis 1A. 
4.7 Results – Smaller Sample 
To further understand the positive relation between union membership and payout in the 
large sample study, we conduct the analysis for a smaller sample of share repurchases and 




the large sample analysis examines the level of payout, the smaller sample analysis allows us 
to examine firm performance associated with the payout. Moreover, an additional benefit of 
conducting such an analysis is to reduce the endogeneity problem by studying how union 
membership affects the relation between the change in payout and the change in firm 
performance.  
The international data of share repurchases are obtained from Thomason One database. 
The sample period is from 1992 to 2013, which is the same as the large sample analysis. I 
choose the repurchases whose Acquisition Techniques are recorded as “Open Market 
Purchase”. I also require that the public status of the firm is “Public”. After merging the sample 
of repurchases with the large sample and excluding the observations with incomplete data, the 
final sample contains 10338 repurchase events in 37 countries.37 
4.7.1 Variables 
This chapter use the same methods to calculate the announcement return and the Net 
Change in ROA around the events of share repurchases as the methods used in Chapter 3 about 
the event study of dividend changes.  
4.7.2 Results about Share Repurchases Events 
This section reports the results of the smaller sample analysis. First, I study the 
announcement return around share repurchases and report the results in Table 4-8. Next, I 
conduct the analysis on the change in operating performance around the events and report the 
results in Table 4-9. 
4.7.2.1 Announcement return 
Table 4-8 reports the regressions. The dependent variables are the announcement returns 
around the repurchases.  Column 1 shows that the coefficient of Union Membership is 0.071 
                              




(p-value=0.01) when the dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal returns over days (-1, 
+1) around the announcement date. It shows that the announcement return is positively 
correlated to Union Membership, implying that shareholders react more positively when the 
repurchase is made by a firm in a country with higher Union Membership. We find similar 
results in Column 2 and Column 3 when the dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal 
returns over days (-3, +3) and is over days (-5, +5) around the announcement date. The 
coefficient of Union Membership is 0.094 (p-value=0.08) for dependent variable is cumulative 
abnormal return over days (-3, +3), and the coefficient of Union Membership is 0.121 (p-
value=0.01) for dependent variable is cumulative abnormal return over days (-5, +5) around 
the announcement date. 
Our results in Table 4-8 indicate that the announcement return is higher when a firm have 
more share repurchases in a country with higher union membership. It implies that when a firm 
increase repurchases, it reduces the resources available for potential collective bargaining. 
Labor unions accept a lower level of wage in that there may be liquidity shortage, provided that 
bankruptcy is costly for employees, that leads to lower operating costs. This is more beneficial 
for shareholders because it is associated with positive market reaction with the announcement 
of repurchases. This is more prominent for the firms in a country with higher union membership. 
This is consistent with the bargaining hypothesis. 
4.7.2.2 Change in operating performance 
Table 4-9 reports the results of the change in operating performance around share 
repurchases. The dependent variable in Column 1 is the Change in ROA from year t-1 to year 
t+1. The coefficient of Union Membership is 0.076 (p-value = 0.06). It implies that there is a 
positive relation between Union Membership and the change in operating performance around 
the event of share repurchases. We get comparable firms based on the matching with size and 




dependent variable in these two columns is the Net Change in ROA, which is defined as the 
difference between an event firm’s change in ROA and its comparable firm’s change in ROA 
from year t-1 to year t+1. The coefficient of Union Membership in Column 2 is 0.066 (p-value 
= 0.01), indicating that firms in countries with higher union membership have a higher net 
change in operating performance around the event of share repurchases. It implies that when 
firms make share repurchases, it reduces the resources available for potential collective 
bargaining. This strengthens a firm’s bargaining positions and thus increases the firm’s 
operating performance. This mechanism is more prominent for the firms in a country with 
higher union membership. Column 3 shows similar results. The coefficient of Union 
Membership is 0.128 (p-value = 0.02) when we use the propensity score matching method. 
The results in Table 4-9 indicate that firms in countries with higher union membership 
have a higher net change in operating performance around the event of share repurchases. This 
is because more share repurchases reduce the resources available for potential collective 
bargaining. Labor unions accept a lower level of wage in that there may be liquidity shortage, 
provided that bankruptcy is costly for employees, that leads to lower operating costs. It is more 
beneficial for the operating performance of firms in a country with higher union membership. 
Our results are consistent with the bargaining hypothesis. 
4.8 Further Analysis 
This section describes the results in further analysis about the relation between share 
repurchases and labor unions. 
4.8.1 Share repurchases and labor costs 
As an effective bargaining tool, firms use share repurchases to distribute excess cash 
reserves to against wage demands of labor unions. In this case, a firm in a country with higher 
union membership is more likely to repurchase stocks to reduce the internal funds available for 




expect that the negative relation between labor costs and share repurchases are stronger (weaker) 
for firms in a country with higher (lower) union membership. 
Similar with Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, I use a sub-sample of 77380 firm-year observations 
and divide it into two sub-groups with union membership is higher or lower than the median  
Table 4-10 shows the results of OLS regressions in Panel A. In terms of OLS regressions, 
the coefficient of Share Repurchases in Column 1 is −0.017 (p-value = 0.07) for the sub-group 
of firms with lower country-level union membership, while the coefficient of Share 
Repurchases in Column 2 is −0.440 (p-value = 0.01) for the sub-group of firms with higher 
country-level union membership. The negative coefficients imply that there is a negative 
relation between repurchases and labor costs. We conduct a t-test of the difference in the 
coefficients of Share Repurchases between the two sub-groups separated by union membership, 
and report the results in Panel B. We find that the difference is 0.423 (p-value = 0.01). The 
significant difference implies that the negative relation between repurchases and labor costs is 
significant weaker in countries with lower union membership. 
The results in Table 4-10 imply that the negative relation between share repurchases and 
labor costs is stronger (weaker) for firms in a country with higher (lower) union membership. 
Similar with the results in Chapter 3, firms in a country with higher union membership 
repurchase more stocks to reduce the internal resources available for bargaining by labor unions. 
Firms can claim they are in liquidity shortage to lower wage demands of labor unions in that 
bankruptcy is also costly to employees. As a result, firms gain bargaining positions with higher 
repurchases and reduce the labor costs. The negative effects of share repurchases on labor costs 





4.8.2 Share repurchases and strikes & lockouts 
From the bargaining perspective, more share repurchases in a firm increase its bargaining 
power because there is less financial resource that can be extracted from labor unions through 
collective bargaining. Similar with discussion in 3.8.2, suppose a firm has lower share 
repurchases and more internal funds, labor unions tend to organize strikes to claim higher wages 
and other benefits in negotiations. Therefore, share repurchases have negative impacts on 
country-level strikes & lockouts. 
The data of strikes & lockouts are collected from the International Labor Organization. 
The data starts from 2002 and includes 52 countries. The variable Log (Country-level Strikes 
& Lockouts + 1) is used as the proxy in this country-level analysis. The Country-level Strikes 
& Lockouts is defined as the total number of strikes and lockouts in a country. I add the variable 
of Log (Labor Force) as an additional control variable, while the Labor Force is defined as the 
sum of all persons of working age who are employed and those who are unemployed. Similar 
with the country-level analysis in Table 4-3, all firm-level variables are converted into country-
level variables by taking the average of the variables across the countries.  
Table 4-11 reports the results. I use the Log (Country-level Strikes & Lockouts + 1) as 
the dependent variable.  The coefficient of the variable Country-level Repurchases is -5.088 (p-
value = 0.07). This negative coefficient indicates that higher share repurchases reduce the 
intensity of strikes and lockouts in a country. The lower repurchases, the more financial 
resources that can be extracted by labor unions. Labor unions are more likely to organize more 
strikes to gain bargaining power in wage negotiations with firms. Therefore, the results in Table 
4-11 are consistent with Hypothesis 1A, implying that more share repurchases reduce the 




4.8.3 The Validity of Instrumental Variables 
As discussed in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, I test whether of instrumental variable is valid 
in this thesis by using the country-level data of gender gap which are collected from World 
Economic Forum. The average salary of female workers is lower than male workers. On one 
hand, the average lower level of salary for female workers means more female workers decrease 
firms’ wage payments. Firms have more cash reserves and have the incentive to increase share 
repurchases due to the free cash flow problem. On the other hand, the positive coefficient of 
Fraction of Female Workers in Table 4-4 indicates that female workers are positive associated 
to union membership. This leads to a positive relation between share repurchases and union 
membership in that the gender pay gap.  
Similar with 2.7.1, I divide the sample into two sub-groups based on the median of the 
variable Gender Gap. A firm is in a country with lower (higher) gender gap if the index is above 
(below) the median. The higher level of gender gap means that female and male are more equal 
in a country.  
Table 4-12 reports the results of the second stage of 2SLS estimation brevity. Column 1 
shows that the coefficient of Union Membership is 0.002 (p-value = 0.01), and Column 2 shows 
that such coefficient is 0.039 (p-value = 0.01). We conduct t-test and find that the difference is 
-0.037 (p-value = 0.33). The results imply that after controlling for the gender gap, firms in a 
country with higher union membership still have more repurchases in both sub-groups. 
Therefore, the findings are consistent with our bargaining hypothesis. 
4.8.4 Collective bargaining coverage 
Collective bargaining coverage rate measures the number of workers who are covered by 
labor unions but not the member. I use the collective bargaining coverage rate as an alternative 
measure for the bargaining power of labor unions to conduct this robustness check. Similar to 




a proxy for the missing year of the variable. Collective Bargaining Coverage Rate is calculated 
as the percentage of workers who are covered by the collective bargaining agreements for all 
workers.  
Table 4-13 shows the results. We use the replicate specifications in previous tables. In 
Panel A, Column 1 shows the results of OLS regression and Column 2 shows the results of the 
second stage of 2SLS estimates when the dependent variable is Share Repurchases. Column 3 
and Column 4 shows the results of OLS regression and the second stage of 2SLS when the 
dependent variable is Total Payout. The coefficient of Collective Bargaining Coverage Rate is 
0.003 (p-value = 0.01) in Column 1 and is 0.015 (p-value = 0.01) in Column 2. The coefficient 
of Collective Bargaining Coverage Rate is 0.036 (p-value = 0.01) in Column 3 and is 0.053 (p-
value = 0.01) in Column 4. The results are similar with the previous tables that there is a positive 
relation between Collective Bargaining Coverage Rate and share repurchases. In the smaller 
sample analysis, I report the results in Panel B. I find the coefficient of the announcement return 
over days around the date of the event of share repurchases is 0.019 (p-value = 0.04) with the 
dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal returns over days (-1, +1) around the 
announcement date of share repurchases. Column 2 shows that the coefficient of Collective 
Bargaining Coverage Rate is 0.029 (p-value = 0.01) when the dependent variable is the 
cumulative abnormal returns over days (-3, +3) around the announcement date of share 
repurchases. Column 3 shows that the coefficient of Collective Bargaining Coverage Rate is 
0.034 (p-value = 0.01) when the dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal returns over 
days (-5, +5) around the announcement date of share repurchases.  
The results are consistent with the interpretation that there is positive relation between 
the announcement return around the event of share repurchases showed in previous tables. 
Therefore, we find similar results when we use collective bargaining coverage rate as 





This chapter examines the effect of labor unions on share repurchases in the international 
setting. I use the country-level union membership as the measure of the bargaining power of 
labor unions across countries in the large sample analysis. In line with the bargaining 
perspective, I find in this chapter that the level of share repurchases is higher when a firm is in 
a country with stronger labor unions. I also find that the positive relation between labor unions 
and share repurchases is stronger when a firm is in a country with a higher degree of 
centralization for collective bargaining. Moreover, both the announcement returns and the net 
change in operating performance around the event of share repurchases are higher when a firm 
is in a country with stronger labor unions. 
In addition, I find that the positive relation between share repurchases and labor costs is 
weaker for a firm in a country with lower union membership. I also find that the number of 
strikes & lockouts is lower in a country with a higher level of share repurchases. Moreover, I 
test the validity of instrument variables with gender gap and use the collective bargaining 
coverage rate as an alternative measure of bargaining power to conduct the robustness checks, 
and find consistent results. 
While the empirical results generally support the bargaining hypothesis regarding the 
relation between labor unions and share repurchases, I also find some evidence that supports 
the operating leverage hypothesis. For example, when there is better employment protection 
legislation in a country, I find that it can offset a part of the bargaining impact of labor unions 
on the level of share repurchases because better employment protection is associated with a 
stronger operating effect for labor unions.  
This chapter reinforces the notion of bargaining theory. I conclude that firms strategically 





Appendix 4-1 Univariate Statistics – Smaller Sample 
This table shows univariate statistics of smaller sample analysis. We use a sample of 10338 share repurchases 
events from 37 countries between 1992 and 2013. CAR (-1, +1) is the cumulative abnormal return over days (-1, 
+1) around the announcement days. CAR (-3, +3) is the cumulative abnormal return over days (-3, +3) around the 
announcement days. CAR (-5, +5) is the cumulative abnormal return over days (-5, +5) around the announcement 
days. The cumulative abnormal return is calculated based on the market model. We use a firm’s daily return and 
the return on its corresponding stock market index over days -200 to -20, where day 0 is the event date. Union 
Membership is defined as the ratio of the total number of trade union members to the total number of paid 
employees in a country. Size is defined as natural logarithm of assets. Tobin’s Q is defined as market value of 
equity plus assets minus book value of equity, divided by assets. Leverage is defined as the ratio of long-term 
debts to assets. Capital Expenditures is defined as the ratio of capital expenditures to assets. Cash Flow is defined 
as income after interest, and taxes, but before depreciation and provisions for common and/or preferred dividends, 
divided by assets. R&D is defined as the ratio of research and development expenses to assets. Working Capital is 
defined as the ratio of current assets minus current to assets. Industry Cash Flow Volatility is defined as the 
standard deviation of the median of Cash Flow in an industry classified by two-digit SIC codes in the prior 5 years. 










CAR (-1, +1) 0.022 0.015 -0.010 0.047 0.065 
CAR (-3, +3) 0.022 0.016 -0.021 0.058 0.085 
CAR (-5, +5) 0.020 0.015 -0.030 0.065 0.100 
Union Membership 0.178 0.136 0.124 0.152 0.114 
Size 20.136 19.982 18.513 21.634 2.058 
Tobin’s Q 1.939 1.550 1.160 2.239 1.300 
Leverage 0.143 0.107 0.004 0.232 0.150 
Capital Expenditures 0.060 0.043 0.023 0.075 0.059 
Cash Flow 0.058 0.061 0.028 0.100 0.097 
R&D 0.030 0.000 0.000 0.037 0.057 
Working Capital 0.263 0.235 0.092 0.414 0.225 
Industry Cash Flow Volatility 0.059 0.057 0.040 0.074 0.025 









Appendix 4-2 Propensity Score Matching - The Event of Repurchases 
This table shows the logistic regression about the likelihood that a firm conducts share repurchases. We use a 
sample of 7289 share repurchases events from 29 countries between 1992 and 2013. The dependent variable is 1 
if a repurchase takes place and is 0 otherwise. Size is defined as natural logarithm of assets. Tobin’s Q is defined 
as market value of equity plus assets minus book value of equity, divided by assets. Cash Flow is defined as 
income after interest, and taxes, but before depreciation and provisions for common and/or preferred dividends, 
divided by assets. R&D is defined as the ratio of research and development expenses to assets. Capital 
Expenditures is defined as the ratio of capital expenditures to assets. Industry Cash Flow Volatility is defined as 
the standard deviation of the median of Cash Flow in an industry classified by two-digit SIC codes in the prior 5 
years. Leverage is defined as the ratio of long-term debts to assets. Working Capital is defined as the ratio of 
current assets minus current to assets. Sales Growth is defined as the percentage change of sale over the previous 
year. Tangibility is defined as the ratio of the net Property, Plant and Equipment to assets. Runup is defined as the 
annual stock return over the previous year. The p–value is noted in the parentheses.  
 
  Repurchase=1 
Intercept -10.782 
  (0.01) 
Size 0.295 
  (0.01) 
Tobin’s Q 0.013 
  (0.13) 




Capital Expenditure 3.014 
 (0.01) 
Industry Cash Flow Volatility 1.980 
 (0.01) 
Leverage 0.942 
  (0.01) 
Working Capital 1.678 
 (0.01) 






Number of Observations 342799 







Table 4-1 Univariate Statistics 
This table shows univariate statistics. We use a sample of 355715 firm-year observations from 66 countries 
between 1992 and 2013. Panel A reports univariate statistics. Share Repurchases is defined as the share 
repurchases to assets. Total Payout is defined as the ratio of the sum of dividends and share repurchases to assets. 
Union Membership is defined as the ratio of the total number of trade union members to the total number of paid 
employees in a country. Size is defined as natural logarithm of assets. Tobin’s Q is defined as market value of 
equity plus assets minus book value of equity, divided by assets. Leverage is defined as the ratio of long-term 
debts to assets. Capital Expenditures is defined as the ratio of capital expenditures to assets. Cash Flow is defined 
as income after interest, and taxes, but before depreciation and provisions for common and/or preferred dividends, 
divided by assets. R&D is defined as the ratio of research and development expenses to assets. Working Capital 
is defined as the ratio of current assets minus current to assets. Industry Cash Flow Volatility is defined as the 
standard deviation of the median of Cash Flow in an industry classified by two-digit SIC codes in the prior 5 years. 
Fraction of Female Workers is defined as the fraction of female workers in the country a firm belongs to. Average 
Age of the Workers is the average age of the workers in the country a firm belongs to. Employment Protection 
Legislation is the OECD indicators of employment protection legislation that measure the procedures and costs 
involved in dismissing individuals or groups of workers and the procedures involved in hiring workers on fixed-
term or temporary work agency contracts in a country. Centralization is an indicator of the degree of labor 
bargaining centralization in a country from the Institutional Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage Setting, State 
Intervention and Social Pacts (ICTWSS) database. Panel B reports dividends and union membership by countries. 
The mean of dividends, total payout and union membership in a country are reported in the panel. 
 










Share Repurchases 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.016 
Total Payout 0.014 0.001 0.000 0.015 0.028 
Union Membership 0.255 0.186 0.129 0.279 0.250 
Size 19.239 19.080 17.894 20.409 1.873 
Tobin’s Q 1.713 1.244 0.958 1.849 1.456 
Leverage 0.127 0.071 0.001 0.202 0.152 
Capital Expenditures 0.057 0.037 0.017 0.069 0.066 
Cash Flow -0.012 0.027 -0.014 0.065 0.181 
R&D 0.025 0.000 0.000 0.012 0.074 
Working Capital 0.203 0.179 0.037 0.352 0.246 
Industry Cash Flow Volatility 0.061 0.057 0.040 0.077 0.026 
Fraction of Female Workers 0.439 0.454 0.419 0.464 0.038 
Average Age of the Workers 39.718 39.557 38.335 40.962 2.133 























Argentina 0.000 0.008 0.382 Malaysia 0.000 0.013 0.103 
Australia 0.000 0.018 0.214 Malta 0.000 0.026 0.546 
Austria 0.000 0.011 0.341 Mauritius 0.000 0.017 0.257 
Belgium 0.001 0.010 0.543 Mexico 0.002 0.008 0.159 
Brazil 0.000 0.015 0.253 Namibia 0.000 0.074 0.304 
Bulgaria 0.000 0.002 0.166 Netherlands 0.003 0.019 0.217 
Canada 0.004 0.014 0.288 New Zealand 0.001 0.021 0.217 
Chile 0.000 0.007 0.144 Norway 0.000 0.013 0.544 
China 0.000 0.007 0.459 Peru 0.000 0.009 0.042 
Colombia 0.000 0.009 0.165 Philippines 0.000 0.009 0.145 
Croatia 0.000 0.002 0.328 Poland 0.000 0.003 0.152 
Cyprus 0.000 0.010 0.530 Portugal 0.000 0.006 0.215 
Czech Republic 0.000 0.003 0.241 Russia 0.000 0.005 0.317 
Denmark 0.001 0.016 0.710 Serbia 0.000 0.000 0.279 
Egypt 0.000 0.009 0.275 Singapore 0.000 0.014 0.183 
Estonia 0.000 0.022 0.092 Slovakia 0.000 0.003 0.256 
Finland 0.001 0.027 0.726 Slovenia 0.000 0.007 0.319 
France 0.001 0.006 0.079 South Africa 0.001 0.016 0.338 
Germany 0.000 0.011 0.225 South Korea 0.000 0.006 0.104 
Greece 0.001 0.010 0.243 Spain 0.001 0.013 0.167 
Hungary 0.000 0.015 0.193 Sri Lanka 0.000 0.018 0.142 
Iceland 0.001 0.004 0.835 Sweden 0.001 0.022 0.741 
India 0.000 0.013 0.175 Switzerland 0.002 0.015 0.193 
Indonesia 0.000 0.005 0.152 Tanzania 0.000 0.026 0.202 
Ireland 0.006 0.017 0.369 Thailand 0.000 0.010 0.029 
Israel 0.001 0.011 0.373 Trinidad and Tobago 0.000 0.021 0.210 
Italy 0.000 0.008 0.350 Turkey 0.000 0.007 0.072 
Japan 0.000 0.007 0.201 Ukraine 0.000 0.000 0.647 
Kazakhstan 0.000 0.001 0.423 United Kingdom 0.002 0.022 0.294 
Kuwait 0.000 0.028 0.023 United States 0.011 0.021 0.129 
Latvia 0.000 0.006 0.164 Vietnam 0.000 0.003 0.146 
Lithuania 0.000 0.010 0.108 Zambia 0.000 0.035 0.057 






















Table 4-2 Union Membership and Share Repurchases 
 
This table shows an OLS regression about union membership and payout. We use a sample of 355715 firm-year 
observations from 66 countries between 1992 and 2013. Share Repurchases is defined as the ratio of share 
repurchases to assets. Total Payout is defined as the ratio of the sum of dividends and share repurchases to assets. 
Repurchase Likelihood is 1 if firms repurchase shares and is equal to 0 for firms doesn’t repurchase shares. Payout 
Likelihood is positive and continuous for firms have total payout and is equal to 0 for firms doesn’t have total 
payout.  Union Membership is defined as the ratio of the total number of trade union members to the total number 
of paid employees in a country. Size is defined as natural logarithm of assets. Tobin’s Q is defined as market value 
of equity plus assets minus book value of equity, divided by assets. Leverage is defined as the ratio of long-term 
debts to assets. Capital Expenditures is defined as the ratio of capital expenditures to assets. Cash Flow is defined 
as income after interest, and taxes, but before depreciation and provisions for common and/or preferred dividends, 
divided by assets. R&D is defined as the ratio of research and development expenses to assets. Working Capital 
is defined as the ratio of current assets minus current to assets. Industry Cash Flow Volatility is defined as the 
standard deviation of the median of Cash Flow in an industry classified by two-digit SIC codes in the prior 5 years. 
Year Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the years in the sample and not reported in the table. Industry 
Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the industries defined by two-digit SIC codes and not reported in 
the table. Country Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the countries in the sample and not reported in 
the table. The p–value is noted in the parentheses. 
 
Panel A: the determinants of share repurchases and the likelihood of share repurchases 
 
 
 Share Repurchases Repurchase Likelihood Share Repurchases 
 Full sample Full sample Non-US firms 
Intercept -0.013 -4.745 -0.005 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Union Membership 0.002 0.175 0.002 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Size 0.001 0.185 0.001 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Tobin’s Q 0.002 -0.042 0.001 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Leverage -0.008 -0.539 -0.001 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
Capital Expenditure -0.001 0.014 -0.001 
 (0.34) (0.81) (0.75) 
Cash Flow 0.021 0.776 0.002 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
R&D 0.006 -0.157 0.004 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Working Capital 0.002 0.206 0.001 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Industry Cash Flow Volatility -0.046 -2.690 -0.001 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.92) 
Year Dummy Variables YES YES YES 
Industry Dummy Variables YES YES YES 
Country Dummy Variables YES YES YES 
Number of Observations 355715 355715 262326 






Panel B: the determinants of total payout and the likelihood of total payout 
 
 
 Total Payout Payout Likelihood 
Intercept -0.037 -0.136 
  (0.01) (0.01) 
Union Membership 0.002 0.075 
  (0.01) (0.01) 
Size 0.002 0.005 
  (0.01) (0.01) 
Tobin’s Q 0.003 0.003 
  (0.01) (0.01) 
Leverage -0.013 -0.021 
  (0.01) (0.01) 
Capital Expenditure -0.003 0.003 
 (0.01) (0.03) 
Cash Flow 0.030 0.080 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
R&D 0.006 0.021 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Working Capital 0.001 0.008 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Industry Cash Flow Volatility -0.052 -0.133 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Year Dummy Variables YES YES 
Industry Dummy Variables YES YES 
Country Dummy Variables YES YES 
Number of Observations 355715 355715 






Table 4-3 Union Membership and Payout: Country-level Analysis 
This table shows an OLS regression on the country-level analysis about union membership, share repurchases and 
total payout. We convert all firm-level variables into country-level variables by taking the average of the variables 
across the countries. The sample includes 974 country-year observations between 1992 and 2013. Share 
Repurchases is defined as the ratio of share repurchases to assets. Total Payout is defined as the ratio of the sum 
of dividends and share repurchases to assets. Union Membership is defined as the ratio of the total number of trade 
union members to the total number of paid employees in a country. Size is defined as natural logarithm of assets. 
Tobin’s Q is defined as market value of equity plus assets minus book value of equity, divided by assets. Leverage 
is defined as the ratio of long-term debts to assets. Capital Expenditures is defined as the ratio of capital 
expenditures to assets. Cash Flow is defined as income after interest, and taxes, but before depreciation and 
provisions for common and/or preferred dividends, divided by assets. R&D is defined as the ratio of research and 
development expenses to assets. Working Capital is defined as the ratio of current assets minus current to assets. 
Cash flow Volatility is defined as the standard deviation of the median of Cash Flow in an industry classified by 
two-digit SIC codes in the prior 5 years. Year Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the years in the 
sample and not reported in the table. Industry Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the industries defined 
by two-digit SIC codes and not reported in the table. Country Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the 
countries in the sample and not reported in the table. The p-value is noted in the parentheses. 
 






 Full sample Full sample Non-US firms 
Intercept -0.004 0.009 0.001  
(0.47) (0.65) (0.85) 
Union Membership 0.003 0.012 0.003  
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) 
Country-level Size 0.001 -0.001 0.001  
(0.06) (0.10) (0.26) 
Country-level Tobin’s Q -0.001 -0.001 -0.001  
(0.33) (0.05) (0.39) 
Country-level Leverage -0.002 -0.033 -0.003  
(0.39) (0.01) (0.13) 
Country-level Capital Expenditure -0.002 -0.019 -0.001  
(0.61) (0.22) (0.88) 
Country-level Cash Flow -0.002 0.060 -0.001  
(0.40) (0.01) (0.71) 
Country-level R&D 0.001 0.120 0.007  
(0.91) (0.01) (0.47) 
Country-level Working Capital 0.003 0.006 0.004  
(0.13) (0.30) (0.02) 
Country-level Cash Flow Volatility -0.016 0.040 -0.002  
(0.53) (0.66) (0.95) 
Year Dummy Variables YES YES YES 
Industry Dummy Variables YES YES YES 
Country Dummy Variables YES YES YES 
Number of Observations 974 974 952 






Table 4-4 Two-stage Least Square Estimation: First Stage 
 
This table shows the first stage of two-stage least square estimation. We use a sample of 355715 firm-year 
observations from 66 countries between 1992 and 2013. Union Membership is defined as the ratio of the total 
number of trade union members to the total number of paid employees in a country. Fraction of Female Workers 
is defined as the fraction of female workers in the country a firm belongs to. Average Age of the Workers is the 
average age of the workers in the country a firm belongs to. Size is defined as natural logarithm of assets. Tobin’s 
Q is defined as market value of equity plus assets minus book value of equity, divided by assets. Leverage is 
defined as the ratio of long-term debts to assets. Capital Expenditures is defined as the ratio of capital expenditures 
to assets. Cash Flow is defined as income after interest, and taxes, but before depreciation and provisions for 
common and/or preferred dividends, divided by assets. R&D is defined as the ratio of research and development 
expenses to assets. Working Capital is defined as the ratio of current assets minus current to assets. Industry Cash 
Flow Volatility is defined as the standard deviation of the median of Cash Flow in an industry classified by two-
digit SIC codes in the prior 5 years. Year Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the years in the sample 
and not reported in the table. Industry Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the industries defined by 
two-digit SIC codes and not reported in the table. Country Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the 
countries in the sample and not reported in the table. The p–value is noted in the parentheses. 
 
 Union Membership 
Intercept -0.426  
(0.01) 
Fraction of Female Workers 1.537  
(0.01) 
Average Age of the Workers -0.006  
(0.01) 
Size 0.000  
(0.01) 
Tobin’s Q -0.001  
(0.01) 
Leverage -0.008  
(0.01) 
Capital Expenditure -0.016  
(0.01) 
Cash Flow 0.000  
(0.71) 
R&D 0.009  
(0.01) 
Working Capital -0.013  
(0.01) 
Industry Cash Flow Volatility -0.183 
 (0.01) 
Year Dummy Variables YES 
Industry Dummy Variables YES 
Country Dummy Variables YES 
Number of Observations 355715 
Adjusted R-square 0.89 
Partial F-statistic (p-value) 0.01 







Table 4-5 Two-stage Least Square Estimation: Second Stage 
This table shows the second stage of two-stage least square estimation. We use a sample of 355715 firm-year 
observations from 66 countries between 1992 and 2013.  Share Repurchases is defined as the ratio of share 
repurchases to assets. Total Payout is defined as the ratio of the sum of dividends and share repurchases to assets. 
Union Membership is defined as the ratio of the total number of trade union members to the total number of paid 
employees in a country. Size is defined as natural logarithm of assets. Tobin’s Q is defined as market value of 
equity plus assets minus book value of equity, divided by assets. Leverage is defined as the ratio of long-term 
debts to assets. Capital Expenditures is defined as the ratio of capital expenditures to assets. Cash Flow is defined 
as income after interest, and taxes, but before depreciation and provisions for common and/or preferred dividends, 
divided by assets. R&D is defined as the ratio of research and development expenses to assets. Working Capital 
is defined as the ratio of current assets minus current to assets. Industry Cash Flow Volatility is defined as the 
standard deviation of the median of Cash Flow in an industry classified by two-digit SIC codes in the prior 5 years.  
Year Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the years in the sample and not reported in the table. Industry 
Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the industries defined by two-digit SIC codes and not reported in 
the table. Country Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the countries in the sample and not reported in 
the table. The p–value is noted in the parentheses.  
 
 Share Repurchases Total Payout Share Repurchases 
 Full sample Full sample Non-US firms 
Intercept -0.020 -0.048 -0.059 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Union Membership 0.041 0.097 0.049 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Size 0.001 0.002 0.003 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Tobin’s Q 0.001 0.005 0.001 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Leverage 0.002 -0.016 0.002 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.10) 
Capital Expenditure 0.000 -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.32) (0.01) (0.15) 
Cash Flow 0.001 0.026 0.010 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
R&D 0.005 -0.021 0.049 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Working Capital 0.003 0.002 0.007 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Industry Cash Flow Volatility 0.001 -0.039 -0.015 
 (0.46) (0.01) (0.36) 
Year Dummy Variables YES YES YES 
Industry Dummy Variables YES YES YES 
Country Dummy Variables YES YES YES 
Number of Observations 355715 355715 262326 
Adjusted R-square 0.05 0.16 0.18 
Over-identifying Restrictions Test (p-value) 0.50 0.77 0.32 






Table 4-6 Employment Protection Legislation 
This table shows OLS regressions and the second-stage regressions of the 2SLS estimation for the sub-groups separated by the 
employment protection legislation. We use a sample of 281691 firm-year observations from 41 countries between 1992 and 2013. Panel 
A shows the regressions of Share Repurchases. Panel B shows the regressions of Total Payout. Share Repurchases is defined as the 
ratio of share repurchases to assets. Total Payout is defined as the ratio of the sum of dividends and share repurchases to assets. 
Employment Protection Legislation is the OECD indicators of employment protection legislation that measure the procedures and costs 
involved in dismissing individuals or groups of workers and the procedures involved in hiring workers on fixed-term or temporary work 
agency contracts in a country. Union Membership is defined as the ratio of the total number of trade union members to the total number 
of paid employees in a country. Size is defined as natural logarithm of assets. Tobin’s Q is defined as market value of equity plus assets 
minus book value of equity, divided by assets. Leverage is defined as the ratio of long-term debts to assets. Capital Expenditures is 
defined as the ratio of capital expenditures to assets. Cash Flow is defined as income after interest, and taxes, but before depreciation 
and provisions for common and/or preferred dividends, divided by assets. R&D is defined as the ratio of research and development 
expenses to assets. Working Capital is defined as the ratio of current assets minus current to assets. Industry Cash Flow Volatility is 
defined as the standard deviation of the median of Cash Flow in an industry classified by two-digit SIC codes in the prior 5 years.  Year 
Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the years in the sample and not reported in the table. Industry Dummy Variables are the 
dummy variables for the industries defined by two-digit SIC codes and not reported in the table. Country Dummy Variables are the 
dummy variables for the countries in the sample and not reported in the table. The p–value is noted in the parentheses. Panel C shows 
the difference in the coefficients of Union Membership between the two sub-groups. 
 
Panel A. Regressions of Dividends 
 
 Share Repurchases 
 OLS The Second Stage of 2SLS 
 EPL < Median EPL ≥ Median EPL < Median EPL ≥ Median 
Intercept -0.031 -0.009 -0.065 -0.007 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Union Membership 0.053 0.004 0.087 0.003 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.07) 
Size 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.000 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Tobin’s Q 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.01) (0.59) (0.01) (0.94) 
Leverage -0.009 -0.003 -0.009 -0.003 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Capital Expenditure -0.001 0.003 -0.001 0.003 
 (0.11) (0.24) (0.16) (0.25) 
Cash Flow 0.012 0.004 0.012 0.004 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
R&D 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.004 
 (0.01) (0.40) (0.01) (0.17) 
Working Capital 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 
 (0.05) (0.02) (0.06) (0.03) 
Industry Cash Flow Volatility -0.012 0.053 -0.012 0.051 
  (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) 
Year Dummy Variables YES YES YES YES 
Industry Dummy Variables YES YES YES YES 
Country Dummy Variables YES YES YES YES 
Number of Observations 158647 123044 158647 123044 
Adjusted R-square 0.11 0.08 0.11 0.07 
Over-identifying Restrictions Test (p-value)   0.34 0.36 







Panel B. Regressions of Total Payout 
 
 Total Payout 
 OLS The Second Stage of 2SLS 
 EPL < Median EPL ≥ Median EPL < Median EPL ≥ Median 
Intercept -0.048 -0.009 -0.145 0.004 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Union Membership 0.155 0.008 0.312 0.007 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Size 0.003 0.001 0.003 0.001 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Tobin’s Q 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Leverage -0.015 -0.013 -0.015 -0.008 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Capital Expenditure -0.011 0.001 -0.010 0.001 
 (0.01) (0.60) (0.01) (0.42) 
Cash Flow 0.022 0.042 0.022 0.041 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
R&D 0.001 0.004 0.001 0.020 
 (0.89) (0.01) (0.89) (0.01) 
Working Capital -0.005 0.004 -0.005 0.004 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Industry Cash Flow Volatility -0.049 -0.029 -0.044 -0.034 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Year Dummy Variables YES YES YES YES 
Industry Dummy Variables YES YES YES YES 
Country Dummy Variables YES YES YES YES 
Number of Observations 158647 123044 158647 123044 
Adjusted R-square 0.12 0.08 0.12 0.06 
Over-identifying Restrictions Test (p-value)   0.32 0.28 
Hausman Test (p-value)   0.01 0.01  
 
 
Panel C. Difference in the Coefficients of Union Membership 
 
The following table shows the difference in the coefficients of Union Membership between the two sub-groups separated by 
EPL and reports the p-value of the t-test in the parentheses. 
 
 Union Membership 
 Share Repurchases Total Payout 
 OLS Second Stage of 2SLS Estimation OLS Second Stage of 2SLS Estimation 
Difference 0.049 0.084 0.147 0.305 









Table 4-7 Labor Bargaining Centralization 
This table shows OLS regressions and the second-stage regressions of the 2SLS estimation for the sub-groups separated by the labor 
bargaining centralization. We use a sample of 253238 firm-year observations from 32 countries between 1992 and 2013. Panel A shows 
the regressions of Share Repurchases. Panel B shows the regressions of Total Payout. Share Repurchases is defined as the ratio of share 
repurchases to assets. Total Payout is defined as the ratio of the sum of dividends and share repurchases to assets. Centralization is an 
indicator of the degree of labor bargaining centralization in a country from the Institutional Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage 
Setting, State Intervention and Social Pacts (ICTWSS) database. Union Membership is defined as the ratio of the total number of trade 
union members to the total number of paid employees in a country. Size is defined as natural logarithm of assets. Tobin’s Q is defined 
as market value of equity plus assets minus book value of equity, divided by assets. Leverage is defined as the ratio of long-term debts 
to assets. Capital Expenditures is defined as the ratio of capital expenditures to assets. Cash Flow is defined as income after interest, 
and taxes, but before depreciation and provisions for common and/or preferred dividends, divided by assets. R&D is defined as the ratio 
of research and development expenses to assets. Working Capital is defined as the ratio of current assets minus current to assets. Industry 
Cash Flow Volatility is defined as the standard deviation of the median of Cash Flow in an industry classified by two-digit SIC codes 
in the prior 5 years.  Year Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the years in the sample and not reported in the table. Industry 
Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the industries defined by two-digit SIC codes and not reported in the table. Country 
Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the countries in the sample and not reported in the table. The p–value is noted in the 
parentheses. Panel C shows the difference in the coefficients of Union Membership between the two sub-groups. 
 
Panel A. Regressions of Dividends 
 
 Share Repurchases 










Intercept -0.027 -0.036 -0.012 -0.051 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Union Membership 0.004 0.061 0.018 0.388 
 (0.44) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
Size 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Tobin’s Q 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.14) (0.01) (0.12) (0.01) 
Leverage -0.008 -0.010 -0.001 -0.010 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Capital Expenditure -0.004 -0.004 0.001 -0.003 
 (0.26) (0.01) (0.41) (0.01) 
Cash Flow 0.015 0.014 0.001 0.014 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
R&D 0.005 0.004 0.001 0.004 
 (0.28) (0.01) (0.33) (0.01) 
Working Capital 0.006 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Industry Cash Flow Volatility 0.059 -0.022 0.007 -0.022 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Year Dummy Variables YES YES YES YES 
Industry Dummy Variables YES YES YES YES 
Country Dummy Variables YES YES YES YES 
Number of Observations 126099 127139 126099 127139 
Adjusted R-square 0.04 0.11 0.04 0.11 
Over-identifying Restrictions Test (p-value)   0.95 0.71 






Panel B. Regressions of Total Payout 
 
 Total Payout 










Intercept -0.042 -0.067 -0.115 -0.193 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Union Membership 0.061 0.302 0.217 0.585 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Size 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.003 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Tobin’s Q 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Leverage -0.012 -0.016 -0.012 -0.015 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Capital Expenditure -0.008 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Cash Flow 0.037 0.022 0.036 0.022 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
R&D -0.002 0.001 -0.003 0.001 
 (0.12) (0.95) (0.05) (0.93) 
Working Capital 0.004 -0.007 0.005 -0.007 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Industry Cash Flow Volatility -0.057 -0.028 -0.040 -0.029 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Year Dummy Variables YES YES YES YES 
Industry Dummy Variables YES YES YES YES 
Country Dummy Variables YES YES YES YES 
Number of Observations 126099 127139 126099 127139 
Adjusted R-square 0.20 0.12 0.20 0.12 
Over-identifying Restrictions Test (p-value)   0.35 0.94 
Hausman Test (p-value)   0.01 0.01  
 
 
Panel C. Difference in the Coefficients of Union Membership 
 
The following table shows the difference in the coefficients of Union Membership between the two sub-groups separated by 
Centralization and reports the p-value of the t-test in the parentheses. 
 
 Union Membership 
 Dividends Total Payout 
 OLS Second Stage of 2SLS Estimation OLS Second Stage of 2SLS Estimation 
Difference -0.057 -0.370 -0.241 -0.368 









Table 4-8 Announcement Return: Repurchases 
 
This table shows the regressions about the announcement return of repurchases. We use a sample of 10338 share 
repurchases events from 37 countries between 1992 and 2013. CAR (-1, +1) is the cumulative abnormal return 
over days (-1, +1) around the announcement days. CAR (-3, +3) is the cumulative abnormal return over days (-3, 
+3) around the announcement days. CAR (-5, +5) is the cumulative abnormal return over days (-5, +5) around the 
announcement days. The cumulative abnormal return is calculated based on the market model. We use a firm’s 
daily return and the return on its corresponding stock market index over days -200 to -20, where day 0 is the event 
date. Union Membership is defined as the ratio of the total number of trade union members to the total number of 
paid employees in a country. Size is defined as natural logarithm of assets. Tobin’s Q is defined as market value of 
equity plus assets minus book value of equity, divided by assets. Leverage is defined as the ratio of long-term 
debts to assets. Capital Expenditures is defined as the ratio of capital expenditures to assets. Cash Flow is defined 
as income after interest, and taxes, but before depreciation and provisions for common and/or preferred dividends, 
divided by assets. R&D is defined as the ratio of research and development expenses to assets. Working Capital is 
defined as the ratio of current assets minus current to assets. Industry Cash Flow Volatility is defined as the 
standard deviation of the median of Cash Flow in an industry classified by two-digit SIC codes in the prior 5 years. 
Runup is defined as the annual stock return in the year prior to the announcement of the repurchases events. Year 
Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the years in the sample and not reported in the table. Industry 
Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the industries defined by two-digit SIC codes and not reported in 
the table. Country Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the countries in the sample and not reported in 
the table. The p–value is noted in the parentheses.  
 
 CAR (-1, +1) CAR (-3, +3) CAR (-5, +5) 
Intercept 0.017 -0.015 -0.031 
  (0.40) (0.57) (0.31) 
Union Membership 0.071 0.094 0.121 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Size -0.001 -0.001 0.001 
  (0.03) (0.16) (0.48) 
Tobin’s Q -0.001 -0.001 0.001 
  (0.31) (0.48) (0.78) 
Leverage 0.016 0.006 0.016 
  (0.01) (0.43) (0.07) 
Capital Expenditure 0.028 0.033 0.035 
 (0.05) (0.08) (0.11) 
Cash Flow 0.001 -0.008 -0.016 
 (0.99) (0.44) (0.18) 
R&D -0.001 -0.035 -0.031 
 (0.94) (0.10) (0.22) 
Working Capital 0.004 0.001 0.005 
 (0.24) (0.87) (0.38) 
Industry Cash Flow Volatility 0.157 0.121 0.114 
 (0.03) (0.21) (0.32) 
Runup 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.06) (0.12) (0.51) 
Year Dummy Variables YES YES YES 
Industry Dummy Variables YES YES YES 
Country Dummy Variables YES YES YES 
Number of Observations 10338 10338 10338 







Table 4-9 Change in Operating Performance: Repurchases 
This table shows the regressions about the change in operating performance around share repurchases. We use a 
sample of 10338 share repurchases events from 37 countries between 1992 and 2013. ΔROA is the change in ROA 
from year t-1 to year t+1, where ROA is defined as the ratio of EBIT to assets. ΔNet ROA is defined as the 
difference between an event firm’s change in ROA and its matched comparable firm’s change in ROA from year 
t-1 to year t+1. We get comparable firms based on the matching with size and M/B in the same industry (Column 
2) and propensity score matching (Column 3). Union Membership is defined as the ratio of the total number of 
trade union members to the total number of paid employees in a country. Size is defined as natural logarithm of 
assets. Tobin’s Q is defined as market value of equity plus assets minus book value of equity, divided by assets. 
Leverage is defined as the ratio of long-term debts to assets. Capital Expenditures is defined as the ratio of capital 
expenditures to assets. R&D is defined as the ratio of research and development expenses to assets. Working 
Capital is defined as the ratio of current assets minus current to assets. Industry Cash Flow Volatility is defined as 
the standard deviation of the median of Cash Flow in an industry classified by two-digit SIC codes in the prior 5 
years. Year Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the years in the sample and not reported in the table. 
Industry Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the industries defined by two-digit SIC codes and not 
reported in the table. Country Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the countries in the sample and not 
reported in the table. The p–value is noted in the parentheses.  
 
 ΔROA ΔNet ROA 




Intercept -0.104 0.017 -0.214 
  (0.01) (0.63) (0.01) 
Union Membership 0.076 0.066 0.128 
  (0.06) (0.01) (0.02) 
Size 0.004 -0.001 0.008 
  (0.01) (0.57) (0.01) 
Tobin’s Q 0.001 0.011 0.004 
  (0.72) (0.01) (0.01) 
Leverage 0.021 0.014 0.020 
  (0.01) (0.36) (0.09) 
Capital Expenditure -0.049 0.002 -0.027 
 (0.01) (0.97) (0.37) 
R&D -0.096 -0.017 -0.086 
 (0.01) (0.69) (0.01) 
Working Capital -0.027 -0.015 -0.003 
 (0.01) (0.14) (0.74) 
Industry Cash Flow Volatility 0.093 -0.424 0.257 
 (0.29) (0.04) (0.09) 
ROA t-1 -0.306 -0.357 -0.354 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Year Dummy Variables YES YES YES 
Industry Dummy Variables YES YES YES 
Country Dummy Variables YES YES YES 
Number of Observations 9633 9633 9780 








Table 4-10 Share Repurchases and Labor Costs 
This table shows OLS regressions about share repurchases and labor costs for the sub-groups separated by union 
membership. We use a sample of 77380 firm-year observations from 63 countries between 1992 and 2013. Panel 
A shows the regressions. Log (Average Labor Costs) is defined as the logarithm of average labor costs, where 
average labor costs are the ratio of staff expenses to the number of employees. Union Membership is defined as 
the ratio of the total number of trade union members to the total number of paid employees in a country. Share 
Repurchases is defined as the ratio of share repurchases to assets. Size is defined as the logarithm of market value 
of assets. Leverage is defined as the ratio of long-term debts to market value of assets. Average Sales per Employee 
is the ratio of sales to the number of employees. Tobin’s Q is defined as market value of equity plus assets minus 
book value of equity, divided by assets. Tangibility is the ratio of plant, property and equipment to assets. Year 
Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the years in the sample and not reported in the table. Industry 
Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the industries defined by two-digit SIC codes and not reported in 
the table. Country Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the countries in the sample and not reported in 
the table. The standard errors are clustered at the firm level. The p–value is noted in the parentheses. Panel B 
shows the difference in the coefficients of Corporate Cash Holdings between the two sub-groups. 
 
Panel A. Regressions 
 






Intercept 7.971 7.820  
(0.01) (0.01) 
Share Repurchases -0.017 -0.440  
(0.07) (0.01) 
Size 0.008 -0.009  
(0.01) (0.01) 
Leverage -0.046 0.226  
(0.08) (0.01) 
Average Sales per Employee 0.339 0.459  
(0.01) (0.01) 
Tobin’s Q 0.005 0.045  
(0.09) (0.01) 
Tangibility -0.197 -0.345  
(0.01) (0.01) 
Year Dummy Variables YES YES 
Industry Dummy Variables YES YES 
Country Dummy Variables YES YES 
Number of Observations 38981 38399 
Adjusted R-square 0.65 0.40 
 
Panel B. Difference in the Coefficients of Share Repurchases 
 
The following table shows the difference in the coefficients of Share Repurchases between the two sub-groups 
separated by union membership and reports the p-value of the t-test in the parentheses. 
 








Table 4-11 Corporate Payout and Strikes & Lockouts: Country-level Analysis 
This table shows an OLS regression on the country-level analysis about Share repurchases, Total Payout and Strikes & 
Lockouts. We convert all firm-level variables into country-level variables by taking the average of the variables across 
the countries. The sample includes 781 country-year observations between 1992 and 2013 from 52 countries. Strikes & 
Lockouts are defined as the total number of strikes and lockouts in a country. Share Repurchases is defined as the ratio of 
share repurchases to assets. Total Payout is defined as the ratio of the sum of dividends and share repurchases to assets. 
Labor Force is defined as the sum of all persons of working age who are employed and those who are unemployed. Size 
is defined as natural logarithm of assets. Tobin’s Q is defined as market value of equity plus assets minus book value of 
equity, divided by assets. Leverage is defined as the ratio of long-term debts to assets. Capital Expenditures is defined as 
the ratio of capital expenditures to assets. Cash Flow is defined as income after interest, and taxes, but before depreciation 
and provisions for common and/or preferred dividends, divided by assets. R&D is defined as the ratio of research and 
development expenses to assets. Working Capital is defined as the ratio of working capital and marketable securities to 
assets. Cash flow Volatility is defined as the standard deviation of the median of Cash Flow in an industry classified by 
two-digit SIC codes in the prior 5 years. Year Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the years in the sample and 
not reported in the table. Industry Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the industries defined by two-digit SIC 
codes and not reported in the table. Country Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the countries in the sample 
and not reported in the table. The p-value is noted in the parentheses. 
 
 Log (Country-level Strikes & Lockouts + 1) Log (Country-level Strikes & Lockouts + 1) 
Intercept -15.776 -31.232  
(0.01) (0.01) 
Country-level Share Repurchases -5.088   
(0.07)  
Country-level Total Payout  -10.732 
  (0.02) 
Log (Country-level Labor Force) 0.796 1.539 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Country-level Size 0.175 0.158 
 (0.03) (0.11) 
Country-level Tobin’s Q 0.041 -0.107 
 (0.56) (0.10) 
Country-level Leverage 0.608 -1.932  
(0.58) (0.13) 
Country-level Capital Expenditure -5.567 -1.514  
(0.01) (0.51) 
Country-level Cash Flow -0.049 2.372  
(0.97) (0.08) 
Country-level R&D 9.326 7.520  
(0.09) (0.19) 
Country-level Working Capital -0.014 -0.383  
(0.99) (0.67) 
Country-level Cash Flow Volatility 5.399 -4.290  
(0.67) (0.74) 
Year Dummy Variables YES YES 
Industry Dummy Variables YES YES 
Country Dummy Variables YES YES 
Number of Observations 781 781 










Table 4-12 Robustness Check: Gender Gap 
This table shows the second-stage regressions of the 2SLS estimation for the sub-groups separated by the Gender Gap. We use 
a sample of 355715 firm-year observations from 66 countries between 1992 and 2013. Panel A shows the regressions. Gender 
Gap index is from the World Economic Forum and is constructed based on the equality between women and men across four 
key areas: health, education, economy and politics (see text for details). Share Repurchase is defined as the ratio of share 
repurchases to assets. Union Membership is defined as the ratio of the total number of trade union members to the total number 
of paid employees in a country. Size is defined as natural logarithm of assets. Tobin’s Q is defined as market value of equity 
plus assets minus book value of equity, divided by assets. Leverage is defined as the ratio of long-term debts to assets. Capital 
Expenditures is defined as the ratio of capital expenditures to assets. Cash Flow is defined as income after interest, and taxes, 
but before depreciation and provisions for common and/or preferred dividends, divided by assets. R&D is defined as the ratio 
of research and development expenses to assets. Working Capital is defined as the ratio of current assets minus current to assets. 
Cash Flow Volatility is defined as the standard deviation of the median of Cash Flow in an industry classified by two-digit SIC 
codes in the prior 5 years. Year Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the years in the sample and not reported in the 
table. Industry Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the industries defined by two-digit SIC codes and not reported 
in the table. Country Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the countries in the sample and not reported in the table. 
The standard errors are clustered at the firm level. The p–value is noted in the parentheses. Panel B shows the difference in the 
coefficients of Union Membership between the two sub-groups. 
Panel A. Regressions 
 Share Repurchases 
 Second Stage of 2SLS 
 Gender Gap < Median Gender Gap≥ Median 
Intercept -0.008 -0.045 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Union Membership 0.002 0.039 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Size 0.001 0.002 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Tobin’s Q 0.001 0.001 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Leverage 0.001 -0.008 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Capital Expenditure -0.002 -0.001 
 (0.01) (0.24) 
Cash Flow 0.002 0.010 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
R&D 0.017 0.001 
 (0.01) (0.11) 
Working Capital 0.001 0.001 
 (0.01) (0.18) 
Industry Cash Flow Volatility -0.001 -0.009 
  (0.84) (0.04) 
Year Dummy Variables YES YES 
Industry Dummy Variables YES YES 
Country Dummy Variables YES YES 
Number of Observations 239191 116524 
Adjusted R-square 0.17 0.12 
Over-identifying Restrictions Test (p-value) 0.26 0.41 
Hausman Test (p-value) 0.01 0.01 
 
Panel B. Difference in the Coefficients of Union Membership 
The following table shows the difference in the coefficients of Union Membership between the two sub-groups 
separated by Gender Gap and reports the p-value of the t-test in the parentheses. 
 
 Union Membership 






Table 4-13 Robustness Check: Collective Bargaining Coverage Rate  
 
This table shows the robustness check by using Bargaining Coverage Rate as an alternative measure of bargaining power. We use a 
sample of 326262 firm-year observations from 55 countries between 2000 and 2013. In Panel A, we report the OLS regression and 
the second stage of two-stage least square estimation. Dividends is defined as the ratio of dividends to assets. Total Payout is defined 
as the ratio of the sum of dividends and share repurchases to assets. Collective Bargaining Coverage Rate is calculated as the number 
of employees whose pay and/or conditions of employment are determined by one or more collective agreement(s) in a country divided 
by the total number of employees in that country.  Size is defined as natural logarithm of assets. Tobin’s Q is defined as market value 
of equity plus assets minus book value of equity, divided by assets. Leverage is defined as the ratio of long-term debts to assets. Capital 
Expenditures is defined as the ratio of capital expenditures to assets. Cash Flow is defined as income after interest, and taxes, but 
before depreciation and provisions for common and/or preferred dividends, divided by assets. R&D is defined as the ratio of research 
and development expenses to assets. Working Capital is defined as the ratio of current assets minus current to assets. Industry Cash 
Flow Volatility is defined as the standard deviation of the median of Cash Flow in an industry classified by two-digit SIC codes in the 
prior 5 years. Cash is defined as the ratio of cash and marketable securities to assets. Year Dummy Variables are the dummy variables 
for the years in the sample and not reported in the table. Industry Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the industries defined 
by two-digit SIC codes and not reported in the table. Country Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the countries in the 
sample and not reported in the table. Panel B report the regressions about the announcement return around the event of dividend 
increases and dividend decreases. The p-value is noted in the parentheses. The p-value is noted in the parentheses. 
 
Panel A. Collective Bargaining Coverage Rate, Share Repurchases and Total Payout 
 
 Share Repurchases Total Payout 
 
OLS The Second Stage of 
2SLS 
OLS The Second Stage of 
2SLS 
Intercept -0.028 -0.031 -0.040 -0.031 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Collective Bargaining Coverage Rate 0.003 0.015 0.036 0.053 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Size 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Tobin’s Q 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.004 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Leverage -0.006 -0.006 -0.015 -0.002 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Capital Expenditure -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 0.002 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.40) (0.01) 
Cash Flow 0.009 0.010 0.029 0.026 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
R&D 0.000 0.001 0.010 0.028 
 (0.45) (0.14) (0.01) (0.01) 
Working Capital 0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.006 
 (0.04) (0.01) (0.40) (0.01) 
Industry Cash Flow Volatility -0.005 -0.003 -0.074 -0.066 
  (0.09) (0.28) (0.01) (0.01) 
Year Dummy Variables YES YES YES YES 
Industry Dummy Variables YES YES YES YES 
Country Dummy Variables YES YES YES YES 
Number of Observations 326262 326262 326262 326262 
Adjusted R-square 0.12 0.12 0.14 0.10 
Over-identifying Restrictions Test  0.38  0.64 


















 (-1, +1) 
CAR 
 (-3, +3) 
CAR  
(-5, +5) 
Intercept 0.017 -0.021 -0.028 
  (0.40) (0.42) (0.36) 
Collective Bargaining Coverage Rate 0.019 0.029 0.034 
  (0.04) (0.01) (0.01) 
Size -0.001 -0.001 0.001 
  (0.03) (0.28) (0.67) 
Tobin’s Q 0.001 0.001 0.001 
  (0.85) (0.92) (1.00) 
Leverage 0.018 0.010 0.019 
  (0.01) (0.19) (0.03) 
Capital Expenditure 0.030 0.036 0.047 
 (0.05) (0.07) (0.04) 
Cash Flow -0.008 -0.022 -0.027 
 (0.34) (0.05) (0.04) 
R&D -0.012 -0.052 -0.042 
 (0.45) (0.02) (0.10) 
Working Capital 0.005 0.005 0.009 
 (0.21) (0.37) (0.17) 
Industry Cash Flow Volatility 0.176 0.171 0.118 
 (0.02) (0.08) (0.30) 
Runup 0.005 0.001 0.003 
 (0.33) (0.92) (0.72) 
Year Dummy Variables YES YES YES 
Industry Dummy Variables YES YES YES 
Country Dummy Variables YES YES YES 
Number of Observations 9383 9383 9383 




Chapter 5 Conclusion 
5.1 Summary of the Findings 
This thesis examines the effects of labor unions on corporate financial policies, including 
corporate cash holdings, dividends and share repurchases across 66 countries from 1992 to 
2013. This thesis aims to extend to which labor unions play a role in these three financial 
policies. My results corroborate some findings reported in previous literature about bargaining 
hypothesis.  
In Chapter 2, we developed two hypotheses based on the bargaining perspective and 
operating leverage perspective. Consistent with Klasa, Maxwell and Ortiz-Molina (2009), 
Chapter 2 shows that there is a negative relation between labor unions and corporate cash 
holdings across countries. We therefore suggest that firms strategically reduce corporate cash 
holdings to gain bargaining positions when there are strong labor unions in a country.  
In Chapter 3, we study the relation between labor unions and dividends. Different from 
Chino (2015), we find that dividends are positively related to country-level union membership 
based on the bargaining mechanism. In addition, we find the market response and operating 
performance changes to the event of dividend increase (decrease) with the presence of labor 
unions are positive (negative).  
In Chapter 4, I examine how country-level labor unions affect share repurchases. When 
there is higher union membership in a country, firms tend to repurchase more shares. Moreover, 
I find the announcement return is higher for firms in a country with higher union membership 
around the announcement date of share repurchases, while the net ROA change is positively 
correlated with the union membership around the event date of share repurchases.  
Therefore, this thesis studies how labor unions affect firms' financial policies across 




of union membership around the world. Our results show that the firms strategically use 
corporate cash holdings, dividends and share repurchases to gain bargaining power in collective 
bargaining with labor unions in international setting. 
5.2 Limitations 
5.2.1 The country-level data 
This thesis uses the data of country-level union membership from the International Labor 
Organization as the proxy of bargaining power of employees across countries because only the 
country-level data are available from the International Labor Organization. Compared with 
firm-level data, country-level data are less accurate because they are the aggregate at the 
country level. However, most papers use industry-level data when they conduct large sample 
analysis for US companies, such as Klasa, Maxwell and Ortiz-Molina (2009), Chino (2016) 
and so on. Similar to them, this thesis is not unique to use more aggregate data instead of firm-
level data. 
5.2.2 Database coverage 
Since our sample period is from 1992 to 2013, the coverage of Compustat Global 
database changes during this period. It implies that for some countries, Compustat Global has 
better coverage so that the data are mostly complete throughout the sample period. However, 
for some other counties, they were not covered in Compustat Global until the late 2000s. Given 
the existence in the difference among the coverage for different countries, in our analysis, the 
countries with more complete data will be assigned more weighting while the countries with 
less complete data will be assigned less weighting. A possible way to mitigate this limitation is 
that, as time goes, the coverage in Compustat may increase. There will be more complete data 




5.2.3 The measure of bargaining power 
We use the variable Union Membership as the measure of bargaining power, however, it 
may not be a good measurement. On one hand, union density has been found very low in some 
countries (e.g. France), but the bargaining power of workers in these countries are not low. 
Because collective agreements negotiated by labor unions also cover workers who are not union 
members. (Olson, 1965, and Calmfors et al., 2001). We also consider the bargaining coverage 
rate as another measure in our robustness checks and find it is also a good measurement of 
bargaining power in countries with available data. On the other hand, as a country-level variable, 
union density is affected by cross-country differences, including the different definitions, 
different data sources and different reporting techniques across countries. In addition, there are 
also some employer-dominated unions and the existences of self-employed people, makes 
union density less valid in measuring bargaining power (Bean and Holden, 1994).   
5.2.4 Instrumental approach 
In this thesis, we use age and female as two instrumental variables to mitigate the 
endogeneity problems. However, there are possible limitations to the instrumental approach. 
For example, these instruments may be correlated to the country-level characteristics. Although 
we have conducted some analysis to address this issue, such as examining the gender gap, we 
may not exhaust all the possibilities of country-level characteristics. 
5.2.5 The attrition of observations about labor costs 
The variable Average Labor Costs are the ratio of staff expenses to the number of 
employees. Since the staff expenses, employee numbers are not required to report, there are a 
lot of firms that have missing value of these data items across countries. These missing 
observations reduce the number of firm-year observations from 355,715 to 77,380 and reduce 
the number of countries from 66 to 63. The missing countries are Egypt (59 firm-year 




Tanzania (2 firm-year observations in original sample). Although this subgroup analysis is still 
efficient to reflect how labor unions affect the relation between labor costs and corporate cash 
holdings, dividends as well as share repurchases. The attrition of observations may lead to loss 
of effectiveness in estimations with a small sample.  
5.2.6 The methodology about strikes & lockouts 
In the current analysis, we demonstrate how corporate cash holdings, dividends and share 
repurchases are related to the number of strikes & lockouts in a country. However, an 
alternative way to conduct more detailed analysis is to conduct some event studies. For example, 
suppose there is a coming strikes & lockouts event, we may study how firms react to this 
coming event by making adjustments of corporate cash holdings, dividends and share 
repurchases. Due to the availability of the data, this thesis has not conducted the event studies 
about strikes & lockouts. 
5.3 Future research direction 
This thesis enlightens some promising areas for future research.  
First, there are several alternative bargaining mechanisms such as EPL, labor bargaining 
centralization. As discussed in the previous study, both EPL and labor bargaining centralization 
increase the bargaining power of workers (e.g., Saint-Paul, 2002, Simintzi, Vig and Volpin, 
2015). For example, further study about EPL will provide us with a promising extension on the 
literature of bargaining hypothesis of corporate finance from the perspective of labor law. 
Secondly, labor unions also impact firms' other financial policies. This thesis shows that 
firms strategically take several measures, including lowering the corporate cash holdings, 
increasing dividend payments and conduct share repurchases, to reduce the internal financial 
resources when there are strong labor unions. There are also other financial policies that can be 




and so on. It will be interesting to explore how labor unions affect other corporate financial 
policies from the bargaining perspective. 
Thirdly, given the limitation of country-level data of labor unions, one extension is to 
study the bargaining power of labor unions with industry-level data or firm-level data from 
other data sources if they are available in future. Most paper study the relation of labor unions 
on corporate financial policies with the industry-level data in the US (e.g., Klasa, Maxwell and 
Ortiz-Molina, 2009). When there are industry-level data or firm-level data of labor unions in 
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